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Abstract 
 
There is a paradox between the post-conflict setting and the healthcare market in Northern 
Uganda. While there is a strong missionary sector and apparent ongoing rehabilitation of the 
government facilities, the popularity of the formal private for-profit sector has steadily 
increased in Gulu municipality, northern Uganda, which has a high poverty-afflicted 
population. Therefore, there is need to understand why and how we can leverage the 
potential of the formal private for-profit providers (FPFPs) to accelerate Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) goals. The study explored the experiences of the FPFPs based in Gulu 
municipality regarding the market in which they operated during and after the conflict. In 
particular, the study sought to understand the characteristics of and changes in FPFPs over 
time, as well as the challenges, coping strategies, opportunities, and linkages with others in 
the market. This was a case study using mixed methods with a quant-qual sequential 
approach. The methods included organisational survey, life-history interviews, key informant 
interviews and observation. This study utilised the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory 
as an analytical lens. Data analysis was conducted using SPSS, ATLAS.ti ver. 7.0 and 
UCINET ver. 11.0 software. 
 
The findings suggest that FPFPs increased in number and experienced internal changes 
within individual businesses across the conflict periods. Conflict provides the context in which 
the FPFP businesses started and operate (d) and explains their survival patterns and the 
emergent regulatory context. The FPFPs were faced with diverse challenges embedded in 
the active conflict that further complicated operational costs and regulatory mechanisms. 
Notably, some of the coping strategies compromise the quality of the services provided. 
There is a dense relational network for FPFPs in Gulu municipality, and these numerous 
relational links have positive implications for the broader coverage of the goal for UHC, the 
reduction of transaction costs as well as their continued relevance in the market. FPFPs were 
continuously faced with a dilemma of balancing optimization of their incomes with their 
altruism objectives. In the period following conflict, FPFPs attempted to implement various 
mechanisms to ensure that the poor could access health care. The mechanisms were 
enabled by the managers’ ad hoc judgements as well as partnerships with the local 
government and NGOs in the area. These ranged from price exemptions and reductions to 
price discrimination and breaking down doses. 
The study concludes by noting that FPFPs play a critical role in service provision in post-
conflict northern Uganda. However, they cannot be ‘exclusively’ pro-poor, given that they are 
formed with a profit maximization objective. Some coping strategies and some mechanisms 
to enable the poor to access services may compromise quality. Hence, the government 
needs to enforce regulations to control the number of FPFPs opening business as well as 
quality. There is evidence of partnerships between the government and FPFPs. This needs 
to be continuous and expanded to include more FPFPs if UHC goals are to be achieved. 
Keywords: Healthcare markets, formal private-for-profit providers, experiences, northern 
Uganda, post-conflict settings, Gulu, life histories, challenges, coping strategies, 
opportunities, pro-poor. 
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Glossary of Terms and Phrases 
 
A Mapping and Geographic Information System (GIS) refers to a system designed 
to capture, store, manipulate, analyse, manage and present spatial or geographical 
data. GIS applications allow users to create interactive queries, analyse spatial 
information and edit data in maps. 
A network is a set of links and relationships that an organisation has with other 
organisations within the market. 
A transaction is an exchange of goods and services between the buyer and the 
seller. The buyer exchanges the right to use the money for the right to use the good 
while the seller gains the right to use the money. It is worth noting that the transactions 
in the health market were not mainly based on monetary terms. 
Age of business refers to the number of years that an FPFP has existed since its 
establishment. 
A boda-boda is a local name, commonly used by people in Uganda, to refer to a 
motorcycle that is used for commercial purposes and as a quick means of transport. 
Bounded rationality implies that human beings cannot make rational decisions. This 
is because of three limitations: limited knowledge about all possible circumstances 
that could affect a situation, limited cognitive ability and limited time to decide.  
Demand is the ability and willingness of an individual to buy a given good at a given 
price, other factors being constant. 
Formal private for-profit healthcare organisations are formalized 
registered/licensed commercial organisations and individuals delivering health-
 xx 
 
related services with the main objective of accumulating profit (Institute for Health 
Sector Development, 2004; Bloom et al., 2013).  The profit generated is under the 
jurisdiction and use of the owners or directors of these business entities. For this 
study, the terms ‘organisations’ and ‘FPFPs’ are used interchangeably about formal 
private for-profit providers. 
Information asymmetry is a situation where one party in the transaction has more 
information than the other party.  
Institutions refer, in this study, to ‘rules of the game’ consisting of both legal and 
informal social norms that govern behaviour and structure social interactions between 
organisations (Williamson, 1998; Douma and Schreuder, 2002; Eggertsson, 2013).  
‘Itwero nongo kony me yat two-jonyo ki kany bene!’ is an Acholi sentence that 
translates as ‘HIV treatment services now available here’. 
Kaveera is a local name in the Luganda language for a polythene bag.  However, 
people from the other Ugandan tribes, including the Acholi, also use the term but 
simply change its tone to make it sound like English. 
Market relates to a set of systems, institutions, procedures and social relations 
infrastructures or arrangements by which buyers and sellers exchange goods and 
services.  
Market share refers to the number of customers that the firm can attract as well as 
maintain. Market share results in market power. 
Market structure, according to McPake and Normand (2008), refers to the number 
of sellers in the market and their degree of differentiation (p.149). 
 xxi 
 
Negotiation of markets refers, in this study, to the survival strategies of PFPs over 
their life span. Examples include how they respond to the actions of others in the 
health market, and how they attract clients, keep old ones despite competition and 
position themselves to attract opportunities as well as develop solutions to 
challenges. 
 ‘Old FPFPs’ are those FPFPs that had existed between 10 and 33 years.  These 
had been established slightly before conflict or during conflict. 
Opportunism refers to a strategy intended to further self-interest.  
Organisations are groups of people and the governance arrangement they create to 
co-ordinate their team action against other teams that are also performing also as 
business organisations.  All formal private for-profit providers were referred to as 
‘organisations’ and in some cases the word is used interchangeably with ‘providers. 
Private sector providers refer to any organisations working in the delivery of health 
services or in other related sectors that are neither run nor belong to the government 
(MOH, 2012). These include for-profit, not-for-profit, and community-based 
organisations or individuals (Institute for Health Sector Development, 2004). 
‘Young FPFPs’ refer to the FPFPs that had existed between 1 and 9 years in 
business. These were established after 2006. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter sets the background for the thesis, and presents the global, national, 
and regional backdrop against which this study is set. The focus is on how 
commitments have inspired the interest in health in general, but the importance of 
multi-sectoral actors, including the private sector, is also highlighted. How these 
global agendas have been adapted to the national context is outlined. This is followed 
by the motivation, study rationale as well as research objectives. Lastly, an overview 
of the thesis is presented.  
 
1.0. Background to the Study 
 
In the context of global development agendas, such as Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), donors, scholars and 
governments have continued to recognise the centrality of health both as contributing 
to and as a consequence of all other 16 development goals.1 Based on the realisation 
that health is not just the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the state, the 
importance of multi-sectoral action in relation to the achievement of Sustainable 
Development Goal 3 is now being underscored (Rasanathan et al., 2017). As such, 
other government ministries and departments as well as other actors, including civil 
society and the private sector, have been called upon to support its achievement. In 
the last decade, there has been increased recognition that health service provision in 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) cannot be left to the government alone 
(Walker, 2009).  The need to achieve global goals such as UHC has led countries to 
 
1https://www.who.int/sustainable-development/sdg-briefs/en/ 
 2 
 
make deliberate efforts over time, among which is the effort to harness the capacity 
of non-state actors such as the private sector (both not-for-profit and for-profit) (WHO, 
2005, 2010, 2013; UN, 2012; World Bank, 2013; Mathauer and Carrin, 2010; Sachs, 
2012).  
 
Unlike the private not-for-profit (PNFP) sector, which has for so long been engaged 
in the advancement of UHC goals, the role of the private-for-profit sector, as a sub-
set of the private sector, has always been subject to extensive debate; such debates 
have increased in the context of UHC (Kamal- Yani, 2015, Montagu, 2015). There is 
an abundance of literature on the role of the private for-profit health sector in LMICs 
(Smith et al., 2001; De Costa and Diwan, 2007; Bloom et al., 2013; Lagomarsino, 
2013; Lucas, 2013). Indeed, the contribution of the private sector in Uganda, 
particularly in relation to the treatment of child-related illnesses such as diarrhea, 
malaria and pneumonia (Rutebemberwa, 2009, 2011; Awor et al., 2012) as well as 
tuberculosis, acute respiratory infections and opportunistic diseases related to HIV/ 
AIDS (Konde-Lule et al., 2006; Konde-Lule et al., 2010) cannot be ignored. 
 
In most stable LMIC settings, factors that enable the private sector to emerge include 
an attractive investment climate; a fair, efficient and contestable market; easy access 
to financial services; appropriate skills, technology and connectivity through good 
infrastructure and information technology (IT). I examine this further in Chapter 2.  
However, with a few exceptions, including the Africa Health Agenda Conference 
(AHAIC, 2019) held in Kigali Rwanda from 5 to 7 March 2019, discussions about the 
role that the private sector plays in conflict-affected settings and its contribution to 
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UHC goals have been limited. Yet, the OECD report on States of Fragility predicts 
that ‘without action, more than 80% of the world’s poorest will be living in fragile 
contexts by 2030’ (OECD, 2018: 3) and that this will have great implications for the 
achievement of the SDG target by that year.  
Documentation of contextual factors that could particularly inhibit or promote the 
private for-profit organisations’/sector’s capacity to contribute to such goals has been 
limited, including discussions on how the private for-profit sector, particularly the 
formal private-for-profit (FPFP), gets established and survives in post-conflict 
settings. Knowledge of the general experiences, challenges, opportunities, and 
negotiation of markets in these settings has also not well been documented. Some 
scholars have argued that fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) represent 
‘frontier economies’(Addison et al., 2001)through which indigenous businesses not 
only contribute to UHC but also help strengthen the health system in the long run. 
Indeed, it has been argued that engagement of the local private sector in FCAS 
presents a number of benefits, as indicated by (Avis, 2016) and (De Vries and 
Specker, 2009). These include having a greater interest in peace-building and 
stabilisation efforts than in large enterprises as they suffer more from conflict, and 
increasingly have sub-national urban centres as their base, providing a stimulus for 
regional development and boosting the ability to maintain linkages with other local 
enterprises.  
However, fragile and conflict-affected settings pose challenges, such as the absence 
of many of the factors listed previously (on p. 2), as well as suspicion of the private 
sector, limited basic services, rent-seeking and weak government  with questionable 
legitimacy (Avis, 2016). According to a World Bank report, other challenges 
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encountered by the private sector in such settings include excessive business 
regulation, unpredictable government behaviour and high transaction costs 
(WorldBank, 2016). 
 Amidst all these challenges, the private sector has  shown a capability to survive in 
difficult situations (WorldBank, 2005, World Bank., 2016), with Sweeney (2009) 
arguing that it often remains (largely) resilient  to systemic shocks, as it is able to 
change shape and direction (see timelines  presented in findings). Notably, the private 
sector and the health market in FCAS present a paradox as poor populations continue 
to seek services from these providers. In Gulu municipality, post-conflict Northern 
Uganda, for instance, there is a strong missionary sector, as well as ongoing 
rehabilitation of government facilities. Yet, despite having a high poverty-afflicted 
population, people seek services from the private for-profit sector (Fustukian et al., 
2017). Some providers that existed prior to the conflict disappeared in the conflict, 
others survived, and many more were established after the conflict. Therefore, there 
is a need to understand the trajectory of the FPFPs in Northern Uganda, the changes 
they encountered, and how they survived and coped with the challenges they faced 
both during and after conflict. The study sought to identify opportunities for FPFPs 
and how they strategically positioned themselves to benefit from or take advantage 
of such opportunities.  
It is also important to investigate the extent to which FPFPs can contribute to the 
promotion of an equitable and pro-poor health system in Northern Uganda during and 
after the conflict. Additionally, considering the acceleration of the UHC goals, it is 
important to explore how and when to leverage the potential of the FPFPs. The study 
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sought to identify some innovations employed by the FPFPs to contribute to pro-poor 
access (or the wider UHC goals), while still maximising their incomes. 
 
1.1. Motivation to Conduct the Study 
The motivation to conduct this study was threefold and arose from a) the aspiration 
to contribute to the ReBUILD Consortium objective; b) fieldwork experiences as 
coordinator; and c) the aspiration to contribute to wider global debates. 
a)  The aspiration to contribute to the wider ReBUILD Consortium research (2011 to 
early 2019) 
First, this study sought to contribute to the overall objectives of the ReBUILD 
Consortium research. In general, ReBUILD focused on addressing the neglected 
area of health systems research in fragile and conflict-affected settings (ReBUILD 
Consortium, 2018). The aim of the research consortium was to ‘provide research 
evidence to guide policy and practice for improving pro-poor health systems’ 
reconstruction in settings affected by conflict and crisis’.2 This objective is echoed in 
my study aim. The key thematic areas were institutions, communities, and human 
resources for health/the health workforce. Figure 1 shows the three general thematic 
areas for the ReBUILD Consortium and related issues affecting the strengthening 
of health systems after conflicts and crises.  
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Figure 1: Broader ReBUILD Consortium research in a snapshot 
  
Source:  ReBUILD Consortium 
https://rebuildconsortium.com/media/1689/rebuild_summary.pdf 
 
 In Uganda, ReBUILD’s (2011-2019) seven six sub-studies were implemented under 
the general programme and these included this doctoral study.  Under the 
institution’s sub-themes, two studies on aid architecture (also known as Study 5) 
and strategic purchasing (PBF)*2 were conducted. The communities theme had a 
study on patterns of household expenditure over time (Study 1) as well as on 
gender, disability, and demographic scar*. The health workers theme informed the 
studies on human resources for health incentives (Study 2) and rural posting (Study 
 
2 The studies with * had no numbers assigned to them. The rest of the studies had been assigned 
numbers 1, 2,4 and 5. 
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4).3 This PhD study can be considered as the seventh study conducted in Uganda 
under ReBUILD Consortium.  
The next section elaborates on the contribution of this PhD study to the overall 
ReBUILD Consortium objective. Figure 2 illustrates the focus and methods of all the 
seven ReBUILD sub-studies in Uganda (including the PhD study). The areas related 
to the PhD study are marked by the maroon-red boxes and arrows. Figure 2 also 
shows that there was an overlap between the intersection with the health workforce 
studies in relation to the general focus area. The PhD study also built upon methods 
used in the six ReBUILD sub-studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 For more details see http://rebuildconsortium.com/  and 
https://rebuildconsortium.com/media/1689/rebuild_summary.pdf 
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Figure 2: Linkage between PhD study and ReBUILD Consortium research studies in Uganda 
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First, this PhD study aimed at filling an information gap on the private for-profit sector 
within the main ReBUILD studies. Whereas the other ReBUILD studies undoubtedly 
provided invaluable evidence on health systems during recovery, the focus on the 
private for-profit (PFP) sector was largely limited. Specifically, the studies focused on 
PNFP sector as compared to the public sector (Studies 2 and 4) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as supporters of the district health team in the 
provision of health services (Study 5). The findings of Study 1 only indicated that the 
private sector was part of the wider pool of providers in the market from among which 
the patients would choose. Therefore, this study provided some evidence about the 
private for-profit sector and the communities’ perspective on its role but was ultimately 
limited in its focus on that sector, yet is central to the debate about the provision of 
equitable and pro-poor health services in settings recovering from conflict. 
 
Second, this study aimed at bringing out an organisational perspective which was 
limited in the ReBUILD studies. The research observed that the studies, except for 
the aid architecture sub-study (Study 5), focused on the individual and households as 
units of analysis rather than on organisations. 
 
Furthermore, this study built on the experience generated using methods previously 
used within the ReBUILD Consortium research, for instance life history methods and 
social network analysis. For instance, three of the ReBUILD Consortium studies 
utilised the life-history interview method. Study 2 used the life history method to 
understand health worker experiences and coping strategies with incentive policies 
during and after conflict (Witter et al., 2017); Study 1 used the life history method, 
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among other methods, to analyse healthcare-seeking patterns in households in Gulu 
district, Northern Uganda (1962-2013) (Fustukian et al., 2017). The third study used 
life-history interview methods to assess the impact of conflict on gender and the 
demographic scar.  
 
Additionally, the aid architecture study (Study 5) had utilised  social network  to map 
the organisational infrastructure for service delivery in post-conflict Northern Uganda 
(Ssengooba et al., 2017). In this PhD study, social network analysis was used to 
generate network maps as illustrations for linkages and relationships between FPFPs 
and other organisations in the market.  
b) Fieldwork experiences and the need to interrogate the booming private sector 
My experience as a coordinator for ReBUILD Uganda provided me with a forum 
through which I was able to observe many things. During my stay in Gulu 
municipality, and on many of the field visits for ReBUILD studies, I used to take 
evening walks around the town and observed that there were many private for-
profit health providers. Given my prior knowledge of the context and the poverty 
levels, I became curious about how these providers came to set up, survive and 
cope with the challenges. Therefore, I decided to conduct an exploratory 
investigation through this doctoral study to understand the subject. 
c)  The aspiration to contribute to ongoing global and national debates 
Lastly, I was motivated by the desire to contribute to ongoing global and national 
debates about the private for-profit sector, through the provision of voices and 
experiences from the formal private for-profit providers in Northern Uganda. The 
next section elaborates on some of the debates. 
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1.2. Target Audience 
The target audience for this research includes policymakers at the national and sub-
national levels (MOH, professional associations, district health offices), multilateral 
development health organisations (such as the United Nations [UN], the World Bank 
and the World Health Organisation [WHO]), members of academia and think tanks 
for UHC. The study will not only contribute to the available knowledge to enrich the 
debate on the contribution of the FPFP to pro-poor and equitable health service 
delivery but also to UHC through the provision of information on what factors influence 
this contribution. This will provide policymakers, donors and implementers with 
evidence of how to tap into the potential of such providers to help communities by 
expanding the provision of health services to them as well as offering an alternative 
to public provision that may be weak, especially early in post-conflict settings. 
 
1.3. Study Aim and Research Questions 
Overall study aim 
To understand the extent to which FPFPs have contributed to an equitable/pro-poor 
health system in post-conflict Northern Uganda 
Main research question  
To what extent have FPFPs contributed to the promotion of an equitable/pro-poor 
health system in post-conflict settings such as Northern Uganda? 
We need to understand the factors that influence/have influenced this ‘contribution’ 
over time. These are broken down in into four specific objectives/research questions 
Sub-questions 
1. a. What are the characteristics of the FPFPs in Northern Uganda? 
b. How have the FPFPs evolved during and after the conflict? 
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2.  What are the dynamics of the healthcare markets in which these FPFPs 
operate? 
a. What are the challenges faced by FPFPs within the market? 
b.  How do these organisations negotiate these markets (what are the 
coping strategies)? 
c. What opportunities does the post-conflict period present for the FPFPs 
in Northern Uganda? 
d. What is the relationship between FPFPs and other health providers and 
health development partners in Northern Uganda? 
3. a. What mechanisms, if any, do FPFPs employ to ensure that the poor access 
healthcare in a post-conflict environment? 
b. How does the interaction/relationship between FPFPs, other health 
providers and health development partners influence their contribution to an 
equitable and pro-poor health system? 
4. What recommendations or suggestions are derived in relation to encouraging 
FPFP to adopt a pro-poor health agenda? 
 
1.4. Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 contextualizes the private sector within the broader development goals. 
The chapter also provides a theoretical background to the existence of the private 
sector. In addition, it indicates how neo-liberalism and the Washington consensus 
provided a background to the development of the private sector.  The chapter then 
presents a review of literature about the private sector in general, while noting the 
types and broad and present characteristics of the private sector in post-conflict 
settings. Chapter 2 then presents a discussion on the market and highlights the major 
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issues related to the price mechanism and demand. Finally, the theory of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), which indicates its connections and variations with 
classical economics as well as its application in this study, is introduced. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a contextual background to Uganda and Northern Uganda. The 
effects of neo-liberalism on health systems in Uganda as well as regulation and 
partnerships with private sector actors are presented. The chapter also presents a 
brief overview of the conflict in Northern Uganda and its effects as well as the socio-
demographic indicators for Northern Uganda. The actors in the healthcare market in 
Uganda/Northern Uganda and their roles are presented. At the end of Chapter 3, 
which is the last chapter for the literature review, the researcher presents the 
conceptual framework that guided the study. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the study methodology, indicating the broader epistemological 
and ontological views guiding the study, and notes that the study was informed by the 
pragmatic view. The researcher then presents the justification for choosing mixed 
methods for the single holistic case study. The boundaries of the case study and 
details of Gulu district as the study setting are described. The chapter also presents 
the data collection methods, data management and analysis process as well as the 
ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings related to the first research objective and is divided 
into two parts: 5.1 focuses on the characteristics of FPFPs in Gulu municipality, 
whereas 5.2 focuses on how the FPFPs have evolved during and after the conflict. 
The analysis for this chapter draws on constructs from neo-liberal theory (proliferation 
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and free entry), the concept of evolution of organisations as well as NIE-related 
concepts such as sunk costs and credible commitment, among others.  
 
Chapter 6 presents findings related to the second research objective, the challenges, 
and coping strategies for FPFPs during and after the conflict and presents the 
opportunities. The analysis in this chapter draws on the concepts of evolution, 
resilience, NIE-related concepts of sunk costs, credible commitment, transactional 
costs, and uncertainty. The chapter emphasizes that the FPFPs experienced many 
challenges against which they innovated coping strategies.  The chapter also 
illustrates that amidst the post-conflict challenges, various opportunities appeared 
and the FPFPs had to take advantage of such opportunities to enter the market or 
survive the market challenges. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings about the relational links between the FPFPs and 
other providers and other organisations within the market.  The links are illustrated 
using social network maps. The analysis of the data for this objective was mainly 
based on the NIE concepts of networks as a form of markets and contracts.  The main 
argument in this chapter is that FPFPs are interdependent and connected with other 
organisations and thus also emphasizes the blurry nature of the boundaries between 
FPFPs and other organisations, including the public facilities. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the findings related to research objective three. It presents 
innovations around the identification of the poor and the mechanisms employed by 
the FPFPs to ensure pro-poor access. The chapter also highlights ways in which 
relationships between FPFPs and others enable its contribution to enabling access 
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for the poor. While analyzing this data, the researcher reflected on the neo-liberal 
assumption of profit maximization while also highlighting aspects of social 
entrepreneurship theory. 
 
Chapter 9 presents a discussion of the main findings of the study in the context of the 
existing literature about private sector characteristics, resilience, linkages to other 
providers/organisations and its contribution to UHC.  The researcher revisits the initial 
conceptual framework while considering the findings and indicates the revised 
conceptual framework. Furthermore, the researcher reflects on patterns of behaviour 
observed in private providers that are particularly characteristic of post-conflict 
settings, while noting, where possible, the outstanding similarities with settings that 
are relatively stable.   The researcher then reflects on the limitations as well as the 
strengths of the study and then draws conclusions and recommendations based on 
the empirical findings. The conclusion draws on the researcher’s position in relation 
to the ideological poles of debate (for and against) on the role of the private sector in 
UHC. Lastly, the researcher summarises areas for further research and action. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL COMMITMENTS, NEO-LIBERALISM, 
PRIVATE SECTOR, PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX 
AND THE MARKET 
 
2.0. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a brief description of the global commitments to health – 
UHC and SDGs – as part of the wider context that not only sparks debates but also 
promotes harnessing the private sector as a key partner in health. The place and 
areas of contribution of the private sector within the wider context are described using 
the UHC cube. Next is a section on neo-liberalism as the main ideology informing the 
establishment of the Washington Consensus/prescriptions which informed the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and later promoted the 
withdrawal of the state from health service provision while favouring the private 
sector. The section analyses and questions the overall intention of the Washington 
Consensus and indicates the key effects on the health sector. 
 
The next section starts with a broad description of the private sector and delves into 
elements of heterogeneity, which are used to distinguish one section of the private 
sector from another. The next section is brief and presents factors that enable the 
existence and expansion of the private sector, with the main argument being that the 
public sector is mainly to blame. The roles of context and regulation are also indicated 
as contributory factors. Next, the researcher reflects on the question of the public-
private mix, which indicates and enforces the idea of the blurred boundaries between 
the public and the private sector. The section ends with recommendations, including 
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a clarification of roles for both the government and the private sector. The researcher 
then presents a brief description of potential interventions for engaging the private 
sector within the public-private mix. 
 
Next is a section describing the private sector in post-conflict settings, while noting 
the key characteristics and challenges. This is followed by a section about the market 
and the related concepts, such as the price mechanism and its roles. The section 
then delves into an understanding of demand in general while also indicating the 
determinants of demand. This section narrows down the discussion to the demand 
for healthcare and highlights the differences and similarities between demand for 
healthcare and demand for other goods. Then, finally, the theory of NIE is introduced, 
indicating its connections and variations with classical economics and how it was 
applied in the study. 
 
2.1. Global Effects in Relation to UHC and SDGs 
First, let us look at UHC, MDGs and SDGs and the linkages between the three 
platforms for discussion about the targets and highlight where these platforms 
recognise the role of the private sector as a whole and the private sector in post-
conflict settings. Countries all over the world have had a centuries-long interest in the 
health outcomes of their people. This could be because health, as indicated by WHO, 
is ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO, 1946). Implied in this definition, therefore, is 
the central connection between health and all other aspects of a person’s life. 
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As a result, deliberate efforts have been made to join global interventions and 
movements targeted towards the improvement of health and access to health. These 
include becoming signatories or at least keen followers of the Alma Ata Declaration 
of 1978 (Alma Ata Declaration, 1978), UHC and later the SDGs. UHC was introduced 
in 2010 as a vehicle for advancing the progress that countries had made in relation 
to the MDGs with the target to achieve them by the year 2030 (WHO, 2013). UHC 
has three goals: quality, protection from financial risk and increasing access for all 
(WHO, 2010b, WHO, 2013). Hence, in relation to the MDGs, UHC implied open 
access for all to health services, and involves strengthening efforts to improve the 
quality, availability and affordability of services (WHO, 2013). 
 
The measurement of UHC is illustrated by the famous UHC cube in Figure 3 (WHO, 
2010b). The cube has three dimensions which help in understanding whether UHC is 
achieved or not – the population served, the costs of services and the quality of 
services – and all these are interrelated. For instance, to understand whether UHC 
has been achieved, one can look at the proportion of a population that can access 
essential quality health services and the proportion of the population that spends a 
large amount of household income on health. However, for UHC to be achieved, all 
the three dimensions must be maximised (McPake and Hanson, 2016). Little is known 
about the extent to which the for-profit private sector tries to contribute to the 
maximisation of the three dimensions in conflict settings. Figure 3 illustrates the three 
dimensions of the UHC cube. 
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Figure 3:  The UHC cube indicating dimensions for measuring UHC 
 
 
Source: (WHO, 2010b) 
 
In September 2015, the SDGs were unveiled.4 The SDGs proposed 17 sustainable 
development goals with 169 associated targets and are based on fundamental 
principles such as economic development, environmental protection and social equity 
and are part of the Global Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development.5 
The WHO and other advocates for the SDGs have underscored the centrality of 
health to all the other 16 SDGs and have indicated this both in word and in illustration.6 
Health is indicated as SDG 3 and it has nine targets: three that continue from the 
MDGs; three  that are related to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and injuries; 
and three that are cross-cutting or focus on systems encompassing UHC, universal 
 
4https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ 
5https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs 
6https://www.who.int/sdg/en/ 
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access to sexual and reproductive healthcare services, and also on reducing hazards 
from air, water and soil pollution.7 SDG 17, which focuses on partnerships, has also 
been emphasised as key to achieving SDG 3. This was informed by the realization 
that UHC requires policy actions in a complex and increasingly multi-sectoral 
approach (Rasanathan et al., 2017).8   
As McPake and Hanson (2016) note, the goal of UHC as outlined in the SDGs 
provides a renewed focus on the need to take a systems perspective in designing 
policies to manage the private sector (p.622). 
The next section introduces us to how this private sector came to exist.  Neo-
liberalism exaggerates the advantages of the private sector which, over time, have 
come to be debatable and have, in practice, not yielded any positive results for the 
populace and for the health sector. 
 
2.2. Background to the Existence of the Private Sector 
 
2.2.1. Neo-liberalism and its assumptions 
Neo-liberalism is a core ideology that has driven the development of the private sector 
worldwide in recent decades. Neo-liberalism is a theory based on Adam Smith’s 
classical economic theory. Together with other 19th century classical economists, 
Adam Smith believed that economic growth could only be stimulated and sustained 
if private individuals could pursue their self-interest unhindered by the state (Clarke, 
 
7https://www.who.int/sdg/targets/en/ 
8Rasanathan et al 2017.  IHP + for UHC 2030.Multisectoral working group. Work plan 2017-
2918.https://www.who.int/social_determinants/IHPplus-for-UHC2030-multisectoral-action-working-
group-workplan-Sept2017.pdf?ua=1 
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2005). In his highly acclaimed book, The Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) suggested 
that, left on its own, capitalism would operate on a rationality that makes possible the 
transformation of individual selfish interests into public virtue. As Harvey (2005) in 
(Thorsen, 2009) reiterates:  
Neo-liberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. 
(p.11) 
There are thus three main assumptions of neo-liberalism: 1) Individualism; 2) a free 
market; and 3) decentralisation/a minimal or reduced role for the state (McGregor, 
2008).  
i) Individualism: Neo-liberalism assumes that human beings will always try to 
favour themselves and, as they do this, will have no concern for others or for 
the environment (Martinez and Garcia, 1997). Implied in this assumption is the 
inherent greed and selfishness among individuals and the tendency to 
accumulate as much property or wealth as possible and to maximize profits. 
This is in line with the adage of ‘survival of the fittest’ (Gregory, 2000). Scholars 
such as Bandy (2000) and Martinez and Garcia (1997) replace the concepts of 
the public good and the community with individual responsibility. This implies 
that in the absence of government intervention, persons are expected to cater 
for their basic needs regardless of whether they can afford to or not. 
Furthermore, this concurs with Harvey’s definition of neo-liberalism indicated 
earlier at the beginning of this sub-section (2.2). 
ii)  Free market: In order to ‘free up markets’ so that they can ‘grow’ the economy, 
neo-liberalism requires that the market be freed from government regulation 
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(Stiglitz, 2002); hence the prices are determined by the forces of demand and 
supply (McGregor, 2008), a situation that is also termed the ‘price mechanism’. 
Again, Harvey (2005) in (Thorsen, 2009) explains:  
State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum 
because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful 
interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly 
in democracies) for their own benefit. (p.11) 
The free market is emphasised as playing a role in achieving both individual well-
being as well as a more trusted role in allocating resources. According to 
(Thorsen, 2009), neo-liberal proponents argue thus:  
Free markets and free trade will, it is believed, set free the creative potential 
and the entrepreneurial spirit which is built into the spontaneous order of any 
human society, and thereby lead to more individual liberty and well-being, and 
a more efficient allocation of resources. p.14 
 Hence, there is free entry for firms as well as ‘perfect competition’. Free entry 
may also result in the presence of large numbers of organisations in the market, 
but these can be regulated by the competition. The private organisations also 
could be flexible and explore various alternatives. 
iii) Decentralisation: Decentralisation or devolution means the transfer of central 
powers, responsibilities and accountability to lower levels (regional and provincial 
authorities) to ensure efficiency(McGregor, 2008, Bergh, 2012). According to 
Bergh (2012: 309)), decentralisation ‘meant shifting mandates and tasks (and 
hopefully funding) to multiple levels, regional, state/provincial authorities to 
ensure effective allocation of resources.’  
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 Bergh (2012) Adds that horizontal disaggregation to the NGOs and the private 
sector came in addition to the vertical disaggregation of the state (ibid.). However, 
Joshi (2008: 11) in Bergh (2012) emphasize:  
Allowing state and non-state providers to flourish at the local level, the invisible 
hand of the market was expected to cater to a greater diversity of needs, 
allowing users to choose providers that best meet their needs in terms of price 
and quality.  
 
In the Mediterranean countries, for example, the competition among the increasing 
numbers of (private) providers and the variety of services they provided enabled 
users to exercise choice (Bergh, 2012). 
 
Bergh’s critique of neo-liberalism, however, is that perfect competition is absent, 
especially in poor and rural areas, where there is often no effective competition and 
users do not have adequate information about the true quality of services (ibid.) 
(Bergh, 2012).Overall, Guazzoni and Pioppi (2009) in Bergh (2012) state that neo-
liberal reforms such as decentralisation contribute to the displacement, relativization 
and reconstruction of the borders between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’.  
 
2.2.2. Neo-liberalism, the Washington Consensus, and its implications for the 
healthcare system 
The Washington Consensus provides the best framework for understanding the 
effects of neo-liberalism, particularly in relation to increased privatisation globally. The 
term Washington Consensus was coined by Williamson in 1989 in reference to a set 
of ten neo-liberal policy prescriptions which had been proposed, and later supported, 
by the influential Washington-based institutions (Williamson, 2004). These institutions 
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include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the US Treasury and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO)  (Williamson, 2004, Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
These prescriptions were developed initially to respond to the economic crisis in the 
Latin American economies of the late 1980s. However, they were recommended later 
for implementation in the rest of the developing and less developed countries, 
including those in Africa. The ten propositions/neo-liberal reforms are hereby 
summarised (Williamson, 2004): 
1. The imposition of fiscal discipline. 
2. The redirection of public expenditure towards other fields. 
3. The introduction of tax reforms that would lower marginal rates and broaden the 
tax base. 
4. The liberalisation of the interest rate. 
5.  A competitive exchange rate. 
6. The liberalisation of trade. 
7.  The liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment. 
8. The privatisation of state-owned economic enterprises. 
9. The deregulation of economic activities. 
10. The creation of a secure environment for property rights. 
 
Although the 10 principles mentioned above imply a lot of freedom, Stiglitz (2002) 
argues that it was actually ‘managed trade’ for the corporate and financial benefit of 
the Bretton Woods institutions and no freedom at all for the developing countries 
(previously referred to as Third-World) (Stiglitz, 2002). Accordingly, as Lensink (1996) 
in Ssali (2018) indicates, healthcare reforms implemented in many developing 
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countries as part of SAPs reflected a top-down translation of these neo-liberal 
prescriptions by the World Bank. 
 
The overall objective of the SAPs in the health sector was to improve cost 
effectiveness and effectiveness and efficiency (Ssali, 2018). The World Bank report 
entitled Investing in Health attributes the so-called inefficiencies and ineffectiveness 
within the health sector to four causes: a) misallocation of resources; b) insufficient 
spending on cost-effective health activities; c) internal  inefficiency of public 
programmes; and d) inequity in the distribution of benefits from health services (World 
Bank, 1993). Therefore, neo-liberalism favoured the private sector over the public. 
 
Kentikelenis (2017) identifies three main pathways along which SAPs affect health: 
policies directly targeting health systems; policies indirectly affecting health systems; 
and policies affecting social determinants of health. She further underscores the 
relevance of such pathways to the experience of SAPS by countries across time and 
space (Kentikelenis, 2017). 
 
The effects notwithstanding, for this study, neo-liberalism and the Washington 
Consensus provide an insight into the emergence of the private sector in general, as 
well as its characteristics and behaviour (for instance, profit maximisation, free entry, 
flexibility and proliferation). 
 
2.3. The Private Sector 
The private sector is defined in varied ways. The private sector refers to all providers 
outside the public sector (Patouillard et al., 2007), those not owned by the state 
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(Birungi et al., 2001) or all non-state actors (Clarke et al., 2019) involved in health or 
the totality of privately-owned institutions and individuals providing healthcare 
(Mackintosh et al., 2016). The private sector is generally large and homogeneous 
(Mackintosh et al., 2016, Clarke et al., 2019, Birungi et al., 2001, McPake and 
Hanson, 2016). This heterogeneity also exists within a given category, for instance 
the not-for-profit providers, as well as within the for-profit providers (McPake and 
Hanson, 2016). 
 
The distinction within the private sector is often limited to a broader dichotomy: private 
not-for-profit and for-profit (Morgan et al., 2016). The private not-for-profit providers 
include mission facilities and NGOs. On the other hand, the for-profit providers 
include individual clinical practitioners, corporate hospital chains and international 
private insurers, itinerant medicine sellers and pharmacies (Mackintosh et al., 2016). 
They also include drug shops, market vendors, home providers and traditional 
healers (Birungi et al., 2001). 
 
McPake and Hanson (2016) present a table with three major dimensions, which can 
be used to achieve an understanding of heterogeneity and therefore differentiate the 
private sector. These include objectives, the size of organisations and quality (using 
proxies of qualified or unqualified front-line staffing) (p.623). However, in their write-
up, they add other dimensions such as ownership, source of funding and 
formalization (licensed or unlicensed). 
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Profit related objective: Not-for-profit and for-profit 
The  private not-for-profit(PNFP) sector is perceived as one that has a social mission 
and is, therefore, set up to deliver a social value to the underserved (Abu-Saifan, 
2012).  Furthermore, the PNFP sector is assumed to offer more financial protection 
compared to the for-profit sector but also to contribute to the delivery of health 
services with no financial gain (Morgan et al., 2016). The PNFPs include networks of 
NGOs and faith-based providers which operate as diocesan provider networks 
(McPake and Hanson, 2016). Given their ownership by the church, the latter were 
described as ‘working for God’ (Reinikka and Svensson, 2003). 
 
The for-profit sector, on the other hand, as in its name suggests, is perceived to set 
out with the aim of maximizing financial gain/profit for shareholders, partners (Morgan 
et al., 2016) or individual owners. In Uganda, the private practitioners have previously 
complained about the ‘for-profit’ tag, considering it demeaning, given that it implies 
that their cardinal role is making profit. Instead, they proposed that they be called 
‘patient funded practitioners’ (Birungi et al., 2001). 
 
The above complaints bring to light the discussion about whether the for-profit sector 
may not be making profit as generally assumed or whether the PNFPs make profit. 
Some scholars have noted that the FPFP sector indeed makes profit, but that, unlike 
their colleagues in the for-profit sector, they reinvest the surplus to improve the 
quality, scope and volume of services or expand the infrastructure required for 
services (McPake and Hanson, 2016, Tumwesigye, 2013) 
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However, McPake and Hanson (2016) argue that both the private for-profit and the 
PNFPs are exposed to market forces through which survival is reliant on revenue 
generation. Hence, the surplus is reinvested by PNFPs to address private interests 
rather than the public good. The act of charging user fees when there is already a 
subsidy from the government or other donors puts PNFPs in the same position as the 
for-profit sector (ibid.). This was one of the causes of mistrust of the PNFP sector, 
and a major challenge facing the government-PNFP relationship in Uganda 
(Ssennyonjo et al., 2018). 
 
In contrast, Abu-Saifan (2012) argues that within the boundaries of social 
entrepreneurship, both the PNFP and for-profit providers have the potential to swing 
between making profit and acting for a social value (p.26).  For instance, Figure 4 
illustrates the possibility for a social enterprise (such as the PNFP) to perform a hybrid 
activity that is both social and commercial in nature for purposes of self-sufficiency, 
still with profits being reinvested in the social value. Furthermore, as entrepreneurs, 
the private for-profit sector can also have a social mission (ibid., p.27). As Filipe and 
Santos (2012) in (Abu-Saifan, 2012) indicate, this can be done by the invention of 
new products and services and hence the deployment of new business models to 
address basic human needs (ibid.). However, social entrepreneurs are advised to 
strike a balance between the social and economic/profit-making objectives (Abu-
Saifan, 2012). Consequently, the study sought to understand whether the FPFPs 
could have any innovations in place that are targeted towards social value creation. 
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Figure 4:  Boundaries of social entrepreneurship – Adapted from Abu Saifan 
(2012) 
 
 
 
Quality 
Morgan et al. (2016) present three main types of quality. The first is service quality, 
which is reflected by the responsiveness of staff and often measured by patient 
satisfaction. The second is technical quality, which refers to the competence level of 
providers and their ability to adhere to clinical guidelines (p.607). The third is structural 
quality, which relates to buildings, equipment, materials and drug availability as well 
as quality of delivery (ibid. p.608). Morgan et al. (2016) further note that PNFPs were 
better than for-profit in relation to structural quality while for-profit providers had a 
comparative advantage in achieving patient satisfaction. However, in contrast with 
the public sector, the two sub-sectors performed worse regarding technical quality 
(ibid.). 
 
Size of organisations 
Private organisations also vary in size, ranging from large to small. The size is most 
related to the square metres covered by the building in which the provider operates. 
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For instance, a corporate hospital chain (Mackintosh et al., 2016) is much larger than 
a drug shop. 
 
Ownership 
A section of the PNFPs, particularly the NGOs, may be owned by a group of people; 
whereas in the mission sector, the facilities are owned by dioceses (Birungi et al., 
2001). Some of the for-profit sector is owned by individuals, who are sole 
entrepreneurs, and these, in some countries such as India, form a substantial share 
of the private sector or even form the bulk of the private sector (Mackintosh et al., 
2016). 
 
Source of funding 
The funding for many the not-for-profit providers comes from external sources. For 
instance, the majority  of  the NGOS normally get their funding from donors whereas 
the mission not-for-profit sector is largely funded by donors, substitutes by 
government through  financial and non-financial resource contributions/subsidies 
and, in most cases, also charge a subsidized  fee (McPake and Hanson, 2016, 
Ssennyonjo et al., 2018). 
 
The funding for many of the not-for-profit providers is based on the type of ownership. 
For instance, in group-owned entities, the stakeholders contribute funding, while in 
sole-owned businesses, the owner provides start-up from their savings. However, 
among the corporate commercial providers, which are a relatively new phenomenon, 
investment is made by international development agencies such as International 
Finance Corporation, the investment arm of the UK Department for International 
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Development (DFID)  and CDC Group (McPake and Hanson, 2016). In their reports, 
these agencies have boasted of collaborating with the private sector to improve 
people’s lives (International Finance Corporation, Undated) and the Harnessing Non-
State Actors for Better Health for the Poor  (HANSHEP) Scheme (DFID, 2013). 
However, critics have argued that private providers increase inequality and their 
investments further undermine countries’ investments in UHC and public health in 
general (McPake and Hanson, 2016) 
 
Formalisation 
This applies to both the for-profit and not-for-profit private sectors. In relation to the 
not-for-profit, being registered restricts (at least on paper) them from the distribution 
of the surplus as profit (McPake and Hanson, 2016, Birungi et al., 2001).The for-profit 
sector is further divided into formalized (licensed) and non-formal (unlicensed). In this 
case, the degree of formalization is merely determined by registration with the 
authorities (Birungi et al., 2001). Formal private for-profit healthcare organisations 
(FPFPs) are formalized (registered/licensed) commercial organisations and 
individuals that deliver health-related services with the main objective of accumulating 
profit (Institute for Health Sector Development, 2004, Bloom et al., 2013). 
Informal providers (IPs) are those that operate outside the formal rules regulating the 
practice and conduct of health workers (Standing et al., 2013). However, they may 
be legitimized and appreciated by communities and even, in some instances, 
intentionally ignored by regulators, for fear of risk to their lives by the communities 
(Birungi et al., 2001). Unlike their counterparts, the FPFPs, IPs possess little or no 
formally recognized training with a defined curriculum from an institution; collect 
payments which are often undocumented; are not registered with any government 
 32 
 
regulatory body; and rarely have professional affiliation (Lagomarsino, 2013, 
Sudhinaraset et al., 2013).These include  drug sellers within the confines of shops 
and clinics, drug vendors, traditional birth attendants (TBAs), traditional healers, 
village doctors, unregistered pharmacists, bonesetters and herbalists (World Bank., 
2003). 
Table 1: Dimensions of heterogeneity among private sector actors 
 
Source: Adapted from McPake and Hanson, 2016. 
 
The above characteristics notwithstanding, the study sought to understand the 
characteristics of the FPFPs within Gulu municipality and how these providers 
evolved and had their characteristics change over time. 
 
2.3.1. Factors shaping the differences in the private sector 
The diversity of the private sector within countries is due to three factors: the changing 
characteristics and performance of the public sector; deregulation; and the context 
Provider 
type 
 Size Quality Ownership   Having 
infrastructure 
Ownership Source of 
Funding 
Formalisation 
Not-for- 
profit 
Large, e.g. 
network of 
NGO 
providers 
 
Small, e.g. 
faith-based 
clinic  
Qualified 
 
Unqualified 
Network of 
NGO 
providers 
 
Diocesan 
facilities 
Facility-based, 
e.g. diocesan 
facilities 
 
Non-facility-
based: Some 
NGOS 
Individuals  
 
Formed by 
an individual 
  
Group: NGO 
networks, 
diocesan 
facilities 
Donor 
funding and 
charity 
Licensed 
For-profit  Small, e.g. 
sole 
practitioner 
 
Large, e.g. 
corporate 
chains 
 
Small – drug 
shops, 
iterant drug 
vendors 
Qualified, 
e.g. sole 
practitioners 
and larger 
corporate 
providers 
 
Unqualified: 
Low quality 
underqualifie
d providers 
Small: 
Individual 
 
Larger for-
profit 
No infrastructure, 
e.g.  private  
insurers 
Individual 
 
Multiple 
shareholders 
-Individual or 
multiple 
share -
International 
donor 
agencies (for 
the case of 
the 
corporate 
providers) 
Formal for-profit  
providers:  
Licensed/registered 
 
Informal for- profit  
Providers:  
Unlicensed/Unregiste
red 
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within countries. Mackintosh and colleagues have argued that in many low-income 
countries, the diversity of the private sector is shaped by the changing characteristics 
of the public sector, driven by deregulation (Mackintosh et al., 2016). Using case 
studies from Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Nepal, they illustrate that higher-end 
private facilities are perceived to offer superior care in contrast with the failings of the 
public sector. Furthermore, they argue that deregulation has allowed smaller-scale 
and poorer-quality providers to multiply (ibid.) It has also been widely documented 
that the accessibility, convenience (shorter waiting times) and flexibility (in opening 
times) (Benjarattanaporn P. et al., 1997, Uplekar et al., 1998, Smith et al., 2001, 
Rutebemberwa et al., 2009, Bloom et al., 2011) of the particularly small private sector 
providers make them attractive compared to the public sector alternatives. Other 
factors that make the private sector more attractive than the public sector include 
cleanliness; increased time spent with the doctor and (perceived) better availability of 
staff (Morgan et al., 2016). Some countries, such as Nigeria and India, have a 
dominant private sector in both primary and secondary care. This is due to the scarcity 
of public sector availability (Mackintosh et al., 2016). 
 
Proponents of the private sector have argued that the sector plays an important role 
(Konde- Lule et al., 2010), therefore, it should be harnessed to ‘fill the gap’ left by the 
public sector (Decosta and Diwan, 2007) or ‘left’ by the state to continue its role in 
health service provision. Some have even provided ideas on the creation of 
meaningful collaboration(s) between the public and private sectors for health service 
delivery (IHEA, 2009). These include insurance and strategic purchasing (WHO, 
2010b). 
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Critics have warned about and documented undeniably ‘fast’ but ‘scary’ growth/ 
expansion of the private sector, particularly in LMICs’ health systems (Doherty, 2011, 
IHEA, 2009, Marriott, 2009). In fact, Doherty has emphasised the need to regulate 
growth and quality as well as the ‘best’ ways to do this in the private sector and further 
warned of how for-profit providers can thwart government efforts to regulate the 
private sector in East and Southern Africa (Doherty, 2013). Others have argued that 
the involvement of the private sector is a ‘disservice’ to the broader agenda of 
achieving UHC (Marriott, 2009, Marriot and Ndour, 2013). This is because it increases 
health expenditures among the poor or discriminates against them. It is also more 
likely to make compromises about quality (ibid.). 
Furthermore, critics such as Marriot and Ndour (2013) have dismissed advocates of 
the private for-profit health sector as being merely ‘blindly optimistic’, implying that 
the private sector offers no escape from the challenges facing public health systems 
in developing countries. As laid out by Clarke et al. (2019), these challenges include 
limited fiscal space for the health sector,  an increase in disease burdens, particularly 
NCDs, as well as demographic shifts, including ageing, displacement and political 
and economic instability (p.434). 
Simply put, the private sector cannot replace the public health system because it has 
its own challenges that need fixing first (Marriot and Ndour, 2013). First, investment 
in the private (health) sector is expensive and can increase inequity of access to 
health services. In LMICs, private sector financing is heavily dependent on out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenditure as the main funding source (International Finance 
Corporation, Undated). In fact, some scholars have referred to the private sector as 
the patient-funded sector (Birungi et al., 2001). As indicated by Xu et al. (2003) and 
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Mackintosh et al. (2016) in McPake and Hanson (2016), this often results in 
catastrophic health expenditures that sustain poverty levels. Secondly, the private 
sector is also experiencing performance gaps. As noted by Morgan et al. (2016), the 
heterogeneity of the private sector complicates assessment of the performance of the 
private sector, particularly in relation to quality of services. Morgan et al. (2016) note 
that, in contrast to the public sector, the technical quality within the private sector is 
largely low (ibid.). As indicated by Basu et al. (2012) in Morgan et al. (2016), poor 
quality in the private sector was reflected in diagnostic inaccuracy, increased 
incidence of unnecessary procedures such as caesarian sections as well as poor 
adherence to medical management standards and prescription guidelines (Morgan 
et al.2016: p.388). Studies conducted in Nigeria and Vietnam attributed the rise in 
drug-resistant malaria to poor adherence to prescription guidelines by private 
providers (ibid.). Nevertheless, some private providers, for instance the corporate 
commercial providers, have been reported to maintain some quality standards 
(McPake and Hanson, 2016). Lastly, given the difficulties in regulating the private 
sector, there is also no evidence that the private sector can be more accountable or 
fraud-free than the public sector (Marriot and Ndour, 2013). 
Context also determines differences in the private sector. McPake and Hanson (2016) 
note that the nature of the private sector is largely shaped by differences in country 
contexts specifically based on political, socio-economic, demographic and historical 
drivers of health system performance (McPake and Hanson, 2016). 
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2.4. The Public-Private Mix, Roles and Examples of Private Sector 
Interventions 
A key issue highlighted in the write-up above is the debate about whether the public 
and the private sectors are different or part and parcel of the same entity or lie along 
a continuum. Patouillard et al. (2007) note that, in practice, the boundaries between 
public and private provision may be blurred. To some scholars this implies dual 
practice, where some practitioners work in both sectors or even provide services in 
the public sector facility premises at a fee (Birungi et al., 2001, McPake et al., 1999). 
In recognition of this complexity, some scholars have recommended some workable 
solutions. 
 
Birungi et al. (2001) recommend that instead of stressing the differences, there is 
need to appreciate the public-private mix and, therefore, to promote the comparative 
advantages of each sector (Birungi et al., 2001). Within this public-private mix, the 
functions of the public and private sector need to be clear. They state that: 
The comparative advantage of the private sector lies in service delivery, 
providing diversity, choice, and innovation and in technical efficiency to render 
services. They also have potential to address equity. The comparative 
advantage of the government is the ultimate responsibility for health and 
wellbeing of its citizens, leadership and policy development, regulation, 
financing health services, promotion of public health and response to 
disasters. They also provide finances. (pp. 85-86) 
 
McPake and Hanson (2016) also call for a recommitment on the part of governments 
to health system outcomes as a prerequisite for the achievement of UHC. They 
recommend that 
Achievement of Universal Health Coverage requires pooled, mainly public 
financing, but can be compatible with various roles for private health providers 
under effective public stewardship. (pp.628-629) 
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In line with Birungi et al. (2001), McPake and Hanson (2016) also highlight the 
regulation of the private sector as another crucial role of the government and their 
proxy bodies. Regulation of the private sector has two main purposes: 1) ensuring 
that public resources are not misdirected to private users; and 2) ensuring that users 
of private services are not exploited through the provision of unnecessary or unsafe 
care, excessive claims and excessive charges (McPake and Hanson 2016:628). 
Ensuring adequate quality of services provided is also another purpose of the 
regulation of the private sector (Conteh and Hanson, 2003). As indicated by 
Patouillard et al. (2007), this may take the form of rules as well as enforcement and 
sanction mechanisms whose implementation and focus are determined by the level 
of healthcare provider, organisation and facility. For example, at organisational level, 
the focus of regulations may be on control of the location of facilities, their registration 
and the minimum number of staff or facilities (Conteh and Hanson, 2003). However, 
at facility level the focus of regulation may range from requirements for pre-service 
training and continuing education to licensing and certification of providers (Waters 
et al., 2003).  
 
In addition to regulation, Patouillard et al. (2007) describe other interventions where 
the government works with the private sector, particularly the for-profit providers. 
These include social marketing, the use of vouchers, pre-packaging, franchising, 
contracting out accreditation and training (Patouillard et al., 2007). However, there is 
also the possibility of creating a package of more than one intervention.  
 
Social marketing refers to the application of tools and concepts of social marketing to 
social and health problems in order to increase population coverage and affordable 
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interventions (Kikumbih et al., 2005). Examples include health promotional activities, 
branding, labelling, pre-packaging and subsidy of public health products (Patouillard 
et al., 2007). Among other purposes, social marketing has been successfully used in 
encouraging the use of condom use in Cameroon (Van Rossem and Meekers, 2000), 
the coverage of iron-folic supplement among non-pregnant women in the Philippines 
(Paulino et al., 2005) and increasing coverage of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) for 
children under two years in Tanzania (Abdulla et al., 2001).  
 
A voucher is a form of subsidy that the recipient can use as part or full payment for a 
product or service for identified providers (Patouillard et al., 2007). Vouchers can be 
demand side, where the voucher is given to service users or where the providers get 
the vouchers to deliver an agreed service, or a mix of both demand and supply sides 
(Ekirapa- Kiracho et al., 2011). The use of vouchers has been successful in relation 
to reproductive health services in Kenya and Uganda (Bellows, 2012) and in 
Nicaragua (Meuwissen et al., 2006). In Uganda, supply- and demand-side vouchers 
were used to mitigate the access barrier related to distance while increasing facility-
based deliveries and ultimately reducing maternal mortality (Ekirapa-Kiracho et al., 
2011, Alfonso et al., 2015). However, vouchers can also be competitive (Meuwissen 
et al., 2006) or non-competitive (Marek et al., 2005), where the former involves 
exchanging a voucher at more than one facility and the latter involves assigning the  
voucher to one provider (Patouillard et al., 2007). 
 
Pre-packaging is a strategy to improve provider and patient adherence to treatment 
regimens. It involves packaging of drugs in pre-defined doses for the targeted 
population group and the length of the treatment regimen (SARA, 2005). 
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Franchising is a transaction enabled by a contract between a health service provider 
and a franchise organisation. The aim of a franchise is to improve access to quality 
and price-controlled services (McBride and Ahmed, 2001). Examples of successful 
franchises include ‘green star’ in Pakistan, ‘ray of hope’ in Ethiopia and Janani in 
India, Sewa in Nepal and Top Reseau in Madagascar (Patouillard et al., 2007). 
 
Contracting out refers to a purchasing mechanism used to acquire specified services 
of a defined quality at an agreed price from a specific private provider and for a 
specific period. This enables the government to purchase services from private 
providers in order to complement public provision (Marek et al., 1999). Cases of 
contracting out to private facilities were found in South Africa, Lesotho (Patouillard et 
al., 2007), Senegal and Madagascar (Marek et al., 1999). However, contracting out 
has been implemented extensively in Cambodia (Vong et al., 2018). 
 
As for training, it can be either formal or informal, where the private sector is provided 
with knowledge about treatment guidelines as well as the use of job-aids (Patouillard 
et al., 2007). Although the training focuses on many issues, the bulk of the training 
has concentrated on the use of guidelines for integrated management of childhood 
illnesses (IMCI), the quality of family planning and the treatment of malaria (ibid.). 
 
2.5. Private Sector in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings 
 
2.5.1. Background to conflict, fragility and related effects 
The focus on conflict and fragility-affected states has gradually increased over the 
years owing to the critical development challenges posed by such situations (World 
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Bank, 2018).9 Among other factors, these challenges are due to high levels of poverty 
and poor health indicators as well as projections about the exacerbation of the 
magnitude of such effects. For instance, the OECD report (2016) projected that by 
the year 2030 the share of extreme poor living in FCAS will rise from 17 per cent  to 
60 per cent  (OECD, 2016). The OECD further indicates that by 2018, 60 per cent  of 
the world’s maternal and child deaths were happening in fragile and conflict situations 
(OECD, 2018). These poor indicators even have the potential to rise and, with 
diminishing and insufficient aid to such settings (Graves et al., 2015), such contexts 
may face deeper challenges with regard to the achievement of UHC in particular and 
SDGs in general. 
 
Defining the terms ‘fragility’ and ‘post-conflict’ has been a major area of contention 
(Witter, 2012, Bertone et al., 2019). To provide a general understanding of the 
context, some general definitions are provided here. 
 
Within the available literature, the definitions of the term ‘fragility’ are varied and, to-
date, there is no clear definition of the term (Bertone et al., 2019). However, there are 
three parameters which can be used to measure or define the degree of fragility of a 
given country. These are 1) limited capacity and willingness of the state to deliver its 
core functions; 2) legitimacy and effectiveness in the provision of services to fill core 
functions gaps for the state; and 3) the presence of active conflict/insecurity (Witter, 
2012, Bertone et al., 2019, Newbrander, 2006). The interrelations and intersections 
of these three parameters are well illustrated in a framework provided by  Call (2011). 
 
9 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview 
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The framework indicates the possibility that a country may exhibit more than one of 
these characteristics. The parameters alluded to earlier emphasise that the state has 
a central role regarding the creation of peace as well as the provision of health 
services. The intersection also highlights the possibility that a ‘fragile tag’ cannot be 
limited to countries that are experiencing active conflict. 
 
According to Sweeney (2009), a post-conflict setting refers to a country or area that 
is either emerging from conflict or one that has experienced a conflict far back in its 
history. However, other scholars (Collier et al., 2003, Witter, 2012) warn that the 
period of transition within post-conflict settings is not linear; it takes time and there is 
a high possibility for some countries to relapse into conflict. 
 
FCAS  are heterogeneous and unique in many ways (Pavignani et al., 2013, Bertone 
et al., 2019, Addison et al., 2001). This heterogeneity or uniqueness derives from 
characteristics which include distance from conflict, the progressive nature of the 
conflict, the scope/coverage of the conflict/destruction, and the cause of the 
destruction/conflict. There can also be variations within categories and/or 
intersections between these categories as has been detailed below. 
 
a) Distance from conflict, where the end of conflict is determined by relative peace 
created by the cessation of hostilities (Addison et al., 2001): Some countries are in 
the immediate post-conflict period, while others have experienced conflict far back 
in their history. For instance, the ReBUILD Consortium categorised some partner 
countries as being far from conflict (Cambodia 1970-1998; Zimbabwe 1980s) and 
 42 
 
others as being relatively close to the immediate post-conflict period (Northern 
Uganda 1985-mid 2006, Sierra Leone 1991-2002, Witter et al., 2017). 
 
b)  Progression/occurrence of conflict: The length of the conflict is another area for 
categorisation of conflict.  Conflict may be short-term or long-term although the 
latter is more common. Pavignani et al. (2013) recognise that for many FCAS, 
the disruption  is chronic and extensive and not merely part of  a transient 
trajectory towards recovery, a situation which  other authors have referred to as a 
cycle of conflict (Witter, 2012). In the available literature, countries that have 
experienced cycles of conflict include Afghanistan, the Central African Republic 
(CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Palestine 
(Pavignani et al., 2013).  
 
c) Scope of the conflict within the given area: Some of the conflicts directly affect a 
given part of the country rather than the whole country. For example, in the 
Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), the oil sector, which is offshore, was 
largely unaffected by the fighting (Addison et al., 2001). Since 2011, the Northern 
Nigerian states of Yebe and later Borno and Adamawa have experienced unrest 
due to attacks by the Boko Haram militant group (Ager et al., 2015). In the case of 
Northern Uganda, it experienced unrest for 26 years while the rest of Uganda 
remained largely peaceful (Namakula et al., 2011). Northern Uganda was the study 
setting and Chapter 3 provides more details about this conflict. 
 
d) Nature of the conflict and/or fragility: In contrast to the types of fragility presented 
in a), b) and c), the fragility in some countries is caused by a mix of factors rather 
 43 
 
than a single factor, while in others it is caused by one factor, which may not 
necessarily be linked to actual fighting.  In Haiti, for example, disruption has been 
caused by numerous factors, including natural disasters and political instability. 
Fragility in Somalia and Palestine, however, has been a result of  political volatility 
(Pavignani et al., 2013).  Zimbabwe, on the other hand,  seems to present a unique 
case unlike all the previous countries, given that  the fragility was mainly caused 
by a protracted economic crisis (Witter et al., 2017). The economic crisis has been 
attributed to many factors, including the continued intervention by the Zimbabwean 
government in the  DRC and the decline in agricultural production following the 
seizure of white-owned farms (Addison and Laakso, 2000). 
 
Violence as a result of conflict generally affects the social, political, economic and 
demographic fabric of the affected settings (Sweeney, 2009). In particular, conflict, 
among other effects, directly or indirectly leads to death and increases the mortality 
rate in a given area, causes displacement, affects fertility levels and increases the 
vulnerability of the population (Guha-Sapir and D'Aoust, 2010). 
 
Pavignani et al. (2013) further note that conflict affects each of the six health system 
building blocks and provide a detailed write-up about health service delivery, human 
resources for health, financing, drugs and technology, health information as well as 
leadership and government (Pavignani et al., 2013). The purpose here was not to 
detail all the effects but to single out issues that are most relevant to the study. 
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2.5.2. Health status and service provision in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings 
Depending on the degree of fragility and the phase and length of conflict in each 
country or area, the effects listed above are experienced differently by different 
countries. For instance, in relation to healthcare, Pavignani et al. (2013) note that, 
although there may be some commonalities observed in relation to the health 
indicators, such as life expectancy and infant mortality, the determinants of the 
outcomes are frequently context-specific (p. 45). 
 
2.5.3. The private sector in FCAS 
The private health sector in many FCAS, including Somalia and Afghanistan, has 
been thriving (Pavignani et al., 2013) and this takes the form of both humanitarian 
and private for-profit businesses. The presence and proliferation of the private sector 
in such settings have been attributed to several factors, including the absence of the 
public sector, limited state investment in health, absence of the rule of law, hence 
limited regulation resulting from such a gap, and capital inflows in the case of Somalia. 
Conflict affects health service provision in two ways. First, conflict leads to the 
destruction of the functional public health infrastructure (Namakula and Witter, 2014, 
Downie, 2012). For example, in Somalia, the previously functional public health 
system was weakened by the civil war which has been going on since 1991. Because 
of the civil war, the modest health infrastructure that existed before the onset of the 
war has been destroyed. The few existing health facilities became homes for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and at times armed tribal militias (Downie, 2012). 
This situation is like that in many conflict-affected areas. 
 45 
 
Second, conflict weakens state capacity to invest in health (Sweeney, 2009). This 
situation results from shrinking revenue, on the one hand, and increasing spending 
on security, on the other (Buckely et al., 2015, Sweeney, 2009, Pavignani et al., 
2013). The state’s inability to invest in health affects its capacity to provide health 
services. This creates a vacuum, which is filled by non-state actors (Pavignani et al., 
2013). According to Sweeney (2009), these non-state actors are comprised of NGOs 
(local and international) and the local private sector (p. 23-35). These actors play 
varying roles. 
    
NGOs do not only take on the role of funding health but also that of service provision. 
For instance, in the Republic of South Sudan, which experienced civil war for 40 
years, the international donor agencies, including USAID and WHO, are the largest 
players in the funding and implementation of largely emergency health services 
(Downie, 2012). The international NGOs (INGOs) often provide services on a parallel 
basis and with a humanitarian focus so as to address immediate health problems 
emerging out of the conflict (Namakula et al., 2011, IOM, 2006). In most cases, the 
services rendered by INGOS are short-term in nature and, therefore, end with the end 
of conflict, often leaving a vacuum  not just in service provision but also in terms of 
deficiency in capacity and experience (Ssengooba et al., 2017). For example, in 
Sudan, there was uncertainty when the two US-funded health programmes, the Office 
of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Sudan Health Transformation 
Project (SHTP), which had been delivering high-impact health services in 200 
facilities and 14 countries, respectively,  were about to close by the end of 2012 
(Downie, 2012).  
 46 
 
Sweeney (2009) notes that the local private sector is also active in health service 
provision in periods of active/violent conflict as well as during the post-conflict period 
(p.34). The private sector in such settings is mainly characterised by informality and 
having a predatory nature and are resilient (Sweeney, 2009) and heterogeneous, and 
provide  poor quality services (Buckely et al., 2015, Pavignani et al., 2013). 
  
Sweeney (2009) adds that the nature and extent of the post-conflict private sector is 
shaped by characteristics specific to post-conflict situations. These include fragility 
and/or pockets of violence, limited regulation, unclear property rights and unclear 
channels of conflict resolution. In areas of fragility, the rule of law is limited and so is 
regulation of providers, hence the increased informality. Pockets of violence may also 
limit the form that the private sector takes and the kinds of activities that the private 
sector can engage in (ibid.). According to Pavignani et al. (2013), the demand for 
services also enables the private sector to thrive in such settings. Inability of the 
government to pay adequate salaries also results in moonlighting by public sector 
staff, hence the continuation of a parasitic relationship by the private sector (ibid., 
p.52). 
 
Examples of local private sector providers include low-level entrepreneurial activities 
by individuals and small groups (Sweeney, 2009), and pharmaceuticals are also a 
common category of providers in conflict-affected settings, particularly Somalia and 
Afghanistan (Pavignani et al., 2013).  
  
In many conflict-affected settings, the for-profit sector has continuously gained 
popularity and, according to Pavignani et al. (2013), it is thriving. In some contexts, it 
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is the first (and sometimes only) point of care for advice and also reaches large 
percentages of populations compared to the public sector (Buckely et al., 2015). 
Pavignani (2012) in Buckely et al. (2015) notes: 
Commercialisation of healthcare provision has advanced to such an extent that 
it has become irreversible. The healthcare business involves many 
entrepreneurs and workers, and moves large monies, which shield it from 
public competition, and make it indifferent to technical considerations. (p.3) 
This is quite ironical, given that populations in conflict-affected situations are 
characterised by high levels of poverty (Pavignani 2013), which are also attributed to 
loss of property and inability to work (Sweeney, 2009) The package of services 
provided by the private for-profit sector is mainly curative, with a limited focus on 
preventive services (Pavignani et al., 2013). 
  
In the case of Somalia, despite the high OOP fees paid by patients, services by the 
private for-profit  sector are low-quality and poor value for money (Buckely et al., 
2015). This, however, does not deter patients from seeking these services because 
they are perceived to be better in quality, easily accessible and diverse (Pavignani et 
al., 2013). For example, in Afghanistan, patients shunned seeking services from 
contracted-out NGO facilities in preference for those provided by the private for-profit 
sector (ibid.). 
 
In FCAS, engagement of the local private sector has been presented as one with 
many benefits (Avis, 2016:2, De Vries and Specker, 2009). These include 1) having 
an interest in peace-building and stabilisation efforts rather than large enterprises as 
they suffer more from conflict; 2) having a presence at sub-national level; 3) the 
potential to provide a stimulus for regional development; and 4) the ability to maintain 
linkages with other local enterprises. 
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However, the private for-profit sector in fragile and conflict-affected settings face a 
myriad of challenges. These include absence of the rule of law, suspicion of the 
private sector, limited basic services, rent-seeking and weak government with 
questionable legitimacy (Avis, 2016). Other challenges include excessive business 
regulation, unpredictable government behaviour, high transaction costs (WorldBank, 
2016) and insecurity (Sweeney, 2009). Despite these challenges, the local private 
sector has demonstrated the capacity to show resilience in the face of shocks by 
changing form and structure (WorldBank, 2005, Avis, 2016). 
 
In FCAS, regulation of the private sector is important, although it does not come 
without challenges and the literature has shown some innovations by the providers 
as well as initiatives by governments. For example, in Somalia, where the government 
is illegitimate and therefore unable to regulate, the private sector has come up with 
some innovations, such as using local courts (WorldBank, 2005). In Afghanistan, the 
Ministry of Health is gradually taking an interest in regulation and stewardship of the 
private health providers (Cross et al., 2016). 
Whereas previous studies have highlighted the challenges faced by private providers, 
studies that bring out the voices of the providers are limited. Hence, this study sought 
to understand the challenges as well as the resilience of FPFPs during and after 
conflict. The study also sought to highlight resilience within each of the FPFPs. 
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2.6. The Market, Price Mechanism and Demand for Healthcare 
 
2.6.1. Defining a market and price mechanism 
According to McPake et al. (2013), the role of the market and competition in 
healthcare has been brought to prominence by the discussion of healthcare reforms 
and also the increased recognition of the presence of a large volume of private 
healthcare activity (p.139)  
  
There is no one single and right definition for the term ‘market’. The meaning of the 
term depends on the context and the perspective of the person who attempts to define 
it.  Below is a summary of some definitions which were made use of by this study. A 
market can be defined in three ways; it can refer to a physical place, a set of decisions 
for price formation, a group of individuals who transact within a boundary or an 
institution that influences mechanisms for exchange. The definitions are laid out 
below: 
a) A market as a physical place: To a layperson, a market is commonly defined as a 
physical place where people go to buy food or any other products. In some rural 
areas, a market is the place where small farmers take their produce on any day 
weekday, as agreed by the residents, to have other people buy the produce. 
 
b) A market as a set of decisions for price formation: In mainstream economics, a 
market is a set of decisions made by consumers and producers of a commodity in 
order to determine the price of the commodity (Ellis F, 1990). This definition 
highlights the potential for negotiation in relation to price formation. It does not 
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matter where these decisions are made; if it is a geographical space, then that 
space becomes the market of that place. 
 
c) A market as a group of individuals: The term ‘market’ has also been used to 
describe the groups of individuals or organisations that make up the pool of actual 
and potential customers for their goods and services (pp. 10-11)(Brown and 
Deloitte & Touche, 1994). These groups fall into one or more of the following 
categories: geographical, demographic or socio-economic, psychographic, 
behavioural or sectoral. 
 
d) A market as an institution: The new institutional economic perspective relates a 
market to a set of systems, institutions, procedures and social relations 
infrastructures (ADB-DFID, 2005) or arrangements (McPake et al., 2013) by which 
buyers and sellers exchange goods and services. The previous two definitions 
notwithstanding, the researcher found definition (d) more comprehensive.  
 
These buyers and sellers can have specific characteristics, for example, size, number 
and behaviour, and this is what McPake et al. (2013) term as the market structure. 
According to Douma and Schreuders (2002), whenever an exchange takes place, a 
transaction takes place and leads to the transfer of rights of ownership between the 
buyer and the seller. The buyer (the person who pays money) thus acquires the right 
to use/own a given good or service whereas the seller (the person who gives up the 
service/good for sale) acquires the right to use the money that they receive (Douma 
and Schreuders, 2002). In healthcare, therefore, when a patient visits a private 
hospital and buys drugs to treat a particular sickness from a pharmacy, that patient 
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acquires the right to use the medication purchased while the pharmacy owner 
acquires the right to use the money paid. 
 
The transactions are co-ordinated by the price, which is determined also by the forces 
of demand and supply (ibid.). This is what is termed as price mechanism.  Price 
mechanism refers to the system where the forces of demand and supply determine 
the prices of commodities and the changes therein (Harrison et al., 1992). Hence, as 
indicated by Adam Smith (1776), 
There is an ‘invisible hand of price mechanism’, in which the hidden hand of 
the market, operating in a competitive market, through the pursuit of self-
interest allocated scarce resources in society’s best interest. 
The price mechanism has three main functions, namely the allocation/incentive 
function, the rationing function and the signalling function (Harrison et al., 1992). 
Through the allocation function, price allocates scarce resources among competing 
users. Through its rationing function, the price will become high when the demand 
outstrips supply. The signalling function enables suppliers to adjust to where 
resources are required and where they are not. For example, if the prices are rising 
because of high demand from consumers, then this signals to the suppliers to expand 
their production to meet the higher demand. If there is excess supply in the market, 
market price will fall so that it helps to eliminate the surplus in the market (ibid.). Figure 
5 illustrates the three main functions of price mechanism. 
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Figure 5: The functions of price mechanism 
 
 
Source: 
https://ezyeducation.co.uk/images/easyblog_images/1829/b2ap3_large_ThePrice-
Mechanism.jpg 
 
2.6.2. Understanding demand 
Demand is an important aspect of the markets because it enables us to understand 
how people make choices and how their choices are likely to change with changing 
circumstances (McPake et al., 2013). In simple terms, demand refers to the 
willingness and ability of consumers to buy a product (Whelan and Msefer, 1996). 
Demand is mostly described as the relationship between price and quality demanded, 
implying that price is the major determinant of demand (McPake et al., 2013). Hence, 
the definition of demand then broadens out to refer to ‘the quantity of a good or service 
which a person is willing and able to buy at the given price’ (ibid.). This view is 
illustrated in the simple demand curve. As indicated in Figure 6, the higher the price, 
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the lower the quantity demanded and the lower the price, the higher the quantity 
demanded. 
 
Figure 6: The demand curve 
 
 
Source: Adapted from McPake et al. 2013. p.12 
 
In addition to price, McPake and Normand (2008) and McPake et al. (2013) describe 
three other factors that determine demand. These include the price of 
substitute/alternative goods, the price of complementary goods, the income of the 
buyer, and individual tastes and preferences. All the factors were expressed (McPake 
and Normand (2008) as  
D= f (P, Ps, Pc, Y, T) 
where D is the demand, P is the price, Ps is the price of substitute goods, Pc is the 
price of complement goods, Y is income and T is tastes (p.17). However, there are 
also other determinants of demand, which are less visible but influence our choices 
and preferences. These include habits, climate and the availability of information 
(illustrated through advertisement of a product or an effect of a product) (McPake et 
al., 2013). 
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However, the health market is unique because it also includes the exchange of the 
goods that are not co-ordinated by market forces but rather organisations using non-
price systems, such as authority. These include consultation time, favours and the 
provision of information (Douma and Schreuders, 2002, McPake et al., 2013). 
 
2.6.3. Demand for healthcare 
McPake and Normand (2008) and McPake et al. (2013) present two main reasons 
why we should be concerned about the demand for health and healthcare. First, this 
would help us predict likely reactions and behaviour. Second, knowing something 
about people’s demand for healthcare may tell us something about how much they 
value health services (p.11). 
 
The demand for healthcare has similarities and differences with the demand for other 
goods (ibid. p.11 and p13-15). The differences between the demand for healthcare 
and the demand for other goods are based on a set of four aspects: who chooses 
and uses the service; the degree of uncertainty; timing; and the degree of enjoyment 
(see Table 2). 
 
a) Who chooses and uses the service: In relation to the demand for other 
goods/services, the individual makes the choice and uses the service. However, in 
healthcare, decisions are often made for the individuals because they are either 
extremely ill or have limited information about their illness. In some cases, the 
doctor and patient decide (ibid.) 
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b) Degree of uncertainty: Uncertainty is a unique future of the need/demand for 
healthcare. Uncertainty arises from 1) the fact that the choice of treatment has 
been made on behalf of the patient who has little knowledge of their illness and the 
treatment. In this case, there is also uncertainty regarding the treatment outcome; 
and 2) the inability of individuals to predict when they need healthcare, what 
healthcare will be needed and how much will be needed. Again, as indicated by 
McPake et al. (2013), such a scenario constitutes the basis for the need for 
insurance to cater for unforeseen future health needs. Ultimately, insurance breaks 
the direct link between the decision to use a service and the price charged. 
  
c) Timing: McPake and Normand (2008) and McPake et al. (2013) note that timing 
between the incidence of illness and ability to pay/source for funds breaks the 
patterns of incomes determining the demand for services. They note that 
In general, we are healthier when relatively young and relatively rich. These 
are times when we are least likely to need healthcare but most likely to be able 
to afford it […] yet, in general, we have medical needs when we are older and 
usually poorer. (P.11 and p.14) 
 
 In such a scenario, insurance as a payment option becomes more relevant, 
although, as noted earlier, it breaks the direct link between the decision to use a 
service and the price charged, which is experienced in the demand for other 
services. 
d) Enjoyment: McPake and Normand (2008) and McPake et al. (2013) further note 
that we rarely enjoy using healthcare services, unlike other goods. McPake et al. 
(2013) describe the experience with healthcare as having long-term gains at the 
expense of short-term pain or inconvenience. 
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Table 2: Differences between the demand for healthcare and the demand for 
other goods 
 Dimension Demand for other goods  Demand for healthcare 
1.  Choice and use of 
service 
The individual makes the 
choice and uses the service 
The individual who makes the choice may not be the 
same using the service 
 
Possibility of joint decision-making between doctor and 
patient 
2.  Degree of 
uncertainty 
We are sure of what we 
need, when and how much 
A high degree of uncertainty because of  
• limited/no advance knowledge about what we 
need, when we will need it and how much we 
will need 
• not being sure about treatment outcomes and 
results 
 
Note: Some health interventions, e.g. immunisation and 
eye tests, are characterised by certainty in relation to 
timing and content 
3. Preferences and 
ability to pay 
Whoever shows a 
preference for a service can 
find resources to pay for it  
• Some individuals cannot afford to pay and 
therefore have no effective demand.   
• Intervention of other parties to pay on behalf of 
others through insurance, subsidies, and 
charitable funding. 
• Insurance breaks the link between the decision 
to use a service and the price charged. 
4. Timing  When we are young and relatively rich, we can pay; but 
when we are old, we are less likely to afford healthcare. 
Hence, much as we need healthcare more when we are 
old, we are less likely to afford it then. 
 
Insurance breaks the link between the decision to use 
the service and the price charged 
5.  Degree of 
enjoyment of a 
service 
We are more likely to enjoy 
what we have bought 
We seldom experience enjoyment but enjoy long-term 
gains at the expense of short-term pain or 
inconvenience 
 
Source: Adapted from McPake and Normard (2008) and McPake et al. (2013) 
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Despite the differences indicated in Table 2, there are two main similarities, and they 
are related to the demand curve and the issue of information asymmetry. First, the 
demand for healthcare is somehow like the demand for other goods. McPake et al. 
(2013) note that despite the inefficiency of the markets to determine the allocations 
resources for healthcare, the behaviour of people seeking health services often 
reflects normal patterns of demand.  For example, people may buy more when prices 
are low and when income rises. They may also buy less when prices are high and 
income falls. Hence, this scenario could explain the long queues and waiting times 
for treatment.  
 
Second, just like the demand for other goods, the demand for healthcare also 
experiences information asymmetry (ibid.).  Information asymmetry means that one 
party to a transaction has more information than another. For example, a professional 
may have more knowledge about the good/service while the health  professionals are 
also better informed about the illness than the patients (McPake et al., 2013). They 
further add that such a scenario may lead the health professionals, as agents, to 
abuse their role to pursue their profit-seeking motive as a supplier. This is one of the 
justifications for the presence of institutions such as medical ethics and self-regulatory 
bodies (ibid. p.48). 
 
2.7. New Institutional Economics (NIE) Theory and Its Application 
This study utilised the New Institutional Economics (NIE) as the theoretical framework 
to guide discussion of the findings. NIE has its roots in Ronald Coase’s classics, The 
Nature of the Firm(1937) and The Problem of Social Cost (1960). However, the term 
‘NIE’ was coined by Oliver Williamson (1981).  
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Proponents of NIE argue that exchanges/ transactions may not only be explained and 
controlled by market forces of demand and supply/price mechanism10, as has been 
described earlier in section 2.61. Instead, NIE argues that exchanges/transactions 
can also be coordinated by organisations which mainly rely on non-price systems, 
such as authority and institutions, in the form of formal and informal rules and norms 
and networks (Eggertsson, 2013, Douma and Schreuders, 2002, McPake et al., 2013, 
Williamson, 1981).  This implies that relational aspects of organisations are useful in 
understanding how healthcare markets thrive and sustain exchanges/transactions. 
NIE introduces contracts as another way of governing transactions, beyond prices. 
 
The main limitation of NIE is that it assumes opportunism within contracts, implying 
that organisations will take advantage of the situation satisfy their selfish interests 
(McPake et al., 2013) but this is not always the case. For instance, Dequech (2005) 
notes that ‘sometimes there is uncertainty among organisations about the reaction of 
those they relate with, sometimes trust is important in the long run'. 
 
This uncertainty is mainly attributed to bounded rationality (McPake and Normand, 
2008, McPake et al., 2013). Bounded rationality, as coined by Herbert Simon (1957), 
implies that human beings cannot make rational decisions. This is because of three 
limitations: limited knowledge about all possible circumstances that could affect a 
situation; limited cognitive ability; and limited time to decide.  
 
 
10This is the basic assumption of neoclassical economics 
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Therefore, McPake and Normand (2008) conclude that the presence of bounded 
rationality implies that contracts are incomplete – they cannot specify all relevant 
possibilities that affect the contracting parties’ returns from participating in the 
contract (p.133). Therefore, they recommend that both optimism and bounded 
rationality need to be balanced to avoid contractual difficulties (ibid.). 
 
Another concept introduced by NIE is the issue of information asymmetry, which also 
leads to uncertainty, a key challenge to the demand for healthcare, which has already 
been discussed in section 2.63. Information asymmetry refers to a situation where 
one party to the transaction has more information than the other party has. 
  
Although NIE presents a number of concepts, analysis focused on the following ones: 
‘small numbers’ markets, sunk costs (SC), trust as an alternative to price in the 
market, information asymmetry, credible commitment (CC), relational contracts, 
institutional coordination and networks as organisational forms/structures. The 
researcher revisited some of these concepts in Chapter 9. 
 
Application of NIE to the study 
The application of NIE to the study is best indicated by showing the linkage between 
the research questions, analytical insights per objective and the selected NIE 
parameters that were used for analytical explanations. Research question 1(a) sought 
to understand the characteristics and evolution of the selected FPFPs during and 
after conflict. This objective emphasizes security as a contextual factor that makes 
the market unfavourable, making start-up difficult and affecting the growth and 
survival of FPFPs in several ways. The analytical focus of this research question was 
 60 
 
the opening and closure, growth and survival as well as the opportunities available to 
and the challenges facing FPFPs during and after the conflict. The NIE concept of 
sunk costs can enhance our understanding of how much money or resources are 
invested at the start of a business while credible commitment can explain why, in 
spite of the various challenges in their life span, the FPFPs survived, or chose not to 
close up shop or take the business to other areas in the country. Over time, sunk 
costs lead to credible commitment and, in the long-term, result in contractual relations 
between FPFPs and other organisations. Additionally, the NIE concept of contractual 
relations was applied to understand alliances and bonds that are created between 
FPFPs and other organisations during and after the conflict. The study sought to 
understand the extent to which these contractual relations (alliances) evolved from 
spot to long-term contracts, and the challenges as well as opportunities that these 
created for FPFPs in the conflict and post-conflict period. 
 
Research question 2 (b) sought to understand the market dynamics for FPFPs in 
post-conflict Northern Uganda. For this research question, the analytical insights the 
researcher looked out for included the negotiation of markets by FPFPs; challenges 
and opportunities; adaptation within the FPFP in response to external controls; and 
the effects of security on the market. The literature had already indicated the conflict-
related effects and that there were few providers in the health system. The NIE-
related concept of ‘small numbers’ markets can enhance our understanding of the 
market dynamics for FPFPs in volatile contexts such as Northern Uganda. In such 
settings, different market dynamics may be of a relational nature (Williamson 1991) 
as opposed to free competition and exit, which is emphasised by neo-classical 
economics. For instance, as opposed to staging vigorous competition and creating 
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‘exit options’ for other providers, some providers may instead decide to support the 
existing providers to support the health system during the hard times. Such support 
may create room for contractual relations. The study shed light on the evolution of the 
contractual relations mentioned above, with specific focus on whether, how and why 
these changed from spot contacts to long-term relational contracts. 
 
Networks and relationships were also a sub-component to look out for in relation to 
research questions 2(d) and 3(b). Social network analysis was used to illustrate these 
networks and relationships, and this is elaborated in the methodology chapter. 
Analysis focused on linkages and/or the nature of networks (formal or informal) for 
the coordination of transactions for healthcare as well as the resources exchanged 
because of the networks. Using the NIE concept of organisational forms, the study 
sought to understand the effects of these networks and relationships on the 
organisational structure of the FPFPs and other internal adaptations. According to 
NIE, there may be various organisational forms in the market because of interactions. 
One of these is the hybrid form (Williamson, 1981, McPake et al., 2013), which 
enables the firm to create efficiency and reduce its transactional costs by ensuring 
coordination between organisations. Other forms include the vertical integrations, 
where a firm of a different level merges with one at a different level (Douma and 
Schreuders, 2002, McPake et al., 2013). These forms of structures enable the 
organisation to reduce the transactional costs (McPake et al., 2013). 
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CHAPTER 3: UGANDA AND NORTHERN UGANDA – A 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
3.0. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is contextual and specific to Uganda and Northern Uganda. The first 
section presents the broader effects of neo-liberalism and/or SAPs on health service 
delivery in Uganda. The main argument here is that neo-liberalism affected the health 
sector and created inequalities while favouring the private sector often at the expense 
of the public sector. The second section presents actors within the healthcare market 
in Uganda as well as their roles; it indicates their positions and roles using the Elliot 
framework and the interaction of these roles. The third section describes the structure 
of healthcare provision in Uganda within the decentralised contexts, noting the 
coverage gaps left by the public sector facilities. The fourth section presents the 
context of Northern Uganda, indicating the effects of conflict on the health system and 
the actors within the healthcare markets in the region. Lastly are two brief sections, 
one about public-private partnership (PPP) and the other on regulation. 
 
3.1. Neo-Liberalism and Healthcare in Uganda 
The World Bank’s diagnosis noted in Chapter 2 – regarding inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness in the health sector – seemed true of Uganda, whose health system 
was dilapidated as a result of economic decline due to civil and military unrest that 
persisted for more than two decades, from 1962 to 1986 (Macrae et al., 1996). Since 
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198711, the Ugandan government has undertaken seven major structural adjustment 
reform processes. These are comprised of two major parts: (i) The Economic 
Recovery and Structural Adjustment Programme of the World Bank/IMF; and (ii) the 
Sectoral Lending Operations of the World Bank (Makhoka, 2001)10).These reforms 
were operationalised through the privatization of former state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the enforcement of public sector management controls through cuts in 
expenditure for basic sectors, particularly education and health, as well as the 
liberalization  of agricultural production and food security (ibid.). Within the health 
sector, reforms such as the introduction of user fees, decentralisation and insurance 
were implemented (Ssali, 2018). 
 
There is a consensus in the literature that neo-liberal reforms had only a modest 
positive effect on the majority of citizens in developing countries (Mavroudeas and 
Papadatos., 2005, Kentikelenis, 2017, Thomson et al., 2017, Wiegratz et al., 2018). 
According to the SAPRI report, the SAPs widened the income inequalities in Uganda. 
In relation to the health sector, the increase in health investment by the government 
and the related increase in health workers’ salaries did not create a significant positive 
change (Makhoka, 2001). The health workers in public facilities were found to also 
charge ‘illegal’ fees to boost their incomes as a response to their inadequate salaries 
(McPake et al., 1999). The introduction of cost-sharing also largely worked to the 
detriment of the poor and worsened their access as well as utilisation of public-
provided health services (Makhoka, 2001). More patients reported a higher likelihood 
to select a private or non-governmental facility in seeking medical care (ibid.). The 
 
11 Structural Adjustment Progammes (SAPs) were first introduced in Uganda in 1981 but failed to 
take off. They were re-introduced in 1987 under the present National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) government. Active implementation, however, took effect from 1992 (Makhoka, 2001: 10), 
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WHO notes that by 2009, spending within the private health sector accounted for 
more than 70 per cent  of total expenditures on health (WHO, 2010a). 
 
To the World Bank, these were indicators of the population’s willingness to pay for 
healthcare services, paving the way for the privatization of  health services in the 
context of several other neo-liberal reforms in Uganda (Ssali, 2018). However, Ssali 
notes that this was merely a response to the deterioration of the public health system 
that later became the norm (ibid.: 180). 
 
In their critique of the implementation of neo-liberal reforms in Uganda (Wiegratz et 
al., 2018), some scholars have concluded that the dynamic interplay of the imperfect 
market favoured a few players, who became winners, while the majority who were 
sidelined became losers  (Asiimwe, 2018 and Ssali 2018 in Wiegratz et al., 2018). 
Ssali (2018) expresses equity concerns arising from a market-led health system in 
Uganda and underscores the need for the state to lead in healthcare provision.  
The vast majority are stuck with poor quality or can only access healthcare 
from private facilities by engaging in catastrophic expenditures. […] if equity 
concerns are to be achieved, the state and not the market needs to be 
responsible for the citizens’ health. (p.196) 
 
Apart from user fees, decentralisation was one of the reforms implemented to reduce 
the role of the state in health service provision in Uganda. Under decentralisation, the 
power of management of health services was devolved to the districts through the 
creation of the district health sub-district (HSD)(Asiimwe and Nakanyike, 2007, MOH, 
1998). This meant that the district health offices were responsible for overall 
leadership, strategic planning, supervision, monitoring and coordination of district 
health services (Tashobya et al., 2018). The Ministry of Health (MOH), on the other 
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hand, mainly retained the role of developing and distributing policies and guidelines 
(MOH, 1998). 
 
Notably, the fiscal space to carry on the mandate was limited in proportion compared 
to the mandate transferred (Kiwanuka, 2013). As such, the districts argued for the 
introduction of user fees as a means of generating revenue and also as a basis for 
negotiating for the Community Health AIDS Project (CHAP)(Okuonzi and Macrae, 
1995). The rapid adoption of user fees by all districts – 42 out of 45 by the year 1999 
(MOH, 1999) – implies that districts prioritized their revenue needs with little regard 
for people’s ability to pay (Ssali, 2018). 
 
According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Statistical Abstract for 2018, 
Uganda was administratively divided into 122 districts as of 1 July 2017 (see Figure 
7) (UBOS, 2018), having started at 45 in 1998, as noted earlier. Evidence within 
documents indicating the disbursement of funds to local governments cast a dark 
shadow over the hopes for expanding the fiscal space and highlight the need for 
districts to continue generating revenue. For example, as indicated in the Sector 
Grant and Allocation Guidelines for the year 2017/18, resource mobilisation and 
allocation  is still part of the broader planning and implementation function for the 
district health office (MOH, 2017). Furthermore, the conditional grant agreement 
between MOH and local governments for the financial year 2018/19, section 14-part 
d), page 11 indicated that: 
Local governments shall demonstrate their support on local revenue 
enhancements so as to improve revenue collection to meet the many 
recurrent expenditures. (Government of Uganda, 2018) 
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The health budget allocation for the financial year 2019 increased only by UGX 0.3 
trillion from UGX 2.3 trillion in 2018 (Delloitte, 2019). 
 
Figure 7: Map showing districts of Uganda and their populations in 2018 
 
 
Source: UBOS Statistical Abstract 2018 
 
3.2. Health Service Delivery in Uganda 
In Uganda, both the public and private sectors contribute an almost equal half to the 
provision of health services in almost equal proportions (MOH, 2010a). Notably, the 
public sector, which is under the direct stewardship of the government and the MOH, 
dominates in terms of ownership of health facilities countrywide, as was shown for 
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the Acholi region in Table 3. The structure of the public health system of Uganda has 
been presented in varying ways in the available literature to serve the purposes of 
researchers (MOH. et al., 2012, Tashobya et al., 2018). However, in this thesis, we 
refer to the structure as presented in government policy, specifically the Uganda 
Health Sector Strategic Investment Plan (HSSIP) 2010/11– 2014/15 (MOH, 2010a). 
Typically, the health system components referred to include the facilities, the services 
provided, the population covered and, in most cases, the administrative unit which is 
part of the decentralised structure for the management of health service delivery in 
Uganda. 
 
The public health system is structured in a tiered ascending spiral of infrastructure, 
where the complexity of services provided as well as the population served increases 
by ascending level of facility (MOH, 1998, MOH, 2012, MOH. et al., 2012). Under the 
decentralised system, the health facilities are also attached to the relevant level of 
administration. For example, the health centre I, the lowest health facility, mainly 
focuses on preventive services through the provision of community outreach at the 
village level (the smallest administrative unit12). On the other hand, HC IVs, or the 
district general hospital, acts as the highest level within the district and as the health 
sub-district health centres. The health sub-district facility is supposed to have a 
coverage area of approximately 100,000 people (MOH, 1998) and the capacity to 
provide a minimum package of services (MOH, 2008) provided for in the Health 
Sector Investment Plan (HSSP). These include emergency surgical and obstetric 
 
12 Although the village is perceived to be the smallest administrative unit, in most cases the 
volunteers are overwhelmed by the coverage area. Some villages, for example, may have over 
1,000 households, so that they have to be divided into A and B.  
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services (MOH, 2010a). Above this level are regional referral hospitals, and above 
these, the national referral hospitals, which are the highest level (MOH. et al., 2012). 
 
The structure of the public health system, as shown in Table 3, was meant to fulfil two 
objectives, which are indicated on page 12 of the first National Health Policy: 1) 
strengthening the referral system; and 2) creating more linkages between the district 
level and the centre as well as between the public and the private sector (MOH., 
1999). Essentially, the assumption behind this structure was that referrals naturally 
occur from the lower level to the higher level. However, this is not usually the case, 
as clients often tend to bypass the facilities that are within the vicinity of their homes 
(MOH. et al., 2012). The factors to which this situation is attributed include shortages 
of human resources for health and a lack of equipment and supplies, which 
compromise the quality of care in some public facilities (Parkhurst and Ssengooba, 
2009). Other factors include disrespect and abuse by health workers (Kyomuhendo, 
2003) as well as informal and illegal payments within the public sector, particularly in 
relation to maternal deliveries (McPake et al., 1999, Birungi et al., 2001, Nabukeera, 
2016). In such cases, the private sector becomes a substitute for the private 
sector(Konde- Lule et al., 2010). 
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Table 3: Levels of the public health system, location and services provided 
  Level of health facility Corresponding 
administrative level 
(within 
decentralised 
system) 
Roles/package of services National 
health 
facility 
standard 
Current 
situation 
7 National referral 
hospital (NRH) 
National All services by the RHH and 
general hospitals plus 
comprehensive specialist 
services, research and 
teaching 
1:10,000,000 1:30,0000 
6 Regional referral 
hospital (RRH) 
Region All services of general 
hospitals plus teaching and 
research 
1:3,000,000 1:2,307,692 
5 
 
District/General 
hospital 
District 
 
All HCIV services plus   in-
service training, consultation, 
research and community-
based healthcare 
programmes 
1: 500,000 1:263,157 
4 Health centre IV (HC 
IV) 
County as sub-district 
or constituency 
All HCIII services plus 
preventive, promotive, 
outpatient, curative and 
inpatient services, 
emergency surgery and 
blood transfusions 
1: 100,000 1:187,500 
3 Health centre III (HC 
III) 
Sub-county All HCII services plus, 
preventive, promotive, 
maternity and inpatient 
services. Delivery services 
may be available 
1:20,000 1:84,507 
2 Health centre II (HC 
II) 
Parish Preventive, promotive and 
curative services (mainly Out- 
Patient). Antenatal services 
may also be available 
1:50,000 1:14,940 
1 (Village health 
team/VHT) HC I 
Village Community-based 
healthcare services, health 
promotion and education (to 
service approximately 100 
people using the community 
1:1000,1per 
25 
households 
 
 
Sources: Uganda NHA Report 1998/99-2000-01; Health Sector Strategic Plan and 
Ministry of Health Inventory 2002; MOH HMIS 2009; MOH Statistical Abstract 2010; 
Uganda Health Sector Strategic Investment Plan 2010/11-2014/15 
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The health system in Gulu follows a hierarchical structure like that at national level, 
except that there is no regional or national hospital. The levels of care under the public 
sector include health centres I, II, III, IV and a hospital.  Facilities are under the 
jurisdiction of the army, the municipality, private not-for-profit providers (PNFPs) 
(mission sector) and private for-profit providers (PFPs) as well as NGOs. More details 
about the health system in Gulu are presented in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3. Private Health Sector in Uganda 
Private health service providers comprise private not-for-profit organisations 
(PNFPs); private for-profit healthcare providers (PFPs), which are divided between 
formal and informal, also known as commercial healthcare providers; and traditional 
healers and complementary medicine practitioners (TCMPs)(MOH, 2012, Konde-lule 
et al., 2006). 
 
The PNFPs sub-sector comprise both facility-based and non-facility-based 
organisations. As shown in Table 3, the majority of the facility-based PNFPs are 
religious-based and fall under three umbrella organisations: the Uganda Catholic 
Medical Bureau (UCMB), the Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau (UPMB) and the 
Uganda Muslim Medical Bureau (UMMB) (MOH, 2002 in (Konde-lule et al., 2006). 
UCMB and UPMB own more facilities (37% and 31% respectively), with the other two 
bureaus having relatively few facilities countrywide (MOH, 2010a). 
 
By 2002, UCMB and UPMB together owned 78 per cent  of the 490 PNFP health 
units in the country, while the rest fell under other humanitarian organisations and 
community-based healthcare organisations (Konde-lule et al., 2006). According to 
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Tumwesigye (2013), any surplus in PNFPs is reinvested and used to improve the 
quality, scope and volume of services or to expand the infrastructure required for 
services. However, as earlier indicated in Chapter 2, the extent to which this claim is 
true is debatable.  
 
3.3.1 The private for-profit healthcare providers (PFPs) 
The MOH defines the  PFPs as  ‘the other sector’ that encompasses all cadres of 
health providers in the clinical, dental, diagnostics, medical, midwifery, nursing, 
pharmacy and public health categories who provide private health services outside 
the public, PNFP and the traditional and complementary medicine establishments 
(MOH, 2002). According to Konde-lule et al. (2006), the definition provided above 
only caters for the formal sector. Furthermore, the definition only focuses on the 
cadres who work within the facilities rather than the facilities themselves, although to 
the layperson, the name for-profit providers does not refer to the facility. Over the 
years, surveys about PFPs have been limited. Odedo (2001) in Konde-lule et al. 
(2006) conducted a study of PFPs in Uganda. He broadly classified FPFPs into 
medical clinics, dental clinics, drug shops and maternity homes, with drug shops 
accounting for the largest proportion of all the facilities. 
 
3.3.2 The informal for-profit providers 
According to Omaswa (2006), informal providers (IPs) in Uganda include drug sellers 
in the confinements of shops and clinics and also drug vendors and  unregistered 
pharmacists. 
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3.3.3 Traditional or complementary practitioners (TCMPs) 
According to the WHO traditional medicine strategy, traditional, complementary, and 
alternative medicine (TCAM) refers to a set of healthcare practices (indigenous or 
imported) that are delivered outside of the mainstream healthcare system. In the 
African setting, it may encompass indigenous healthcare practices such as bone 
setting (traditional bone setting), as well as imported complementary and alternative 
medicine products and practices, e.g. acupuncture or chiropractic as well as  local 
herbal medicines or products (WHO, 2014). In Uganda, the common types of 
Traditional Complementary Practitioners(TCPs) include traditional birth attendants, 
bonesetters, herbalists and traditional healers (Omaswa, 2006). A traditional healer 
is one who is recognized by his community as a healer, and uses indigenous 
knowledge handed down from generation to generation, to alleviate diverse forms of 
human suffering (ibid.). The main traditional healing practices described include 
spiritualism, herbalism and ‘false teeth’ extraction. Although witchcraft is mentioned 
among the practices, all healers tend to dissociate themselves from this practice 
(Konde-lule et al., 2006).  Among other forms of illness, traditional healers have been 
visited mostly in cases of mental illness because  of the belief that mental illness is 
caused by an attack by an evil spirit, witchcraft or curses (Ovuga et al., 1999, Akol et 
al., 2018). 
 
There also exist the non-indigenous traditional or complementary practitioners 
(TCMPs), such as practitioners of Chinese and Ayurvedic medicine, although these 
are  relatively new and have no formal linkages with the public and private providers 
(MOH, 2010a). 
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Table 4: Categorization of the private sector in Uganda 
 Categories Sub-categories 
1 Profit orientation Two extremes: 
– For-profit 
–  Not-for-profit  
2 Ownership – Mission-owned  
– Individual-owned 
3 Infrastructure – Facility-based 
–Non-facility-based 
4 Formalization/ 
Licence 
– Formal private for-profit providers (with 
licence) 
 –Informal private for-profit providers 
(without licence) 
Source: Author analysis 
 
3.4. Partnership with the Private Sector in Uganda 
According to the second National Health Policy, the Government of Uganda 
recognises the private sector as a major stakeholder and partner in the provision of  
health service delivery across the country (MOH, 2010b) and also as a partner in the 
provision of the national  minimum healthcare package (MOH, 2008). The 
government also encourages public-private sector partnerships (PPPs) in the 
implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP) as well as other sector 
plans, including health(MOH, 2010a). 
 
Nevertheless, for over 40 years, government partnerships in health have been 
dominated by engagement with the mission/PNFP sub-sector sector, particularly 
through their bureaus (MOH, 2010b, MOH, 2010a, MOH, 2012) while leaving out the 
for-profit sector. To this extent, the mission sector has been given subsidies for 
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primary healthcare and drugs as well as staff for purposes of expanding and 
achieving UHC. Furthermore, the mission sector has been invited to various 
committees in the MOH management structure and also allowed to participate in the 
discussions (Ssennyonjo et al., 2018).They have also been co-opted to take part in 
the accreditation of facilities which qualify to remain open. The government- PNFP 
(mission sector) relationship has also been characterised by challenges such as 
mistrust and rent-seeking by political leaders. However, various coping strategies 
were developed to ensure sustainability of the relationship for broader health sector 
gains (ibid.). With the recent development in scaling up strategic purchasing (results-
based financing), the mission sector facilities have also been able to benefit more 
compared to their for-profit colleagues, even in post-conflict settings (Witter et al., 
2019). Apart from regulation, these engagements and relationships have been quite 
limited in relation to the private for-profit sector. The study sought to explore if there 
are any relationships, or even partnerships, between the FPFP facilities and the 
government. 
The next section presents a brief discussion on the regulatory relationship between 
the public and private not-for-profit sector as well as related challenges.  
 
3.5. Regulation of the Private Sector in Uganda and Related 
Challenges 
Regulation refers to interventions initiated by the government to correct market 
failures (Muthaka et al., 2004, Ensor and Weinzeirl, 2006). Although this definition of 
regulation stresses the importance of the leadership of government in regulation, 
regulation activities may be devolved to other actors and bodies such as professional 
bodies as well as other agencies (Ensor and Weinzeirl 2006). In Uganda, the 
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operating licenses for the FPFPs are provided by the various related professional 
medical associations such as the Uganda Medical and Dental Practitioners Council, 
the National Drug Authority (NDA) and Allied Health Professionals (AHP). Hence, it 
is not surprising to find lists of FPFPs in the records of each of the professional 
associations. These lists are supposed to be updated annually based on payment for 
a licence. 
 
Over time, the Government of Uganda has made several deliberate policies to 
encourage the continued growth and contribution of the private sector to national 
development (The Republic of Uganda, 2010a). Among these is the easing of tariff 
barriers, although non-tariff barriers still constrain overall trade freedom. Although 
such policies have mainly encouraged the participation and growth of the formal 
private sector in health service delivery, they have not been able to tame the 
proliferation of the informal private sector (Konde-Lule et al., 2006). A similar problem 
has also been identified in other LMICs such as Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2002). 
 
Yet, given that the level and quality of services obtainable from the private healthcare 
providers are as varied as the providers themselves are, regulation of activities of 
these providers is important in order to safeguard patients and create order (Muthaka 
et al., 2004). Some scholars have identified the increasing numbers as well as 
proliferation of the private sector actors as a basis for regulation to create some order 
(Konde-Lule et al., 2006; Doherty, 2011; Doherty 2013). Within the UHC umbrella, 
the private sector needs to be regulated to ensure financial protection of the 
populations (McPake and Hanson, 2016). 
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In many LMICs, such as Uganda and Kenya, the success in regulating the private 
sector has been hindered by factors that include high costs, lack of information about  
those being regulated, poor legal infrastructures, and lack of clarity/agreement on 
what aspects to regulate (Muthaka et al., 2004, Ensor and Weinzeirl, 2006, Konde-
lule et al., 2006). 
 
3.6. Contextual Background of Northern Uganda 
From 1986  to mid-200613, Northern Uganda experienced violent armed conflict, in 
particular the war between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
(ARC, 2007, Kindi, 2010, Namakula and Witter, 2014, Namakula et al., 2011, 
MOFPED, 2002). The effects of the war have been widely documented: loss of lives, 
physical injuries; displacement of populations; destruction of livelihoods and the 
resultant poverty; suspension or dysfunctionality of public/government provision; and 
increased presence of other actors, including INGOs (Rowley et al., 2006, World 
Vision., 2009, Kindi, 2010, UKPCDP, 2013). Increased susceptibility to illnesses 
resulted from congestion in camps (ARC, 2007), the flight of health workers and other 
human resource challenges (Brown, 2006, Namakula and Witter, 2014, Roberts et 
al., 2009). All these effects elucidate the fragility created by the war in the Northern 
Region. 
 
In June 2006, relative peace14 was ushered into Northern Uganda following a 
cessation of hostilities agreement signed between the government and the LRA 
 
13 The conflict period runs from 1986 to mid-2006. The post-conflict period runs from mid-2006 to 
date. 
14  I refer to ‘relative peace’ here because the rebel leaders refused to sign the final peace 
agreement but signed only the ceasefire agreement (see ARC, 2007; Kindi, 2010).  Hence, it is 
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rebels (Kindi, 2010, ARC, 2007), hence creating prospects for the recovery and 
development of the region. The displaced population in camps was dissolved into a 
number of unplanned satellite/transit camps; more than 85 per cent of IDPs living in 
camps either moved to transit/satellite camps closer to their homes, returned to their 
villages of origin, or ‘commuted’ between their homes and the camps (IDMC, 2008, 
Brück and Bozzoli, 2008). During the post-conflict period, the movement of 
populations from camps to their original villages have raised issues of access and 
equity as well as the need for health system reconstruction (Namakula and Witter, 
2014). The effects of the conflict were so profound that the region lags behind the 
rest of the country, with poor human development indicators, as will be explained in 
section 3.7. 
 
3.7. Socio-economic and health indicators for Northern Uganda 
The Uganda National and Household Survey 2016/7 indicated that the literacy levels 
in Northern Uganda have remained relatively high; however, there exist sub-regional 
differences. The literacy level in the Acholi sub-region is still below the national 
average (UBOS, 2016a). For instance, data shows that in the financial year 2012/13, 
the literacy level in Lango was 71.4 per cent while that in the Acholi sub-region was 
67.7 per cent. In the financial year 2016/17, the Iiteracy level in Lango improved to 
77.6 per cent while the Acholi sub-region registered a decline to 59.7 per cent. Over 
the years, the Ministry of Gender and Social Development (MoGSD), with support 
from other partners, has implemented the functional adult literacy (FAL) programme 
 
not clear whether the rebels will come back to terrorise the region or not.  Nevertheless, the 
region has prospects for recovery and development. Various investments have been made under 
the framework of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). See Government of 
Uganda (2007, 2012) 
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which links literacy to livelihood and other needs.15 Nevertheless, even with this safety 
net, the literacy level in Acholi only increased to 61 per cent. This is still lower than 
the national average of 73.5 per cent (ibid.) 
 
In 2016, the total fertility rate in Uganda – interpreted as the number of children that 
a woman can have during her child-bearing age – was 5.4 children (UBOS, 2016b). 
Whereas the total fertility rate of Northern Uganda  was not indicated, there is 
evidence that the population of Northern Uganda is quite high and this can be 
illustrated using household size (UBOS, 2016a). According to the Uganda National 
Household Survey (UNHS) report for 2016/17, the household size of the Northern 
Uganda sub-regions was high (Acholi 5.5, Lango 5.1) compared to the national 
average household size of 4.7 people (UBOS, 2016a).  
 
Results from the UNHS indicated that the proportion of the population living in poverty 
in Uganda increased from 19.7 per cent  in 2012/13 to 21 per cent  in 2016/17, an 
equivalent of about 10 million  people in Uganda are living below the poverty line. 
(UBOS, 2016a). Interestingly, the Northern region16, which had consistently been the 
poorest region in the country in the last decade (Appleton et al., 1999, Brück and 
Bozzoli, 2008) registered a decline in poverty from about 44 per cent in 2012/13 to 
33 per cent  in 2016/17(UBOS, 2016a). Despite this performance, the poverty levels 
in the Northern Region are still higher than the national average. Table 5 summarises 
the trends in poverty for the Northern Region and the national average from 1992- 
2016. 
 
15 https://uil.unesco.org/case-study/effective-practices-database-litbase-0/functional-adult-literacy-
fal-programme-uganda 
16 Comprising Acholi and Lango sub-regions as per UBOS glossary for UNHS 2016 
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Table 5: Poverty trends in Uganda by region, 1992-2016 
Year Region 
 Central Eastern Northern Western National average 
1992    74  56 
1993 45.6 58.8 73.5 52.7  
2000 19.7 34.9 63.7 26.2  
2003 22.3 46.0 63.0 32.9  
2006 16.4 35.9 60.7 20.5  
2010 10.7 24.3 46.2 21.8  
2013   4.7 24.5 43.7  8.7 19 
2016   33  21 
Sources: UNHS 1993, 2013; UNHS, 2016; (World Bank, 2016) 
  
A poverty proxy survey conducted in 2013 by the ReBUILD Consortium in four sub-
counties in four villages in Gulu district, two of which are part of Gulu municipality, 
had earlier  revealed that poverty levels were still relatively high in the district and 
even higher among female-headed households (Ssali et al., 2011, Ssali et al., 2016). 
 
The major symptoms of ill health and injury for Northern Uganda, as indicated in the 
UDHS, were malaria, respiratory infections, severe  headache, general body 
weakness, abdominal pain, chills, childbirth-related, mental disorders and others 
(UBOS, 2016a). In the Acholi sub-region, the incidence of malaria was high (30.6%) 
followed by respiratory infections (13.3%) (ibid.).  
 
Despite the high poverty levels, the UNHS (2016/17) indicates that a high number of 
people in Northern Uganda (Lango 55%, Acholi 35%) sought treatment from a private 
hospital or clinic, while 6.4 per cent and 7.2 per cent of the population in Lango and 
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Acholi sub-regions, respectively, sought care from pharmacies. Those who sought 
care from a public health centre were 31 per cent and 53.4 per cent for Lango and 
Acholi sub-regions, respectively. Fewer people in the two  sub-regions (3.9% and 
4.6% respectively), however, visited government hospitals (UBOS, 2016a) 
   
3.8. The Healthcare Market in Northern Uganda 
The players in the healthcare market in Northern Uganda are similar to those in the 
whole country (MOH, 2010a, MOH. et al., 2012) and resemble those indicated in Elliot 
et al. (2008) framework (Figure 8), which is indicated in Bloom et al. (2014).  
 
Figure 8:  Framework for understanding the roles of actors in a pluralistic health 
system 
 
 
Elliot’s framework helps us understand the pluralistic and complex nature of the 
health system. At the centre of the framework are the forces of demand and supply 
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which co-ordinate the market. However, many players also exist within the same 
setting. The framework highlights the importance of interaction between players 
through formal and informal networks. The role of the state to regulate the market 
through formal laws is also highlighted as part of the major features (Bloom et al., 
2014).The supply side comprises public, PNFP and PFP sectors.  Table 6 shows that 
the public sector leads in ownership of health facilities, followed by the Uganda 
Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB), and then the Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau 
(UPMB). There were no facilities owned by the Uganda Muslim Medical Bureau 
(UMMB). One facility appeared in the ‘other specify’ column but this was not explained 
in the report (AVSI., 2011). 
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Table 6: Summary of health facilities per district in Acholi sub-region based 
on ownership by government and religious bureaus17 
District  Level of 
health 
facility 
Ownership 
Government 
 
 
The 
Catholic 
Diocese  
The 
Anglican/ 
Protestant 
Diocese 
The 
Uganda 
Muslim 
Supreme 
Council  
Others,  
specify 
 
Total 
of HC 
Kitgum HC II 9 0 2 0 0 11 
HC III 8 0 0 0 0 8 
HC IV 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Hospital 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Gulu  HC II 29 2 1 0 1 33 
HC III 14 1 0 0 0 15 
HC IV 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Hospital 1 1 0 0 0 2 
 Regional 
referral 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Pader HC II 15 2 0 0 0 17 
HC III 7 0 0 0 1 8 
HC IV 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Lamwo HC II 11 0 0 0 0 11 
HC III 6 1 0 0 0 7 
HC IV 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Amuru HC II 11 0 3 0 0 14 
HC III 3 2 0 0 0 5 
HC IV 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Agago HC II 24 0 0 0 0 24 
HC III 8 0 0 0 0 8 
Hospital 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Nwoya HC II 7 1 3 0 1 12 
HC III 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Hospital 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Source: Comprehensive health facility assessment for Acholi sub-region  
  (AVSI., 2011)  
 
 
17  This picture has largely changed, given the efforts of rehabilitation of government/public facilities 
during recovery. Nevertheless, their optimal functionality is yet to be achieved 
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Although PFPs also operated within the same setting, little has been documented 
about them. Yet, as Bloom et.al (2011) point out, ‘markets are frequently segmented, 
with actors that serve different social groups following different rules and behavioural 
norms’; they also vary widely in terms of their practice, type of knowledge and 
associated training, the extent of public subsidy and relationship with the legal system 
(p.i48). Other players in the healthcare market in northern Uganda include NGOs and 
donor agencies, which mainly fund and actively engage in the implementation of 
health services and vertical health programmes (Namakula et al., 2011). 
 
On the demand side are the public who demand/use health services. Inter-sectoral 
linkages/interactions exist between the private sector and other players in the health 
system as well as intra-sectoral linkages between private sector players. These can 
be through referrals, interpersonal bonds with doctors working in the formal sector, 
interactions resulting from government training programmes (Gautham et al., 2014) 
and through dual practice (McPake et al., 2002, Roenen et al., 1997). 
 
Having reviewed all the literature, the researcher then developed a conceptual 
framework for this study. The conceptual framework provided the basis for 
understanding, analyzing and designing ways to investigate relationships in health or 
social systems. It guided the emphasis of the research objectives/questions, the 
research design and, to some extent, the interpretation and analysis of the findings.  
3.9. Conceptual Framework 
The researcher developed a conceptual framework (Figure 9) based on insights from 
the literature reviewed combined with a composite of concepts borrowed from Elliot 
et al. (2008) framework (see Figure 8, sub-section 3.8) and from NIE theory. The 
framework emphasizes markets as complex systems (ibid.). The conceptual 
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framework shows that the factors influencing the contribution of FPFPs to 
equitable/pro-poor health systems are embedded in the context of operation and 
interactions between and within the context. As such, the context of the FPFPs has 
two components, the external context (EC 1 + EC 2) and the internal context (IC), 
where elements within each context interact with each other to produce an effect on 
FPFPs’ contribution towards a pro-poor and equitable health system. EC 1 consists 
of the broader context comprising the existence and behaviour  of other providers in 
the market/alternatives (Elliot et al., 2008) as well as security of the area, the demand 
for services, and local and international economic factors. EC2 comprises policy 
levers, i.e. nationwide or regional policies, which NIE term as external controls. 
According to Douma and Schreuders (2002), the internal environment (IC) of FPFPs 
comprises individual characteristics such as size, objective function and length of stay 
in business (sunk costs and credible commitment), skills mix, supervision, services 
offered (transactional costs), mission and internal adaptation.  
 
FPFPs must interact with all these elements and rely on both formal and informal 
networks to survive. Networks enable the sharing of vital information and other 
resources, such as human resources for health and equipment, and may facilitate 
referrals. These networks reflect contractual relations in NIE and are based on the 
trust developed between individuals in different organisations. In this case, the larger 
organisations benefit from linkages between individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 85 
 
Figure 9: Conceptual framework: Formulated by the researcher drawing on a 
composite of concepts from the literature 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology used to conduct this 
study. It begins with a brief discussion of the philosophical assumptions underpinning 
the development and implementation of the study. This study, as will later be 
indicated in this chapter, is a mixed-methods case study using a variety of data 
collection methods. Here, the chapter indicates the quant-QUAL sequence of the 
methods as well as the relationship between quant and QUAL methods – where the 
QUAL methods play a major role. A section on fieldwork and data collection indicating 
the study setting, fieldwork preparations and data collection methods comes next. 
The data collection methods are presented along with the rationale, selection of 
participants and how they were implemented. A discussion about the role of the 
researcher in influencing the process is indicated. The second last section focuses 
on ethics, the ethical clearance obtained as well as the ethical issues encountered 
and how they were managed.  Lastly is a presentation about the data management 
and analysis process for both the quantitative and qualitative data. As indicated, the 
researcher used thematic analysis for qualitative data and used mostly ATLAS.ti, 
although, with the relational objective, a combination of UCINET and ATLAS.ti was 
utilised to help illustrate the visualized networks between FPFPs and other 
organisations. 
4.1. Research Epistemology 
Before conducting any study, the researcher needs to clarify the epistemological and 
ontological considerations. The epistemological perspective of a study refers to the 
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philosophical groundings about the nature of truth and the approach used to 
understand and explain reality (Crotty, 1998). The selection of an epistemological 
perspective of a study is important because it helps the researcher to shape the 
research design and makes explicit to others the phenomenon being investigated 
(Creswell, 2007).The main epistemological perspectives have been represented in 
varying ways by various scholars, with names often used interchangeably, and this is 
often confusing. However, for this study, three of the four categorisations presented 
in Creswell (1998;2007) (see Table 7) were considered and used as a basis for the 
selection of an appropriate combination (Creswell, 1998, Creswell, 2007) and then 
used to  inform the choice of data collection methods. These include post-positivism, 
social constructivism, and pragmatism 
 
Table 7: The four worldviews 
Four World Views 
Post-positivism Constructivism 
• Determination 
• Reductionism 
• Empirical observation 
• Theory verification 
• Understanding  
• Multiple participant meanings 
• Social and historical construction 
• Theory generation 
Advocacy Pragmatism 
• Political 
• Empowerment issue-oriented 
• Collaborative 
• Change-oriented 
• Consequences of actors 
• Problem-centred 
• Pluralistic 
• Real-world practice-oriented 
 
Source: Creswell (2007), p. 6 
Post-positivism 
According to Creswell (2007), post-positivists argue that it is difficult to posit or be 
entirely objective when studying human behaviour (Creswell, 2007). Hence, they 
disagree with the traditional thinking predominant under positivism, which assumes 
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an absolute truth of knowledge, which can be posited and studied objectively for 
purposes of measuring reality and verification/testing theories. Despite their criticism, 
post-positivists continue to use the same assumptions as those of positivism (Phillips 
and Burbules, 2000). They still emphasise the need to employ a reductionist 
approach by reducing ideas into a small set of hypotheses and variables that are to 
be tested (Creswell, 2007). This view informs many quantitative approaches, which 
influence the use of experiments and closed-ended questions in a questionnaire to 
collect data. This view informed the researcher’s choice of the organisational survey. 
 
Social constructivism/interpretivism 
The terms ‘constructivism’ and ‘social constructionism’ tend to be used 
interchangeably and subsumed under the generic term ‘constructivism’(Charmaz, 
2006). However, they are quite different. Constructivism proposes that each individual 
mentally constructs the world of experience through cognitive processes while social 
constructionism proposes that individuals construct reality in relation to the 
experiences of others within the society in which they live (Andrews, 2012).Therefore, 
reality is a social construct since it refers to the subjective experience of everyday life, 
[or] how the world is understood rather than to the objective reality of the natural world 
(ibid.). 
 
Social constructivism originated from the classical works of Berger and Luckmann 
based on the social construction of reality (1991). They argue that  knowledge is  
constructed by interactions among individuals within society (Berger and Luckmann, 
1991). This view is consistent with that of Hamersley, who perceives reality as a social 
construct, one that is socially defined based on experiences of everyday life 
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(Hammersley, 1992). Social constructivists further argue that individuals attach varied 
subjective meanings to the realities that exist, based on their varied experiences 
(Creswell, 1998). This implies that to understand reality, the researcher needs to rely 
on participants’ views to describe this reality (Guba and Lincoln 1988 cited in Creswell 
1998; (Bryman, 2012). Based on this view, Creswell (2012) urges researchers to 
understand the context and/or set of participants through visiting the context and 
gathering the information themselves and also interpret what they find, based on their 
own experiences and backgrounds (p. 18). 
 
Therefore, the social constructivist epistemology informed the understanding of the 
healthcare market in Gulu as experienced by the FPFPs and individual FPFP 
healthcare organisations. The researcher mainly used a variety of qualitative 
methods, with broad and open-ended questions to enable the participants to 
construct meaning through the various discussions and interactions. The researcher 
also visited Gulu municipality, a post-conflict setting where the FPFPs have been 
located and conducted the interviews herself. 
 
 Advocacy/participatory epistemology 
Advocacy epistemology, which is sometimes referred to as ‘participatory’ or 
‘emancipatory’, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s and can be found in the works of 
Marx and Adorno (Neuman 2000 in Creswell 2007), Fay (1987) and  Wilkinson and 
Kemmis (1998). Participatory research has a predominantly transformative and social 
justice concern (Van der Riet, 2008). Therefore, proponents of the advocacy 
epistemology argue that  research subjects need to be emancipated and empowered 
to make changes in their lives (Kelly and Van der Riet, 2001). Unfortunately, neither 
the post-positivist nor the constructivists adequately contributed to this broader view. 
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Post-positivism is criticized for imposing theories and structural laws that do not 
adequately address issues of social justice. On the other hand, constructivism is a 
little better than post-positivism, because it enables the exploration of people’s 
experiences. However, good points do not go very far, because inherent in 
constructivism is a lack of an action agenda (Creswell, 2007), a crucial input for 
advocacy. 
 
Hence, advocacy focuses on the needs of people who are powerless in society and 
the need to have an action agenda which goes beyond the information generated to 
empowering participants to make changes in their communities. Therefore, research 
becomes a form of social activism, a ‘social intervention’ within which an idea and 
action are embedded (Kelly and Van der Riet, 2001).  
 
Pragmatism 
The term ‘pragmatism’ was derived from the Greek word, ‘pragma’, which means 
action, and which is the central concept of pragmatism (Pansiri, 2005). Pragmatism 
as a research paradigm is rooted in the contributions of the philosophical movement 
of pragmatism which originated in the late 19th century in the United States (Maxcy, 
2003). The pragmatist scholars, who include Charles Sanders, William James and 
Chauncey Wright, rejected the traditional assumptions about the nature of reality, 
knowledge and inquiry. In particular, they  rejected a notion  that  inquiry within social 
science could only be  conducted using a single scientific method (Maxcy, 2003).   
This implies that knowledge should not be generated only on the basis of a mutually 
exclusive reliance on either positivism alone or constructivism alone.  
  
 91 
 
Hence, pragmatist scholars argue that  although there is an objective reality that 
exists apart from human experience, this reality is grounded in the environment and 
can only be encountered through human experience (Morgan, 2014, Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2008). Based on this understanding of the complexity of reality,  pragmatists 
concern themselves with what works to solve the problem and also emphasize the 
use  of various philosophical and methodological  approaches to generate extensive 
knowledge about the problem or to answer the research question (Creswell, 2012, 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). This implies that  researchers need to have the 
flexibility and the freedom to choose methods that best meet their needs and 
purposes (Creswell, 2007). The possibility of the dichotomous nature of objective and 
social reality also influences the possibility of researchers aligning themselves with or 
conducting research that is influenced by more than one epistemological view.  
 
Application of pragmatism epistemology in this study 
Based on the pragmatic principle, this research was influenced by both the post-
positivist and constructivist worldviews. Accordingly, pragmatism provided the 
philosophical underpinning for using the mixed-methods approach and combining 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. The researcher chose a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative methods to help her answer the research questions and 
also to interrogate a complex phenomenon, the market, as experienced by the FPFP 
sector in post-conflict Northern Uganda, about which little is known.  
4.2. Research Strategy:  Case Study Research Design 
The study was informed by a case study design using mixed methods. These included 
organisational survey, organisational life histories, key informant interviews and 
observation.  
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A case study refers to an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not evident (Yin, 2003). The decision to use the case 
study design was guided by the ontological and epistemological view noted earlier. 
For instance, this study is informed by the interpretivist epistemology as well as the 
ontological paradigm.  In this connection, Stake (1995) suggests that qualitative case 
study researchers should be informed by constructivism. This implies that knowledge 
is constructed rather than discovered (p.99). Thus, as indicated in Creswell (2012), 
the qualitative case study researchers are conceived as interpreters who work in 
partnership with the participants to co-construct reality (p.24). 
 
Creswell (2008) advises researchers to determine the type of case study they want 
to undertake before conducting a case study. Stake (1995, 2005) highlights and 
distinguishes between three main types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental, and 
collective. In an intrinsic case study, the researcher’s interest is to understand a case. 
Therefore, the case itself is of interest. According to Stake (1995), the instrumental 
case study enables an examination of a case, with the sole aim of providing an insight 
into an issue or re-drawing a generalization. Therefore, the choice of a case itself 
advances the understanding of another interest. Lastly, in a collective case study, 
individual cases could manifest or not manifest some common characteristics. The 
cases are selected because understanding them will lead to a better understanding 
of the larger collection of cases. 
 
This study is an adaptation of an instrumental case study, which focused on providing 
insights into the healthcare market in Northern Uganda during and after conflict using 
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a selection of FPFP categories. However, the researcher did not intend to refine any 
pre-existing theory as such. 
The case study design has various advantages.  It enables the researcher to: 
1)  Conduct a detailed investigation of phenomena within their context to provide an 
analysis of the context and processes, which illuminate the theoretical issues 
being studied (Hartley, 2004, Pacho, 2015) 
2) Make sense of and contextualize explanations about the focus of the study by the 
research participants (Welch et al., 2011). 
3)  Helps a researcher to plan better for their research. For example, one knows in 
advance what the unit of analysis will be. It can be a single phenomenon, be it a 
single individual, programme or event (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). 
However, the case study design also has disadvantages and these have been mainly 
related to reliability, generalization and validity (Shareia, 2015). Because of the small 
samples involved in a case study, one of the main critiques about case study research 
as a qualitative method is the limited generalization of the findings (Yin, 2003, 
Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014). 
Indeed, case study scholars (Bryman, 1995, Creswell, 1998, Yin, 2003, Bryman, 
2012, Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014) have acknowledged the generalization of external 
validity as the ‘common and perceived inadequacy’ of case studies. 
 
However, some have also argued that case studies need to be evaluated on the 
adequacy of theoretical inferences rather than on generalization to a large population 
(Mitchell 1983 and Yin 1984 in Bryman 1995). Bryman (1995) notes that ‘the aim is 
not to infer the findings from a sample to a population but to engender the patterns 
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and linkages of theoretical importance’ (p.173). This study utilised the holistic 
embedded case study design using mixed methods in a quant→ QUAL sequence. 
This sequence, according to Bryman (2012), means that the quantitative methods of 
data collection play a subsidiary role, although they come before the qualitative data 
collection methods of data, which comprise the main data collection approach. Details 
about this are elaborated upon in section 4.5.  
4.2.1. Defining the case 
The term ‘case’, in a case study, can relate to several things based on the 
researcher’s interest, that is, the study objective and research questions (Baxter and 
Jack, 2008). According to Yin (2003) and Bryman (2012), the term ‘case’ in the case 
study is commonly associated with a location or site such as a community, 
department within an organisation, event/activity, programme or a person. Baxter and 
Jack (2008) note that a case can be bounded by context, time, scope, or geography. 
They further add that the definition of a case can also be guided/informed by the type 
of case study that is selected by the researcher. 
 
According to Yin (2002), there are two to four types of case studies – single holistic 
design, single embedded design, multiple holistic design, and multiple embedded 
design. Yin further distinguishes between holistic and embedded designs, noting that 
they require one unit of analysis and multiple units of analysis, respectively. 
 
In this case, a single embedded case study was employed as the specific case study 
design, where the focus of the case was the healthcare market during and after 
conflict. The unit of analysis was the experiences of the private for-profit healthcare 
providers of the market in Gulu municipality during and after conflict.   To understand 
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the case, 10 FPFPs (five young and five old, respectively) were selected to represent 
the various categories of FPFPs in Gulu municipality and hence various experiences.  
These included the experiences of the managers within these FPFPs that provided 
an in-depth elucidation of the growth and survival of the FPFPs within the healthcare 
system in Gulu municipality, their challenges, coping strategies as well as 
opportunities. The selected sub-units also highlighted the possible relationships 
between FPFPs and other providers in the area and provided an insight into whether 
and how the formal private for-profit sector in Gulu municipality contributes to access 
by the poor to health services.  
 
Boundary of the case: Merriam (1998) looks at the case as a thing, a single entity or 
a unit around which there are boundaries. Based on this view, Merriam advises 
researchers to delimit the boundaries of the case as a means of sharpening their 
focus (p.27). 
The contextual/geographical boundaries of the sub-units of the case in this study are 
defined by the geographical location of the study site (which is Gulu municipality, 
Northern Uganda).18However, a few key informant interviews were conducted in 
Kampala with individuals and groups who regulate the sub-units.  
 
The temporal boundary, according to Creswell (1998), is related to time (p.61). In this 
case the boundary was twofold: 1) the age of the FPFPs selected as sub-units of 
analysis, which reflected two phases of the conflict, that is during and after conflict; 
and 2) the end of the data collection period in April 2015.  
 
 
18The details about Gulu have already been provided under the section entitled ‘contextual 
background’. 
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The population boundary consists of individuals working within the FPFP, in facilities 
that relate with the FPFPs and those who supervise the operations of the FPFPs in 
Gulu municipality. The study population included managers of formal private for-profit 
organisations/businesses working in Gulu and health workers of formal for-profit 
organisations working in Gulu. Other participants included managers and health 
workers of other facilities that are not-for-profit (particularly private not-for-profit); 
managers of some public facilities; health workers working in the mission sector 
(PNFP) and regulators at the district and national levels. The study population also 
included 10 formal private for-profit organisations, which were sub-units for the focus 
of the study. The reasons for selecting the above categories of participants are 
detailed later. 
Figure 10: Illustration of the case study and unit of analysis 
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4.3. Mixed Methods 
Case studies have often been associated with qualitative research methods only 
(George and Bennett, 2005, Gerring J., 2004). However, Bryman (2012) argues that 
such an association is not very appropriate. Case study should not be a method, but 
rather as a design framework that may incorporate several methods. For instance, 
researchers conducting case studies can employ both qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Simons, 2009, Yin, 2009). Furthermore, the use of multiple sources of 
evidence is recommended when doing case study research (Creswell, 1998, Yin, 
2003, Yin, 2009). Yin (1989 cited in Creswell 1998) and Yin (2009), for example, 
recommend up to six examples of sources.19  According to Yazan (2015), advantages 
such as those indicated in a), b) and c) below accrue from the use of multiple 
methods: 
a) Multiple sources of evidence, which may converge on the same set of facts or 
findings for the purpose of triangulation 
b) A case study database (a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final case 
study report which helps the novice researchers understand how to handle or 
manage data); and 
c) A chain of evidence (explicit links between the questions asked, the data 
collected, and the conclusions drawn), which helps ‘follow the derivation of any 
evidence, ranging from initial research questions to ultimate case study 
conclusions.’ 
  
 
19The six common sources of data for case studies include direct observation, interviews, archival 
records, documents, participant observation and physical artifacts (Yin, 2009). 
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Additionally, Bryman argues that multiple methods enable the researcher to offset 
limitations between the two types of methods (quantitative and qualitative) as well as 
enable completeness of data (Bryman 2006 cited in Bryman 2012).  Therefore, using 
mixed methods enabled the researcher to probe or ask for clarification on information 
generated through other types of interviews. Table 8 shows a summary of methods 
and data sources and corresponding study objectives. 
 
Table 8: Summary of methods, data sources and related study objectives 
Research objectives  Sources of data  Analysis 
1a. Characteristics of 
FPFPs  
b. Evolution and changes of 
FPFPs during and after the 
conflict 
 
• Organisational survey 
• Observation 
• Organisational life-history 
interviews 
• In-depth Interviews 
• Key informant interviews 
•  Descriptive 
analysis (simple 
frequencies) 
using Excel 
• Thematic analysis 
using ATLAS.ti 
2. Market dynamics for 
FPFPs 
a) Challenges and 
coping strategies 
b) Opportunities  
c) Relationships 
between FPFPs 
and others 
• Organisational survey 
• In-depth interviews 
•  Key informant interviews 
•  Organisational life-history 
interviews 
•  Document review 
 
•  Thematic 
analysis using 
ATLAS.ti 
•  Social network 
analysis using 
UCINET software 
3. Mechanisms by FPFPs to 
ensure that the poor access 
health services 
and how interaction with 
others influences FPFPs’ 
contribution 
• Organisational survey 
• In-depth interviews 
• Organisational life-history 
interviews 
• Observation 
 
• Thematic analysis 
using ATLAS.ti 
 
4.Suggestions and 
recommendations 
Findings from 1-3 above •  Synthesis of 1-3 
 
4.3.1. Sequencing of the methods 
According to Creswell (2007), employing a mixed-methods approach involves 
collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially to understand research problems 
better. Sequential mixed-methods procedures are those in which the researcher 
seeks to elaborate on or expand on the findings of one method with another method 
(p.14). 
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However, as indicated by Bryman (2012), there can be up to nine ways of sequencing 
mixed methods (p.638). Although none of the scenarios is appropriate for this study, 
Bryman’s classifications were used as a guide for developing a suitable one. Creswell 
and Plano also describe four designs for a mixed method design: the convergent  
parallel, the exploratory sequential, the explanatory sequential and the embedded 
design (Creswell and Plano, 2011). Although the explanatory sequential design was 
a little closer to the study, it was not necessarily the best fit. With this guidance in 
mind, this study adopted the quant→ QUAL sequence (Bryman, 2012), where the 
upper case and lower case indicate priority, and the arrow indicates sequence 
(p.638). 
 
In the sequence above, two things characterize data collection: a) Quantitative 
methods precede qualitative methods; b) The quantitative methods play a subsidiary 
role, such as informing the selection of units (hence the reason why it is written in 
small letters, ‘quant’); c) The qualitative methods comprise the main data collection 
approach, hence the reason they have been indicated as ‘QUAL’; hence the study 
took an inductive approach. 
 
Bryman (2012) advises that in relation to the quant-Quant sequence, quantitative 
methods can be used to facilitate case selection (Bryman 2006 cited in Bryman 2012). 
Although this study used a similar sequence, the quantitative methods, in this case 
an organisational survey was used to generate data on the description of the sub-
units of the FPFPs’ characteristics and to facilitate selection of the sub-units of 
analysis. Hence, the organisational survey acted as a mechanism for screening and 
identifying the FPFP sub-units. For instance, some of the selection criteria (such as 
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a), e) and d)) indicated in Table 10 were derived from the analysis of quantitative data 
generated in this survey. 
 
Other relevant information that required further explanation and detail, for instance, 
information on the human resources, services provided, categories of clients served 
and information on informal relationships with certain listed other organisations 
(among others), was followed up in qualitative interviews. Probes were also made to 
check consistency and to fill the information gap. Figure 11 illustrates the sequencing 
of the data collection and the relationship between quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 
Figure 11: Sequencing of data collection methods 
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4.4. Fieldwork and Data Collection 
 
4.4.1. Study setting: Gulu district 
This study was conducted in Gulu district during March-May 2015. Gulu district is one 
of the eight districts which form the Acholi sub-region in Northern Uganda. Other 
districts include Kitgum, Pader, Agago, Amuru, Nwoya, Lamwo and Omoro. Gulu 
district was selected purposively because it was and continues to be the hub of the 
region during the conflict. As a hub, Gulu attracted a relatively high influx of private 
healthcare organisations compared to other districts in the region.  
 
Gulu district is found in Northern Uganda between longitudes 30-32 degrees east and 
latitudes 02-4 degrees north. It is bordered by Amuru district to the west, Lamwo 
district to the north-east, Pader district to the east, Lira district to the south-east, Oyam 
district to the south and Nwoya district to the south-west (UBOS, 2013). The total land 
area of Gulu district is 3,449.08 sq. km (1.44 % of the Uganda’s land size), of which 
96.9 sq. km is open water. The district headquarters is 332 km by road from Kampala 
and through the Great North Road, which enables access to South Sudan and the 
DRC (UBOS, 2013). 
 
Administratively, Gulu district comprises one municipality (Gulu municipality) and 
counties, namely Aswa and Omoro. Gulu municipality, commonly abbreviated as 
GMC, is the most urban of the four administrative units, the smallest and but also the 
most densely populated. For example, the 2013 population projections indicated that 
the Gulu municipality population was 163,100 while Omoro and Aswa had 143,400 
and 101,000 people, respectively (UBOS, 2013). Branch (2013) attributes the high 
population in Gulu municipality to the massive influx of populations to town during the 
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war, given that the town remained relatively stable compared to rural areas. The rural 
areas were characterised by internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, given the 
movement of populations to towns during the war (Branch, 2007, Branch, 2013). 
 
Figure 12 shows the four divisions that make up Gulu municipality, namely Bar-dege, 
Laroo, Layibi and Pece (UBOS, 2013). Each of the counties is sub-divided into 
several sub-counties/divisions, making it 16 sub-counties all together. 
 
Figure 12:  Map showing location of Gulu and Gulu municipality 
 
 
4.4.2. Health indicators for Gulu district 
The health system in Gulu follows a hierarchical structure like that at national level, 
except that there is no regional or national hospital. The levels of care under the public 
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sector include health centres I, II, III, IV and a hospital. Other providers of healthcare 
services include PNFPs and FPFPs. The district seems to be performing well in 
certain indicators, and even beyond 100 per cent around immunisation coverage. In 
2015, Gulu was among the best performing districts in Uganda (MOH, 2015).  By 
2015, malaria was the leading cause of mortality in Gulu, followed by pneumonia, 
intestinal worms and diarrhea (Gulu District Local Government, 2015). The situation 
had remained relatively the same during the 2015 study period. Table 9 summarises 
the basic health information for Gulu district for 2015. 
 
Table 9: Basic health-related information for Gulu district FY 2015 
Issue Data 
Functional health facilities 
4 Hospitals, 2 HC IV, 17 HC III and 62 HC II 
86 
  % health workforce staffing level (compared to approved 
positions) 
87 
OPD attendance capita 2.2 per person per year 
% of those with 4th antenatal care visits 46.1 
% immunisation coverage 161*20 
% deliveries at health facilities 89.3 
% HIV prevalence 7% 
% latrine coverage 72.1 
Position at league table (year 2015) 4th 
 
Source: Gulu District Local Government Plan (2015) 
 
4.4.3. Fieldwork preparations 
The researcher used existing networks developed over the last six years as a field 
coordinator for all ReBUILD Consortium studies. An initial field visit was undertaken 
in February 2015, during which the researcher paid a courtesy call on the District 
 
20 This is because of disease outbreaks and massive campaigns 
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Health Officer (DHO) and informed him of the intention to research the topic.  She 
also requested him to provide the list of registered21private for-profit healthcare 
organisations in Gulu, which would later be used as a sampling frame for the survey. 
The DHO, Gulu advised her to contact the laboratory and clinic supervisor for the 
updated list of formal private for-profit healthcare organisations. Before preparing for 
the key informant interviews, the researcher had already secured the telephone 
contacts of most of the participants as well as the physical addresses of their offices. 
Hence, it was easy for the researcher to visit to make appointments in person and to 
confirm by telephone. 
 
4.5. Data Collection Methods and Procedures 
The research methods used in this study have been illustrated in Figure 11 and 
summarised in Table 12. These include organisational survey, organisational life-
history interviews, in-depth interviews, key informant interviews, document reviews, 
and observation. The organisational survey came first and then were followed by the 
qualitative interviews. 
 
4.5.1 Organisational survey 
Bryman (2012) defines a survey as a type of cross-sectional research design whereby 
data is collected by questionnaire or by structured interview on more than one case 
at a single point in time in order to collect a body of quantitative data in connection 
 
21 Registration entailed payment of an annual operation licence fee and then completion of a form, 
which was downloaded online or physically picked up from the district health office.    The form also 
provided for questions about the location of the facility as well as the owner of the facility and 
telephone contacts. Furthermore, the person registering the clinic had to pay their membership fee. 
This would then enable a manager of the FPFP to have their organisation added to the list and 
entered in the district database (see annex). 
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with two or more variables to enable detection of patterns of association (Bryman, 
2012: 60).  
 
The advantage of surveys is that they enable data collection from a large population 
within a short time. Questions can also be standardized  (asked in the same order 
and same manner) for all respondents to allow comparability of responses from all 
respondents (Bryman, 1995). Survey questionnaires are also quick to code and 
analyse.  
 
4.5.1.1. Selecting organisations for the organisational survey 
For the organisational survey, a list of all the registered FPFPs, which was provided 
by the laboratory supervisor in Gulu district, was used as a sampling frame. All the 
organisations that appeared on the sampling frame were visited for an interview. Out 
of the 60 organisations that appeared on the list, only 45 participated in the survey. 
The remaining 15 were excluded from the study based on two reasons: 1) having 
declined to participate; and 2) having moved business or having closed shop despite 
being on the list. 
4.5.1.2. Conducting the organisational survey 
An organisational survey was conducted using a structured questionnaire. The 
purpose of conducting the survey was twofold – first, to establish the characteristics 
of the formal private for-profit organisations in Gulu in the post-conflict period (part of 
research question 1) and, secondly, to facilitate ‘case screening’ (Yin, 2003) and 
inform case selection for the organisational life-history interviews. Managers or any 
other person delegated by the manager participated in the survey.  
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The organisational survey provided data on several issues. These included period 
and duration of existence, category of organisation, mission/values, operating hours, 
bed capacity, the package of services offered in general, and the package of services 
offered free of charge or at a reduced price. Other issues included the categories of 
patients targeted, the number of staff and skills mix, among others, which other 
providers they had relationship/linkages with, and the resources exchanged with 
other organisations/providers in the area or beyond. The interviews lasted for 
approximately 40 minutes. 
 
4.5.2. Organisational life history22,23 interviews 
A life history is a type of in-depth interview which enables a  subject to narrate a 
chronological story of their lives while highlighting key events/turning points along the 
life course as perceived by them with the guidance of the interviewer (Atkinson, 1998, 
Bird, 2008, Bryman, 2012).   Historically, life histories have been used to study the 
lives of Polish immigrants (Plummer, 1983: 64 cited in Bryman, 2012), patient groups 
(Cole and Knowles, 2001, Miller, 1994), the nursing profession (Cole and Knowles, 
2001, Leininger, 1985), the history of neighborhood organisation (Yin, 2003), and 
poverty and well-being (Bird, 2008). Most recently, life histories have been used to 
study health workers' experiences of living and working through conflict (Namakula 
and Witter, 2014). Over time, modifications have been made to the life-history 
interview, particularly concerning the use of a timeline/lifeline.  A timeline is a 
horizontal line drawn on a piece of paper or on the ground by the storyteller or the 
interviewer to facilitate probing by the interviewer, jog the memory and check the 
 
22 The term ‘life history’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘life story’.  
23  The interviews are termed as ‘organisational life histories’ because they will be focusing on the 
lives of the organisations as perceived by the respondents rather than the lives of the respondents. 
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consistency of responses during the interview (Namakula and Witter, 2014, Bird, 
2008). At the end of the interview, timelines can act as summaries for the interview 
and can facilitate analysis. 
 
The life history method enabled the researcher to conduct a retrospective inquiry into 
the ‘lives’ of the FPFPs across different phases – and after the conflict.  It also enabled 
the researcher to map the different aspects of growth as well as the survival and 
challenges of these businesses across the conflict phases. The main disadvantage 
of the life history method is that it is usually long, running for 1-3 hours, and can yield 
much data that is difficult to transcribe and analyse. 
 
4.5.2.1. Selection criteria for sub-units of analysis 
Given the sequential nature of the data collection noted earlier, the data from the 
organisational survey informed the case selection for the life histories. Silverman 
encourages researchers to think critically about the parameters of the population 
being studied, based on which the purposive sample can be selected (Silverman, 
2005). Hence, the researcher developed a list of attributes, indicated in Table 10, to 
guide the purposive sampling of sub-units of the FPFPs/organisations for their life 
history from the available data generated from the organisational survey. Additionally, 
the researcher ensured that the sub-units of analysis were representative of the 
various categories of FPFPs. 
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Table 10: Parameters/inclusion criteria of 10 sub-units of the 
FPFPs/organisations selected for in-depth study 
a) Registration: They should be registered private for-profit 
organisations/entities. To this effect, only those that appear on the list of 
those registered/sampling frames for the quantitative component were 
considered for selection.  
b) Location: They should all be FPFPs located in Gulu municipality, to 
provide a linkage to conflict as a context.  Hence, the district and region 
are used to define what Creswell calls the ‘contextual/spatial boundaries’ 
of the sub-units of the FPFPs (Creswell, 1998: 61). 
c) Age:  Age was a temporal boundary (Creswell, 1998: 61) for the selected 
sub-units of the FPFPs. Here, age refers to years of existence and 
operation in Gulu and corresponds with the period during the conflict or 
after the conflict.   
d) Category of organisation: The research tried to represent a diversity of 
each of the categories of FPFPs that would have been mentioned in the 
survey if the categories met criteria a) and b) above. 
e) Ownership of organisation: The researcher also tried to include sub-units 
of the FPFPs according to ownership. For instance, the selection 
included individually owned FPFPs as well as those that are group-
owned. This was to ensure variety and diversity. However, this was also 
dependent on whether they met criteria a) and b) above and was based 
on results from the organisational survey. 
 
As a result, 10 sub-units comprising five old and five young FPFPs were included for 
life histories. The ‘old’ organisations were those that had existed in business within 
the area for more than 10 years (>10). The purpose of including such organisations 
was to enable the researcher to capture the experiences of FPFPs/track evolution, 
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growth, survival, challenges, coping strategies, and opportunities across different 
phases of conflict – during the conflict and after or even beyond. 
The ‘young’ organisations were those that had established business in Gulu 
municipality after the conflict (after mid-2006). These were less than 10 (<10) years 
old. The purpose of including such organisations was to enable the researcher to 
highlight reasons for the hypothesized expansion of the FPFP organisations in Gulu 
municipality after the conflict. Where possible, the researcher sought to have some 
comparisons between challenges, survival strategies, coping mechanisms as well as 
opportunities of the old and young organisations.  
4.5.2.2. Criteria for selection of study participants for life-history interviews 
The criteria for the selection of study participants varied according to the type of 
interview to be conducted.  Facility managers of the selected sub-units of the FPFPs 
who were to participate in life-history interviews were selected based on the position 
they held in the FPFPs (either as managers or owners of businesses). They were 
also selected based on the period they spent working in those organisations, i.e. at 
least 10 years and above for ‘old’ organisations and, in the case of the ‘young’ FPFPs, 
since the business was first opened.  Like in the cases of the FPFP managers, the 
other health workers in the sub-units of the FPFPs were selected based on the period 
worked24 and, therefore, had comprehensive knowledge about the business. Some 
health workers of FPFPs working in Gulu were selected based on their working 
experiences in old or young organisations, which is >10 or <10 years, respectively. 
 
 
24 They should have worked in the organisation since its inception/establishment. 
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4.5.2.3. Conducting the life-history interviews 
Using a semi-structured in-depth interview guide with open-ended questions, 
organisational life-history interviews were conducted with current managers of 
selected FPFPs to uncover the turning points/key events in the life cycle of the 
organisations since their establishment. The guide was developed based on the 
questions depicted by Yin (2003) in the ‘case study of a neighborhood organisation’ 
(pp. 13-52).25 However, some adaptations were made to suit the context.  
During the interview, the researcher would ask some questions to break the ice and 
then explain how the interview would be followed through. A timeline was drawn and 
then the researcher asked the participant to talk about the key events in the life of the 
organisation/business. In most sub-units of the FPFPs, the interview started with the 
opening of the business and the reason/decision to open the business. The 
discussion was then followed by some aspects of growth, e.g. growth in size, bed 
capacity and staff numbers. As most FPFP managers were reluctant to talk about 
their profits, the researcher used proxies such as the number of clients attended to to 
bring out indicators of profit. Probing questions were made across the timeline to seek 
clarifications as well as consistency. The interview was iterative, going back and forth 
across the timeline. At the end of the interview, the participants were asked to look at 
the timelines and check which information to correct or include what could have been 
missed. Each life-history interview generated a transcript but also a timeline as a 
visual summary of the interview. The duration of the life-history interviews ranged 
 
25  See annexes for sample questions that will be in the semi-structured interview guide for the life-
history interview. 
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from 1.5 to 2.5 hours, with those for ‘old’ organisations taking longer than those for 
young organisations. 
4.5.3. Key informant interviews 
Key informants are chosen because they are believed to have the most knowledge 
of the subject matter (Parsons, 2011). In a mixed-methods case study, they may be 
selected for purposes of triangulation of findings with other methods (Yin, 2009; 
Bryman, 2012). In this study, key informant interviews were used for purposes of 
gathering key information that would not have been identified by the managers who 
participated in the life-history interview. 
 
4.5.3.1 Selection of key informants 
Key informants were comprised of regulators at district and national levels, individuals 
who worked in other FPFPs (outside the 10 selected for in-depth study) as well as 
managers and health workers from the mission sector/private not-for-profit and 
managers of some public facilities. Key informants were selected purposively based 
on their experiences derived from having worked in the region for a long time (above 
10 years), working in other facilities in the market in Gulu or in positions of authority 
in relation to the supervision of FPFPs. Some of the participants, particularly the 
regulators, were included following recommendations from other interviewees. 
 
Using a semi-structured interview guide, key informant interviews were conducted 
with health workers in PNFPs, public facilities, and some private for-profit facilities to 
gain an insight into the informal relationships between their facilities and the private 
for-profit sector in general as well as perceptions of the FPFPs in Gulu. 
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Further key informant interviews were conducted to gain further insights into the 
experiences of coordinating FPFPs, regulating FPFPs, working with FPFPs as well 
as general perceptions about the potential of FPFPs. These were conducted with 
members of the district health team, including, for example, the District Drug Inspector 
(DDI), the regional Allied Health representative, the inspector for laboratories, the 
coordinator of the PPP office, and the inspector for clinics. These were interviewed 
based on the advice of the DHO. Other members who were interviewed at the district 
level included the town clerk and executive directors/representatives of professional 
councils.  
 
The DHO advised that, rather than interview him, the coordinator for laboratories, the 
district drug inspection officer, the coordinator for Allied Health and the coordinator 
for clinics, pharmacies and drug shops should be interviewed, as they would provide 
the most relevant information for the study. Some of the participants were selected 
following recommendations from other interviewees. The duration of the key 
informant interviews ranged between 45 minutes and one hour. 
 
4.5.4 Document review 
Document analysis is one of the six methods that Yin (2002) proposes for a case 
study. Documents can provide information which may triangulate or supplement 
views from the interviews. To provide a background to the topic, official documents 
were analyzed. Thus, national reports and district reports were reviewed to 
understand issues related to the regulation of the private sector and the engagement 
of the private sector in health service delivery at the district level. The researcher had 
requested FPFPs to provide selected documents, such as internal reports (annual or 
monthly). However, the majority were reluctant to share them. Instead, they preferred 
 113 
 
telling their story and merely sharing non-sensitive/ marketing information such as 
brochures, which indicated the services provided. In this case, the memos on the 
noticeboards of the various FPFPs were analyzed as well. 
 
4.5.5. Observation 
Observation is a data collection method which is most strongly associated with 
ethnography and applies to experiments. Using observation, a researcher 
systematically observes/looks, records/notes, describes, analyses and interprets 
phenomena in the social setting of the study as they occur (Kawulich., 2012, Davies, 
1999, Ritchie, 2003). Table 11 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the 
observation method. 
Table 11: Advantages and disadvantages of observation method 
Advantages  Disadvantages 
1. May enable you (the researcher) to 
access those aspects of a social 
setting that may not be visible to the 
public – those backstage activities that 
the public does not generally see. 
You may not always be interested in what 
happens behind the scenes 
2. Observation gives a researcher an 
opportunity to provide rich, detailed 
descriptions of the social setting in 
field notes and to view unscheduled 
events, improve interpretation, and 
develop new questions to be asked of 
informants 
Your interpretation of what you observe may 
be hindered by several factors – participants 
may only permit you to observe situations that 
you already know 
 
 
3.  Limited researcher bias Observation does not solely involve watching 
others; it also involves asking questions to 
ensure that your interpretation of what you 
observe is really what is going on and this 
may imply bringing in your researcher bias as 
you ask questions 
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There are two main types of observation, namely participant observation, and 
structured observation. Participant observation, which is a common practice in 
ethnographic research, involves the long-term personal involvement of a researcher 
with the research subjects (ibid.). 
 
Structured observation, on the other hand, is concerned with the frequency of event. 
It is characterised  by a high level of a predetermined structure of observing 
phenomena and is used for measuring the occurrence of phenomena for purposes of 
quantitative analysis (Bryman, 2012). 
 
Whereas a distinction is provided, some scholars have argued that there is a thin line 
between participant observation and mere observation, given that the researcher may 
find themselves participating, for instance, by asking questions. Such a situation 
opens the door to researcher bias (Ratner, 2002). This study adopted a mix of 
participant observation and structured observation. This is because the researcher 
not only drew up a list of things to observe but also, once in the field, found herself 
participating in some of the activities that were going on and also asked some 
questions after making some observations during the interviews. 
 
The researcher observed certain aspects of the physical environment of the FPFPs, 
such as the physical structure, signposts, posters and nearby surroundings, general 
cleanliness as well as the interaction between the health workers in the FPFPS and 
their clients. She then filled in the spaces on a structured and pre-typed sheet with 
structured questions. In some instances, the researcher abandoned the observation 
checklist and resorted to writing detailed notes on the back of the checklist. 
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Observation enabled the researcher to gather firsthand information that may not have 
been in the organisational documents. It also provided an insight into the day-to-day 
experiences of those working in FPFPs and the category of clients being served. For 
instance, this included the infrastructural size of a FPFP, the range of services 
provided as well as the general advertisement mechanisms (noticeboards and 
signposts), marketing strategies and directions around the facility. Observation of 
general cleanliness was also undertaken as a proxy to enhance the understanding of 
environmental quality. Ritchie notes that observation offers the opportunity to record 
and analyse behaviour and actions as they occur (2003: 35). This was true of the 
observation of the interaction between health workers at FPFPs and their clients.  
 
The researcher spent a minimum of one day observing each of the 10 FPFPs selected 
for in-depth study. The researcher would visit the facility in the morning, and then 
return in the evening of the same day or in the afternoon of the following day, 
depending on which was preferred.  During the observation, the researcher would 
make notes in the spaces left in the observation sheet, for different parameters.  A 
note on general observations was made. 
 
4.5.6. Total number of interviews conducted 
As a result, 45 semi-structured survey interviews, 10 organisational life histories, 13 
key informant interviews and observational notes were gathered. Table 12 
summarises the type, number of interviews and categories of respondents. 
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Table 12: Summary of interviews and category of participants 
Category of method Number of 
interviews 
Participant category 
Organisational survey 45  FPFP managers or any other person delegated by the 
manager 
Life-history interviews 10 FPFP managers and in some sub-units of the FPFPs, a long-
serving member or co-business owner  
Key informant interviews 13  District drug inspector (DDI), regional Allied Health 
representative, inspector, laboratories, coordinator, clinics, 
executive directors of professional councils, Town clerk 
 Others included managers in PNFP and public facilities s as 
well as Health workers in PNFP, Public facilities, and some 
other private for-profit facilities that were outside the sub-units 
of analysis 
TOTAL 68  
Observation (PO and 
structured) 
10  Ten FPFPs observed, notes taken, and checklist completed 
Document review Over 200  
4.6. Data Management and Analysis 
 
4.6.1. Management and analysis of quantitative data 
A database was generated from the structured questionnaires. Data was captured 
and entered in Excel spreadsheets and then exported into Statistical Methods for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) analysis software. Descriptive statistics were then generated 
based on the questions in the survey questionnaire 
 
4.6.2. Management and analysis of qualitative data 
As advised by Silverman (2005), analysis of qualitative data began in the field 
(Silverman, 2005). After every interview, the researcher reviewed data, and reflected 
upon the research questions to identify gaps where further probing/follow-up needed 
to be done in the subsequent interviews. 
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Furthermore, analysis of qualitative data was guided by the framework approach 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 1994) and the organisation of data was further assisted by 
ATLAS.ti version 7.0. Framework analysis adopts an iterative approach and involves 
the following stages: ‘familiarisation, listening to audio recordings, reading field notes, 
coding and identifying key themes, merging themes, searching for key findings, 
finding associations and providing explanations for the results’ (Ritchie and Lewis., 
2003). 
 
Audio recordings were transcribed verbatim so that original quotes were not lost. The 
audio recordings were also compared with the notes taken during interviews to fill in 
any gaps in information that could have been left out or mis-recorded during the 
interview. The interviews were then filed using identifiers emerging from the data. 
Transcripts were read several times to allow familiarisation with the data and enable 
the identification of recurring themes. A coding framework was developed, and the 
transcribed interviews were entered in ATLAS.ti software and coding nodes were 
attached to the various themes. ATLAS.ti query reports were generated and printed 
out for each theme. Furthermore, the query reports were scrutinized for emerging 
sub-themes and quotations that epitomize the central themes were identified. 
Findings were then synthesized across the main themes, and patterns and 
differences across different organisations were noted. 
 
4.6.3. Social network analysis 
Research question 2(d) focused on understanding the dynamics of the healthcare 
markets in which the FPFPs operate.  Research question 3(d) also focused on how 
the relationships enabled the FPFPs to make their contribution. Hence, the 
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researcher was interested in understanding the relationships between FPFPs and 
other organisations to understand how healthcare markets thrive and sustain 
exchanges/transactions. Accordingly, some relational questions were also asked 
during the interviews across the survey questionnaire, key informant interviews and 
life-history interviews.  The researcher chose to use Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
to illustrate the relationships and the networks which could emerge because of these 
relationships 
 
SNA has the following advantages: 
•  It enhances the possibility of revealing social network data embedded in 
qualitative interviews (Mckether et al., 2009).  
• SNA can help anthropologists to improve their analysis and reporting of 
ethnographic data, thereby expanding the methodological tool kit traditionally 
used by anthropologists (Mckether and Friese, 2016). 
• SNA enables the researcher to examine the relationships (also referred to as 
links, edges or ties) which an actor or actors (referred to as nodes, alters or 
vertices) have with other individuals, groups or organisations in an environment 
(Mckether and Friese, 2016). 
•  SNA helps depict the structure of a group by examining important relationships 
reflected in the strength, direction and complexity (or number) of ties embedded 
in a network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
Under this analysis, in this study, the researcher was interested in ego-centred 
networks. Ego-centric networks are those that focus on an individual who describes 
people/organisations (alters) close to him or her (Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988) and 
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his/her connections.  For this study, the FPFP was the ego while those that were 
mentioned were referred to as ‘alters’.  
 
4.6.4  Analysis process for the relational objective 
The analysis process for the relational objective followed the process as presented 
in (Mckether and Friese, 2016) although with some modifications.26  McKeither and 
Friese first developed a special coding frame for the relational objective, and then 
coded the data in a new ATLAS.ti file. They then extracted the relational links that 
arise out of the data coded into ATLAS.ti and then exported it to UCINET. 
 Table 13 indicates a separate coding frame which was developed for the relational 
objective and interviews coded again into ATLAS.ti, while identifying organisations 
and individuals to which FPFPs are related as well as the relational links between 
FPFPs and other organisations and individuals.  For each organisation mentioned 
and relational link identified, a three-digit numbers from 400 through 464 and 001 
through 035 respectively and then coded into ATLAS.ti, with the words added by 
mere separation with an underscore. 
Table 13: Codes for names of organisations and relational links developed for 
ATLAS.ti 
Nodes Object in 
ATLAS.ti 
 Numbering 
scheme 
 Code generated in ATLAS.ti – 
with examples 
 Names of 
organisations 
mentioned in 
interviews (including 
those being 
interviewed) 
Name code 400-464 Org_FLAMAUganda_400 
 
 Names of people 
mentioned in 
interviews 
Person code 001-007 N_LastName_First Name_ID 
Number 
 Example: N_Nathan _ Akello*_001 
Relational link  Link code 001-035 L_Link Relation_ID Number 
Example: L_we refer to them_011 
 
 
26 The network maps were not created with in ATLAS. Ti but within Net Draw (which is a platform for 
developing networks within UCINET software. 
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Figure 13: An extract of coded data for relational objective – interview with a 
medical centre 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s ATLAS.ti Hermaneutic project 
 
The relational links were then summarised into Excel to generate a descriptive graph 
and later exported to UCINET to generate network illustrations. After coding in 
ATLAS.ti, the researcher had to prepare the data further for input in UCINET. An 
Excel file was developed indicating 1) the organisations being interviewed; 2) the 
organisation that has been mentioned; and 3) the relationship/link that exists between 
the organisations.  At this stage, the researcher further shortened the relation link 
name to one word/compound word and then created a comment column explaining 
what exactly was being exchanged between the two organisations. This would help 
later in the write-up. Additionally, the researcher merged some of the 35 relational 
links into 14 broader categories and later seven categories whereas the remaining 
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relational links, including links with individuals and between organisations that were 
already linked to FPFPs, were clustered into the ‘others' category. 
 
Separate matrices were created for general network and seven relational links that 
had been mentioned 10 times and above.  The researcher decided to sort the data 
(by clicking on the filter function in Excel) and then select all similar links together with 
the organisations. For each of the selected relational links, a dichotomized square 
matrix with a list of all organisations that had appeared in the sorted sheet had to be 
generated. 
 
These matrices or sorted Excel files were then imported into UCINET, then saved as 
a network analysis file ending with the extension ##h. The UCINET files were 
visualized Net Draw to create a socio-graph/network. For all the graphs, the circular 
layout was selected and then the colour codes edited and finally the file was saved 
as JPEG. Some of the files were saved as a bitmap to allow for further editing. Those 
network maps that had isolates – those that were not related to any other – were 
deleted from the network. 
 
To identify the core organisations in the networks, the aggregated matrix for each of 
the relational links was subjected to the degree of centrality analysis, particularly the 
degree of betweenness (Borgatti and Everett, 1999). Betweenness centrality 
measures the extent to which a vertex lies on paths between other vertices and hence 
controls some information passing between others. Removal of such a vertex from a  
network  causes a disruption (Borgatti and Everett, 1999).27 The level of  
 
27https://www.sci.unich.it/~francesc/teaching/network/betweeness.html 
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betweenness is  illustrated by the number of arrows connected to a node, where  the 
arrows are fewer, it implies high betweenness and  where the arrows are many, it 
implies low betweenness.  In relation to the study, some organisations within a given 
network had many links attached to them compared to other organisations, hence 
they had high betweenness and were referred to as the ‘most central organisations’. 
The many links represent high influence within the network. Given their influence, the 
network would be disrupted if they were removed from a network. In the case of the 
FPFPs, those that were central were the ones with the high betweenness, those with 
many links, so that when the researcher attempted to remove them, many links were 
lost. 
4.7. Reflexivity of the Researcher 
Reflexivity is a continuous process of reflecting on how the researcher could be 
influencing their research project and also shapes the final outcome of the project 
(Hardy et al., 2001). It should be integrated into the whole research process right from 
conducting research through analysis to write-up. When doing research informed by 
the traditional positivist research paradigm (e.g. experiments), the researcher 
attempts to be neutral while collecting data. However, this may be difficult for research 
influenced by a social constructivist paradigm as researchers bring on board their 
interpretations and experiences in order to co-construct reality (Creswell, 2012) with 
the participants. 
 
The researcher acknowledges that her experiences and her background as a social 
scientist and a person who had worked in post-conflict settings for several years 
shaped her access to participants and influenced her interpretations of the findings. 
The researcher’s interest in the pro-poor agenda also influenced the questions that 
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were asked. Nevertheless, the researcher continued to be less judgmental of the 
FPFPs as she continued to analyse the findings interviews during and in-between 
interviews. 
 
4.8. Ethical Considerations and Clearance 
Ethical principles of social research enable researchers to ‘do the right thing’ (Ruane, 
2005). Ethical principles that were adhered to in this study include informed consent, 
confidentiality, anonymity, do no harm and data storage. These principles have been 
articulated well by various authors of research methods (Ruane, 2005; Bryman, 
2012). Ethical approvals/clearance were sought from the Queen Margaret University 
(QMU) Ethics Committee, the Makerere University School of Public Health Higher 
Degree Research and Ethics Committee (HDREC 279) and Uganda National Council 
for Science and Technology (UNCST) – SS 3795. Further permission to conduct 
research was also sought from the district health office and managers of the private 
for-profit organisations/facilities (Appendix 3). 
 
Written informed consent to participate and record interviews was obtained from the 
individual study participants (Appendix 1). Anonymity and confidentiality for all 
information obtained were ensured using serial numbers and pseudonyms or codes 
in place of respondents or organisations. Additionally, broad terms such as ‘young’ or 
‘old’ organisation were used to ensure that organisations/sub-units of the FPFPs are 
not identifiable when referred to in the thesis. All the collected data was saved, and 
password-protected and accessed only by the researcher. 
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CHAPTER 5:  CHARACTERISTICS AND EVOLUTION OF  
  THE FPFP SECTOR 
 
5.0. Introduction 
The findings in this chapter address research question (1), which focused on the 
description of the general characteristics of FPFPs in Gulu as well as the 
changes/evolution of FPFPs, during and after the conflict. The researcher used data 
from an organisational survey of 45 FPFPs as well as qualitative data sources such 
as life-history interviews and key informant interviews. The analysis draws on 
constructs from the neo-liberal theory (proliferation and free entry), the concept of 
evolution of organisations as well as NIE-related concepts such as sunk costs and 
credible commitment, among others. The chapter also draws on the stages of the 
organisational life cycle to analyse evolution among the FPFPs. The chapter is 
divided into two parts; 5.1 focuses on the characteristics of the FPFP sector while 5.2 
focuses on the emergence of the FPFP sub-sector in Gulu as well as the evolution of 
the FPFP sector over time. 
5.1. Characteristics of the Formal Private For-Profit Provider 
(FPFP) Sector 
The 45 FPFPs surveyed had varying characteristics, which were categorised into 10 
sub-themes, deducted from the questionnaire. These included registration, category 
of organisation, ownership28, source of initial capital invested, age (duration of 
existence), package of services offered, staffing, the inpatient admission capacity 
 
28 This was derived from life-history interviews. 
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(where appropriate), the operating hours and number of days open in a week. These 
are explained in greater detail below. 
 
5.1.1. Registration 
To deliver services legitimately, all FPFPs were required to register with the district 
health headquarters to appear on the list. Fulfilment of this obligation required 
payment of annual licence fees for operation, suitability of the premises and 
displaying the licenses in the facilities. The researcher also observed that for most of 
the FPFPs, the annual licenses for that year (2015) hung on the walls, although many 
were not keen to keep and share records of the previous annual licenses, except for 
the drug shops. Regulation also required that all staff of the FPFPs, depending on 
their respective cadres, had to belong to a specific professional body, with an annual 
subscription. Although the researcher did not request certificates of membership 
during the interviews, the managers verbally acknowledged that this was the case for 
all their staff. 
 
5.1.2. Categories of FPFPs in Gulu 
The mini-organisational survey also showed a variety of categories of FPFPs in Gulu, 
including clinics, clinics with laboratory sections, pharmacies (exclusively retail or 
wholesale, a mixture of wholesale and retail), stand-alone laboratories, medical 
centres, private hospitals, insurance company clinics, and others. Others included 
drug shops, imaging, and medical X-ray centres, ‘health centres’ and NGO clinics. All 
health centres that were operating on a for-profit basis were at the HC II level.29 As 
illustrated in Table 14, the majority of the FPFPs surveyed were clinics (18), followed 
 
29 This is the second level of facility within the public health system. 
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by drug shops and medical centres (7). There was only one private hospital, 
insurance company clinic30, X-ray centre, NGO clinic and HC II, respectively. The 
majority of the FPFPs were located either along relatively busy streets within Gulu 
town. 
Table 14: Categories of FPFPS 
 q15 Category of organisation 
Code Organisation Frequency Per cent  Cumulative Per cent  
1 Clinic 18 40.0 40.0 
2 Medical centre 7 15.6 55.6 
3 Pharmacy 5 11.1 66.7 
4 Laboratory 2 4.4 71.1 
5 Private hospital 1 2.2 73.3 
6 Insurance company clinic 1 2.2 75.6 
7 Drug shop 8 17.8 93.4 
8 X-ray and scan centre 1 2.2 95.6 
9 NGO clinic 1 2.2 97.8 
10 HC II (health centre level 2)31 1 2.2 100 
 Total 45 100.0  
 
30These were two but one declined to participate in the study. 
31 Although this is a government designation, some of the FPFPs are awarded the same title if they 
satisfy the requirements for this level. This is after they pass the accreditation process.  The 
requirements are summarised under the section on health systems components.   On observation, 
there turned out to be many private providers at HC II, although the majority were private not-for-
profit. 
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Photo 1: Some of the FPFPS in Gulu – Courtesy of Justine Namakula 
 
5.1.3. Ownership and source of initial capital invested 
There were two major categories of ownership of FPFPs – individual ownership and 
group ownership – with the former being more common. Sub-categories under group 
ownership were family-owned businesses or businesses owned by a pair or group of 
friends. In some cases where there was more than one owner, the strategy was to 
combine initials to form the name of the business. Regarding initial capital, the data 
indicated three main sources of initial capital for the FPFPs in Gulu: savings, funds 
pooled across a group of people and loans.  Loans as a source of capital were more 
common among the relatively new FPFPs. 
Savings were mainly from salaried jobs in the public sector or PNFPs as well as 
salaries from jobs in non-health-related sectors or savings from other businesses 
owned by the FPFP owner(s). Businesses whose initial income was a result of pooled 
funds across a group (not necessarily relatives) had experienced major changes in 
the past, i.e. a change in location and name after current owners disagreed with their 
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previous co-owners. Other challenges, such as lack of continued financial 
commitment and the presence of shareholders in some group owned FPFPs, also 
resulted in ‘potential struggle’. This was the case with one clinic and one stand-alone 
laboratory: 
We joined resources and opened a clinic [in Pece] for some time and later we 
separated, and I opened-up my own in Layibi in 1985. (P18: LH_Medical 
centre_ Old FPFP) 
 
They had some shares, got the money, put it together and established a 
business. (P20: LH_ Laboratory_ Young FPFP) 
 
We got a loan. (P21: LH_ Clinic_ Young FPFP) 
 
5.1.4 Age (duration of existence) of business 
In this study, the age of business referred to is the number of years that a FPFP has 
existed since its establishment. The longest duration in business was 33 years, 
whereas the shortest was four months. Table 15 indicates that of the 45 FPFPs 
surveyed, only 12 FPFPs had existed between 10 and 33 years, and the majority 
were clinics. Throughout the finding’s chapters, these are referred to as ‘old FPFPs’. 
Thirty of the FPFPs had existed between 1 and 9 years, and the majority of these 
were also clinics and others, including drug shops, hence these were referred to as 
‘young FPFPs/organisations’. However, three of the organisations interviewed in the 
survey – two pharmacies and a medical centre – had been in existence for less than 
a year at the time of data collection. Accordingly, such organisations are referred to 
as being in the ‘fetal stage’. 
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Table 15: Age of existence for FPFPs 
 
Source: Organisational survey 
 
5.1.5. Package of services 
The results revealed that FPFPs provided a range of services. As indicated in Figure 
14, skill-demanding services such as maternal deliveries and major surgeries were 
offered by a few, which had the requisite medical equipment and personnel.  For 
instance, in this respect, private hospitals and some relatively large medical centres 
had a competitive advantage. Few FPFPs offered specialised services, such as 
dental, ear, nose and throat (ENT) and X-ray services. In some cases, FPFPs 
specialised in certain services, for instance, stand-alone laboratories that specialised 
in haematology and urine tests, whereas other FPFPs were a one-stop centre for all 
services. For example, some clinics had a laboratory and mini pharmacy 
incorporated. This is one of the survival strategies revisited in Chapter 6. The ‘other’ 
Category of organisation Years of operation/existence Total 
  >1 yr. ('fetal 
stage’) 
1-9 yrs 
(young org.) 
10-33 yrs 
(old org.) 
Clinic   11 7 18 
Medical centre 1 5 1 7 
Pharmacy 2 2 1 5 
Laboratory  0 2 0 2 
Private hospital  0 0 1 1 
Insurance company clinic  0 1 0 1 
NGO clinic 0 0 1 1 
Drug shop 0 7 1 8 
X-Ray, scan and medical imaging 
centre 
0 1 0 1 
HC II** 0 1 0 1 
TOTAL  3 30 12 45 
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category included services such as Ante-natal clinic (ANC), paediatric services, HIV 
screening, scan, mammography and dermatology consultation. 
 
Figure 14: Package of services provided by FPFPs in Gulu 
 
 
For which service is this facility best known? 
Of the package they provided, the managers of FPFPs were also asked to report on 
the services offered by their facilities that the facilities were best known for or the 
services for which their loyal customers always came. Figure 15 shows that the 
majority of the FPFPs reported that they were ‘best known’ for laboratory services 
(25). However, only one FPFP, a stand-alone laboratory, stated that it was best 
known for ‘blood tests. Few FPFPs reported being ‘best known’ for maternal 
deliveries. Similarly, only one FPFP reported being ‘best known’ for X-ray. 
Furthermore, many FPFs reported being ‘best known’ for the sale of drugs (20), family 
planning services, prescription of drugs and consultation. 
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Whereas a few had reported that they provided ENT-related services as well as an 
eye clinic32, none of the FPFPs mentioned that they were best known for these afore 
mentioned services. Five of the FPFPS reported they were known for other services, 
particularly a paediatric section (1), HIV screening (1), scan (1), gynaecology (1) and 
mammography (1)). Having a paediatric section was reported by only one clinic (one 
of the old); only the private hospital mentioned mammography. 
 
Figure 15: Which services is this FPFP best known for? 
 
 
 
Who are the users of the services in the FPFPs? 
The survey questionnaire also had a question in relation to who the service users for 
the services provided by FPFPs were. The researcher had generated nine pre-
determined categories, namely the elderly, people with disabilities (PWDs), pregnant 
women, NGO staff, all households in Gulu, former abductees, persons living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) and child mothers, and the results showed no significant 
 
32  See graph (Figure 1) under section on package of services 
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differences across all categories. However, Figure 16 indicates that relatively fewer 
reported that they provided services to all households in Gulu (18) as well as former 
abductees (13). Some FPFPs reported that they provided services to all people(19), 
whereas three FPFPs reported that the users of their services were not necessarily 
people, rather other facilities, i.e. clinics(1), drug shops(1) and hospitals(1). 
 
Figure 16: Who are the users of the services in FPFPs? 
 
 
5.1.6. Human resources for health 
Based on the survey findings, the private hospital had the highest number of staff 
(62), followed by medical centres and clinics, whereas the drug shops had the lowest 
number of staff (2). It is important to note that, in most cases, this total always included 
part-time staff (Figure 17). Part-time staff were common across all the FPFPs 
interviewed, with the clinics and drug shops more likely to employ such staff while 
laboratories were least likely. Concerning cadres, the commonest cadre employed by 
the FPFPs interviewed was enrolled nurses, whereas specialists, such as 
radiologists, surgeons and gynaecologists, were few (Figure 18). 
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Figure 17: Availability of part-time staff in FPFP facilities 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Cadres working in FPFPs 
 
 
5.1.7. Admission capacity for FPFPs in Gulu 
The researcher assessed the admission capacity of the FPFPs in Gulu based on the 
reported bed capacity/number of beds in the facilities/organisations. Table 16 shows 
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that only 15 of the 45 FPFPs reported that they had beds. The private hospital had 
the highest number of beds, followed by a medical centre and some clinics. The 
pharmacies, drug shops as well as the laboratories, the insurance company clinic and 
the NGO clinic all reported that they did not have beds for admitting patients. 
 
Table 16: Number of beds reported per category of FPFP 
Status of 
admission 
Category of 
organisation 
Number of beds for admission 
Admit   1-6 beds 7-15 beds 50 beds and above TOTAL 
  Clinic 6 1 1 8 
  Medical centre 3 2 0 5 
  Private hospital 0 0 1 1 
Not admit Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 
  Insurance company clinic 0 0 0 0 
  NGO clinic 0 1 0 1 
  Drug shop 0 0 0  0 
  HC II 0 0 0 0 
  X-ray and scan centre 0 0 0 0 
  TOTAL 9 4 2 15 
 
Source: organisational survey 
 
5.1.8. Days open in a week and operating hours 
Figure 19 shows that the majority of the FPFPs (77%) reported that they were open 
for business every day of the week, including weekends, while a few were open during 
weekdays only. Figure 20 illustrates that the majority of the FPFPs surveyed reported 
being open for 12 hours a day, while a few operated for 24 hours. 
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Figure 19: Number of days open in a week 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Operating hours for FPFPS  
 
 
5.2 How the FPFP Sector in Gulu Has Evolved Over Time 
The survey data was used to understand how FPFPs evolved in general as a 
collective group, whereas life histories (timelines) were used to map the changes that 
occurred in the ‘lives’ of the businesses during and after conflict.  
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The FPFPs experienced various dimensions of growth, either collectively or 
individually.  The key informant interviews provided further insights into the general 
increase in number. The most prominent dimension of change related to an increase 
in the number of FPFPs in the area/district.  The dimensions of growth (changes) in 
the life cycle of the individual businesses from life histories are described later on. 
 
5.2.1 Increase in number of FPFP across conflict periods 
As might be expected, the quantitative findings of the organisational survey showed 
that the number of FPFPs established within Gulu municipality increased from 2, 10 
and 33 across the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict periods, respectively. As a 
category, clinics dominated the period before the conflict, and they continue to be 
higher in number compared to other FPFP categories both during and after conflict. 
In the post-conflict period, new types of FPFPs emerged, such as insurance company 
clinics, stand-alone X-ray, and medical imaging centres and stand-alone clinical 
laboratories. Figure 21 illustrates the variation of FPFPs across phases of conflict, 
namely before during and after conflict. Notably, the details reflected in Figure 21 rely 
heavily on those interviewed in the survey and are computed using the year of 
establishment as indicated for each of the FPFPs within the survey. Therefore, the 
specifics of pre-conflict and conflict periods may have been different from what was 
reported.  
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Figure 21: Number of FPFPs established during and after the conflict 
 
 
The general impression among those who participated in the in-depth interviews    
was that the FPFPs were few during the conflict compared to the post-conflict period. 
This could also explain why most of the respondents even went further and listed 
some older FPFPs by name. This opinion is illustrated by a health worker who had 
over 10 years’ experience working in the area.  
[the clinics increased in numbers] because, for example in Gulu, during the 
war, I can count. We had Mola medical clinic, Lacekocot clinic, Gulu 
community medical clinic, I think those were the main clinics or common ones 
by that time […] but now everywhere! […] you walk across every street you 
find a pharmacy. […] more than one so the number is big. (P4: KI_ 
Healthworker_Other FPFP Facility) 
 
Furthermore, regulators also reported that FPFPs increased in number over time both 
in Gulu municipality and within the region and that the increase had been observed 
with respect to drug shops, clinics and pharmacies. 
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Figure 22:  Illustration of regulator’s recollections about how the sector has grown over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[…] the number of drug shops in the municipality is now […] over 60! (P9: KI_ Regulator_ District level)  
[…] in 2012 the number of licensed clinics was 40 in northern Uganda. In 2013 it was 54 clinics and in 2014 it was 60[…]. (P 8: KI_ Regulator_ 
District Level) 
One of the regulators attempted to illustrate his recollection using a hand drawing to provide an impression of which FPFPs existed before, during 
and after the conflict. Figure 22 shows the modified version of the original drawing, which was modified with longitude and latitude co-ordinates, 
and then reconstructed using the Mapping and Geographic Information System (GIS). 
 
Source: Regulator’s recollections 
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5.2.2  Reasons for the emergence and increase in number of FPFP sub-sector 
in Gulu 
 The emergence of the FPFPs in Gulu and the increase in their number in the post-
conflict period were attributed to several factors. These include the return of peace; 
the increase in population and perceived willing to pay; the demand for specialised 
services; inconveniences associated with public and PNFP facilities increased 
demand for drug procurement; and systemic health workforce challenges in the 
public sector. 
Return of peace 
The return of peace to Northern Uganda after 26 years created a favourable operating 
climate/environment for businesses, including the health service providers.  
I think they [private for-profit providers] have changed in number and quality, 
the numbers are increasing, and the quality is also improving. […] on one side 
I think there is the return of peace, so health service providers feel confident 
to come. (P6: KI_ Manager PNFP Facility) 
 
Increase in population and perceived willingness to pay 
The influx of people to Gulu town from villages in search of safe places to live during 
the war was reported to have [cumulatively] resulted in the increase in population. In 
contrast with what would have been expected, after the conflict, many of the people 
never returned to their original villages, instead preferring to remain in the slum areas 
of Gulu town. To some respondents, the increase in population implied an increase 
in aggregate demand for healthcare services, which had reportedly overwhelmed 
other providers in terms of capacity. As indicated by a manager of a medical centre, 
FPFPs took advantage of the available demand. 
 
I think Gulu was growing bigger in terms of population, the needs for 
healthcare were also required, and […] the war was also raging. […] with 
villages mostly affected. But the town was better and safer and so more 
people were accommodated in town, so there was a need for healthcare. 
(P18: LH_Medical centre_ Old FPFP) 
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The increase in the number of NGOs, banks and supermarkets (such as the now-
closed Uchumi outlet) created a perceived increase in income and willingness to pay 
for services, particularly those managed by the facility-based insurance companies 
with clinics as well as those without clinics. A case in point is P15, an insurance which 
opened in 2010 to address the health demands of employees of the many NGOs 
operating in the area at the time.  
[…] Basically [P15] came to Gulu in 2010 based on many NGOs that were [still] 
working here due to the conflict […] and I think they [managers of insurance 
company clinics] saw that as an opportunity to open up in Gulu. (P15: LH 
_Insurance Clinic_ Young FPFP) 
 
Demand for specialised services 
In some cases, corporate clients being catered for by insurance companies reflected 
the demand for specialised services because of the willingness to pay and the other 
providers did not have the capacity to provide such services at the time. For P20, a 
stand-alone clinical laboratory, the limitation of the available providers to offer certain 
specialised services created a vacuum as well as an opportunity to set up shop.  
[…] they opted to start the Clinical Independent Laboratory because in 
Northern Uganda, apart from XX [ a named Clinical Research Centre] which 
was in Eastern, there was no laboratory which could help [with] diagnosis of 
other infectious diseases. They also came to conduct some complicated tests, 
which cannot be handled by either the PNFP hospital and the government 
hospital or those that the other health facilities are not doing. […] Under 
dermatology we have series of tests those that are complicated […], for 
example in relation to the fertility tests related to checking hormones […] even 
the PNFP hospital has just recently started offering it but it was not offered 
before. (P20: LH_ Clinical Lab_ Young FPFP) 
 
Inconveniences associated with public and PNFP facilities 
The inconveniences associated with alternative providers, such as PNFP or public 
facilities, and the absence of the private sector during the conflict period motivated 
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an increase in the establishment of FPFPs in Gulu. The associated costs were related 
to either time or prices.  For instance, long queues in the outpatient departments as 
well as the long time spent waiting to receive lab results or X-ray reports in PNFPs or 
public facilities were reported as inconveniences. The time taken to access X-ray and 
laboratory test results in the existing PNFPs and public facilities was also perceived 
to be long and this created a gap, which was readily filled by owners of one of the 
stand-alone laboratories and an X-ray imaging centre. These facilities noted that they 
could provide the same services at competitive prices in a shorter time. Key informant 
interviews also indicated that FPFPs were preferred because they were perceived to 
be more convenient owing to shorter queues compared to the public and PNFP 
facilities that offered free services.  
[…] the PNFP hospital here has all the equipment they need but they were 
overwhelmed […] too much work because it is private not-for-profit, and it 
offers free services. Therefore, everybody ends up there. So when you are 
requested to go there [PNFP hospital] and have an X-ray taken, it would take 
you an average of three days if your condition is so severe and you might not 
survive the time for the results. Then, in the private hospital, they had the 
service, but the costs were expensive to the community. (P19: LH_ X-ray 
centre_ Young FPFP) 
[…] the biggest advantage of private for-profit to a patient is convenience. […] 
usually, you do not find a long line. So, you are attended to quickly […] (P2: KI 
Manager_Public Facility) 
 
 
The increased demand for drug procurement 
The increase in the number of pharmacies was associated with the increase in the 
number of other facilities/categories that relied on drugs for treatment and competition 
in other markets. The increased numbers of pharmacies in Kampala threatened their 
survival, causing some of them to not only look for viable markets elsewhere (such 
as in Gulu) but also to innovate ways of beating competition in Gulu. Examples of 
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these innovations are those around the transportation of drugs to Gulu, something 
that used not to happen before.  One of the managers of the PNFP hospital remarked 
on how they had benefited from these innovations. 
I think these pharmacies that have opened here [in Gulu] due to competition 
from Kampala. The competition there is pushing them to bring services nearer 
from Kampala.  Previously, we had to transport drugs from Kampala ourselves. 
Therefore, they tried to take advantage over the others, by saying, if you buy 
from us, we offer free transport.  Now if you order from Kampala the lorry will 
just deposit it here [in Gulu].  For us, we save transport sending our Lorries to 
Kampala. […] you order, and they deliver it here. Therefore, probably it is the 
competition that is -between the pharmacies which sell those drugs. (P6: KI_ 
Manager_PNFP Facility) 
 
These innovations in drug procurement in the private sector mimic the public sector 
intervention of the last mile delivery (LMD). The last mile delivery is an intervention in 
the supply chain management of drugs which enables the National Medical Stores 
(NMS) to deliver medicines to the doorstep of every health facility countrywide33. The 
LMD intervention  has  been  prioritized to enhance reduction of stockout challenges 
in the public sector in Uganda(MOH., 2014) 
 
Systemic health workforce challenges for the public sector 
Two systemic health workforce challenges experienced by the public sector, namely 
poor remuneration and inadequate absorption of cadres into the labour market, 
created an opportunity for the FPFPs.  For instance, interviews with some FPFPs 
revealed that inadequate incentives, particularly lack of adequate salaries in the 
public sector, contributed to an increase in numbers of FPFPs. Many of the owners 
opened FPFPs as a side business to enable them to earn an extra income and be 
 
33  National Medical Stores. https://www.nms.go.ug/index.php/client-services/last-mile-delivery-lmd 
 143 
 
able to support their families. Hence the establishment of FPFP businesses 
represented an opportunity for some health workers. 
We [me and my wife] were working together in Gulu regional referral hospital. 
She is a nurse and I am a Principal Human Anesthetist. So, when we thought 
of starting this clinic […] because we wanted to have some supplement to our 
earning since we have family responsibility. (P17: Community Clinic_ Old 
FPFP) 
[…] I do not think the market has anything to do with it but the other reason I 
would say is that the government institutions are now not giving the kinds of 
incentives that people would really want. Therefore, other medical practitioners 
are now finding that it is better to put a clinic somewhere they can get some 
survival out of it. […] so, it is side business for survival. (P4: KI_ Health worker_ 
Other FPFP Facility) 
According to key informants in the PNFP sector and some regulators, there was a 
surplus of health workers in the market post-conflict. They attributed the surplus to 
the increasing outputs from health training institutions located in Gulu town, their poor 
absorption into the healthcare system and the return of health workers who had fled 
from the area during the conflict. This availability of the surplus of health workers 
created an opportunity for FPFPs to increase in number.  In the absence of obvious 
employment related to their field, health workers found it easier to open health-related 
businesses and ultimately contributed to the increase in the numbers FPFPs in Gulu 
municipality. 
[…] many clinical officers have been produced in Gulu. There are two health 
training schools in Gulu, and the government is not taking them, so they are 
available, looking for anything to do. (P6: KI_ Manager_PNFP Facility) 
[…] during the time of the war most of the qualified staff were not within the 
district and [now] people have returned, and they want to settle down. (P9: KI_ 
Regulator_ District leveI) 
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Weaknesses in regulation and enforcement about opening and operation of 
FPFPs 
Weaknesses in the supervision and enforcement of policy requirements for opening 
certain categories of FPFPs also created opportunities for FPFPs to open in Gulu, 
post-conflict.  However, the key informants were divided regarding this finding. The 
district-level regulators in the DHO’s office34 reported that during conflict, regulation 
was stricter in relation to the opening of new FPFPs within Gulu municipality, given 
that each category of organisation could only be established/started by the cadres 
that possessed professional skills related to that category. For instance, only 
pharmacists could establish/start pharmacies. In contrast, there was a perceived 
flexibility in regulating and enforcing the opening of FPFPs post-conflict and this was 
indicated in the interviews, which showed that the majority of the owners did not have 
the relevant qualifications but, instead, had a contract with a qualified cadre whose 
job was to ‘supervise’ the particular FPFP. It was the supervisor’s licence that would 
be revoked in case of any misconduct. This was the case with many clinics and 
pharmacies that were opened post-conflict. 
During the war, they [FPFPs] were fewer. […] I think it was because of policy. 
[…] they were only allowing doctors mainly to open clinics but now the policy 
changed now. Clinical officers, nurses even can now open clinics, so the issue 
was about policy so you find that they were fewer during the times of the war 
and then as now that the war is over, the clinics and drug shops are increasing 
in number. (P4: KI_ Health worker_ Other FPFP Facility) 
 
[Unlike now], during the war a nurse could not open a clinic. (P9: KI_ 
Regulator_ District level) 
 
 
34  The researcher was unable to collect information about changes in the regulation of the FPFPs by 
the professional bodies during and after conflict. 
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However, one of the participants stated that the enforcement of policy/regulation 
during the conflict was weak and attributed this to the existence of limited supervision 
because of conflict, which ostensibly created room for quack doctors to open clinics. 
The regulators also agreed that the security situation during conflict made follow-up 
and support supervision more difficult for them. Nevertheless, although support 
supervision was reported to be more common in the post-conflict period, frequency 
of the visits was reported to be limited owing to lack of funding for transport as well 
as larger coverage areas. 
[the FPFPs have] drastically increased [in numbers] due to lack of supervision. 
The law was not being enforced. All the supervisors were at ministry of health 
[head offices located Kampala]! (P8: KI_ Regulator_ District level) 
 
In addition to lack of facilitation for transport, other challenges experienced by 
regulators at district level, which were peculiar to the post-conflict period, included 
death threats (security concerns) and understaffing, given that some regulators held 
other positions within the district health office.  
 
In relation to professional bodies, all the respondents reported a limitation in scope of 
coverage. Out of the four professional bodies, the researcher observed that only one 
professional body – Allied Health – had a coordinator with an office at the Gulu district 
health headquarters in Gulu. Nevertheless, he reported the issue of a heavy 
workload, given that he also acted as a regional coordinator. Whereas other 
professional bodies noted that they were partners with the district office in their 
regulatory role in the FPFPs, they were limited in scope of coverage, given that they 
were based in Kampala and made only a limited number of trips to Gulu. At the time 
of data collection, the Uganda Medical and Dental Practitioners’ Council (UMDPC) 
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was in the process of introducing the involvement of retired health workers in the 
supervision of FPFPs located in their areas. This was expected to address the issue 
of the high cost of support supervision. 
 
5.2.3. Characteristics and evolution of 10 FPFPs under in-depth study 
(general life cycle curves) 
 
Introduction 
This section presents findings about the 10 FPFPs which acted as sub-units of the 
study.  The section largely draws upon life-history interviews.  The researcher first 
presents a table of characteristics of all the 10 FPFPs. This is followed by a 
presentation of critical events in the evolution of the 10 FPFPs across conflict periods 
and then an analysis of the dimensions of growth as reported by the FPFPs across 
the same periods. The findings show that the post-conflict period was perceived to 
be better than the conflict period, with the former presenting more opportunities to 
navigate and to experience various dimensions of growth. Nonetheless, numerous 
challenges were also experienced.  
 
Characteristics of the 10 FPFPs for in-depth study 
Table 17 summarises the characteristics of the 10 FPFPs that participated in the in-
depth study using life histories, Five of the FPFPs had been in business for over 10 
years, and two had been established before the war. However, the other five FPFPs 
were established after the war. Three of the 10 FPFPs were set up using family 
savings, four using individual savings while three were set up using savings by groups 
of individuals and were, therefore, group owned. Five of the 10 FPFPs provided a 
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wide package of services, with three specialising in the sale of drugs, one specialising 
in X-ray and imaging and one specialising in laboratory tests. The highest number of 
staff among the 10 FPFPs was 62 health workers while the lowest was two.  Only two 
of the   FPFPs had bed capacity, six did not have any bed capacity and one did not 
provide information about their bed capacity. All the 10 FPFPs are open for business 
every weekday, and only one opens on weekends. Seven of the 10 FPFPs open for 
12 hours a day while three open for 24 hours. 
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Table 17: General descriptive characteristics of FPFPs under in-depth study 
 Facility ID and 
category 
Characteristics for FPFPs under in-depth study 
Age of existence 
 (in years/months) 
Year of initial 
registration 
Ownership and 
source of capital 
Package of services HR staffing Bed capacity Opening days and hours 
1 P17 Community 
health centre 
30 1985 Family Sale of drugs, prescription, family 
planning services, minor surgeries, 
blood tests, lab services 
12 (4 nurses, 3 
lab techs, 1 
anesthetic, 2 
registered nurses 
unknown Every weekday, 12 hrs. 
2 P18 Medical centre 20 1995 Individual Medical consultation, lab services, 
radiology/X-ray. Ultrasound scan, 
immunisation, physiotherapy. 24hr 
nursing care, maternity, free 
counselling, minor surgery, dental 
services, bedside services, medical 
camps (quarterly) outreach, ART(HIV) 
testing and drugs etc. 
 19(includes part-
timers- specialists 
and clinical 
officers) and 5 
cleaners 
20  Every weekday 24 hrs. 
3 P14 Pharmacy 18 1997 Family Sale of drugs, prescription of drugs 5 N/A Mon-Saturday for 12 hrs. 
4 P23 Drug shop 14,3mths 2002 Family Sale of drugs 2 N/A Every weekday for 12 
hrs. 
5 P22 Private hospital 13 2002 Group of 
individuals 
Dentistry, consultation, prescription, 
maternal deliveries, major and minor 
surgeries, blood tests, gynaecology 
services, mammography 
About 62 68 beds Whole week including 
weekends, 24 hrs 
6 P21 Clinic 7 2009 Individual  Dentistry, family planning, 
 minor surgeries etc. 
12 staff (4 co, 3 
lab tech, 2 nurses, 
1 reg nurse, 1 
nursing assistant, 
1 doctor 
  Every weekday, 24 hrs. 
every  
7 P15 Insurance 
company clinic 
6 2009 Group Dentistry, consultation, prescription, 
minor surgeries, blood tests, ENT, 
laboratory services, ANC 
11 N/A Every weekday for 12 
hrs. 
8 P20 Clinical lab 6 2009 Group Laboratory services only  5 staff (2 lab tech, 
2 lab 
technologists, 
1receptionist 
 N/A Every weekday for 12 
hrs. 
9 P16 Drug shop 2,6mths 2011 Individual  Sale of drugs 2 N/A Every weekday 12 hrs. 
10 P19 Imaging centre 2,4mths 2012 Individual X-ray and scanning services 4(1 radiologist, 
registered nurse, 
and 2 cleaners) 
N/A Every weekday. 12hrs 
Source: Organisational survey and timelines 
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General evolution of the FPFPs 
The life histories of the FPFPs indicated that they experienced various events which 
affected their life cycles, and these are summarised in Table 18. The researcher used 
Table 18 as a basis to generate Figure 23. The events shaded in grey in Table 18 
indicate the times when the businesses experienced a plunge in their growth. For 
example, those that changed location experienced a reduction in the number of 
customers, given that not all loyal customers had got to know about their move. 
Contemplating closure and temporary closure were critical events which created 
negative progress in the evolution of the FPFPs. 
 
Table 18: Summary of major events in the ‘life’ of 10 FPFPs for in-depth    
study across three conflict periods 
  Event Before 
war 
During 
war 
After 
war 
TOTAL of 
events 
1 Establishment 2 3 5 10 
2 Date of initial registration (at the start of 
business) 
1 4 5 10 
3 Change of location 1 2 2 5 
4 Change of name - 1 - - 
5 Stopped renting - 2 1 3 
6 Upgraded from small to big category - 1 5 6 
7 Closed temporarily  - 2 - 2 
8 Contemplated to close - - 1 1 
8 Expanded in size of building - - 6 6 
9 Started partnership with the district for services 
and training 
- 1 3 4 
10 Started partnership with NGOs and/or insurance 
companies 
- - 5 5 
11 Increased number of staff - 1 3 4 
12 Increased number of clients - - 5 5 
13 New services - - 5 5 
14 Loss of qualified staff (specialists) - - 4 4 
15 Opened up braches outside Gulu  - - 2 1 
16 Stopped sharing space with another - - 1 1 
17 Reduced number of clients - 1 4 5 
18 Started conducting medical camps - - 2 2 
   Total count 3 16 58 76 
Source: Organisational life histories 
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The FPFPs were at various stages of growth; some were already mature; others were 
still relatively young and being established. However, the researcher chose to divide 
them into two categories of young and old.  Furthermore, the stages of the growth of 
the businesses did not follow the typical life cycle, namely birth, early growth of 
business, subsequent growth, survival/stagnation and death35 (Lester et al., 2003) in 
a linear manner. Growth sometimes happened in inverse order. For example, an 
organisation was established, closed/died shortly after, and then was revived. An 
organisations’ growth stage overlapped with the survival stage and it was difficult to 
separate them in the write-up; this was true of the growth and survival stages. Figure 
23 represents the researcher’s attempt to illustrate the overlaps.  
 
Figure 23: Evolution of FPFPs across conflict periods  
 
Source: Constructed by researcher based on life histories and events in table 18 
 
 
35 The researcher was unable to talk to managers of the FPFPs that had closed business(died) but 
obtained this information from some managers of those that were open. 
Key 
Green: Established during conflict, had some 
challenges but survived and are still existing 
Red: Established pre-conflict, temporarily 
closed and then re-emerged, still existing 
Blue: Established post-conflict, had some 
challenges in the beginning, still surviving 
Orange: Established post-conflict, still in initial 
stages, surviving 
Black: Established during conflict and died as 
soon as established 
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Presentation of timelines for some FPFPs for in-depth study reconstructed 
based on life histories 
The researcher reconstructed a timeline for each of the 10 FPFPs which participated 
in the life-history interviews.  The  researcher randomly  selected four  of the 10  
timelines – P18 (Figure 24), P14 (Figure 25), P22 (Figure 26), P19 (Figure 27) – to  
present as raw data  while the rest of the  six timelines – P15 (Appendix 12),  
P16(Appendix 13), P17(Appendix 14), P20(Appendix 15) and  P21(Appendix 16) and 
P23(Appendix 17) – have been attached as appendices. P stands for participant 
identification while the number in roman numerals was automatically assigned in 
ATLAS.ti software during the process of filing interviews. In the write-up, the 
researcher selected examples of timelines that were representative of the growth 
dimensions being described. The selection of the timeline was informed by the extent 
to which an FPFP reported experiencing a growth dimension, as summarised in Table 
19. 
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Figure 24:  Timeline for P18 
 
Figure 25: Timeline for P14 
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Figure 26: Timeline for P22 
 
Figure 27: Timeline for P19 
 
 154 
 
5.2.3 Common growth dimensions within FPFPs across conflict phases 
Table 19 shows a summary analysis of the several developments/growth dimensions 
across the 10 FPFPs which participated in the in-depth   study (life-history interviews). 
The FPFPs are arranged in descending order from oldest to youngest. Table 19 
further shows that the FPFPs experienced developments around human resources 
for health, admission capacity, expansion of service package, infrastructural 
development, business expansion as well as upgrade, and these are then described 
with examples of timelines.  
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Table 19: Common dimensions of growth along the lifetime of FPFPs in Gulu 
Source: Organisational life histories:   Key: +++ high, ++ moderate, + low and – non-occurrence 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility 
 
Age (in 
years/months) 
Growth dimensions 
Human 
resources 
for health 
Bed 
capacity 
Package of 
services 
Infrastruct
ure and 
space 
Equipment  Opened 
branches 
beyond 
Gulu 
Upgraded to 
a larger 
category 
P17 Comm. health 
centre 
30 +++ ++ ++ ++ - - - 
P18 medical 
centre 
20 +++ +++ +++ +++ + +++ - 
P14 Pharmacy 18 ++ -  + - - + 
P23 Drug shop 14,3 months + - - - - - - 
P22 Private 
hospital 
13 +++ +++ + +++ +++ +++ + 
P21 Clinic 7 ++ - ++ + - - - 
P15 Insurance 
company clinic 
6 ++ ++ ++ ++ + - - 
P20 Clinical lab 6 + - - + - - - 
P16 Drug shop 2, 6 months + - - - - - - 
P19 Imaging 
centre 
2, 4 months - - - ++ +++ - - 
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5.2.3.1. Increase in the number of staff 
Across their organisational life, FPFPs reported an increase in staff. However, this 
dimension of growth was more common among the older and larger FPFP 
organisations compared to the smaller and relatively new FPFPs. The increment in 
the number of staff was gradual rather than spontaneous, except in cases where one 
FPFP realised that they needed to hire a certain cadre(s) to fulfil the objective of 
expansion of service coverage for services for which their clients expressed demand.  
For example, P17(Appendix 14), P18 (Figure 24) and P21(Appendix 16) experienced 
an increase in staffing although P21 reported more struggles in relation to maintaining 
staff over the five years leading to the interview. P17(Appendix 14), a clinic, also 
reported an increase in the number of staff from seven (at the beginning) to 12 by the 
time of interview, whereas for P15 (Appendix 12), the number of staff increased from 
10 to 20. Given that some of these staff were part-time, it was difficult to ascertain 
how many exactly were added at a given time. It was possible for the manager to add 
the part-timers to the    other full-time staff working in that facility. The smaller FPFPs, 
such as P23 (Appendix 17) and P16 (Appendix 13), had an almost consistent number 
or a very slight increment in the number of staff. For instance, P23 (Appendix 17) 
relied heavily on close family members to run the business.   
 
5.2.3.2.  Increase in bed capacity 
Larger FPFPs, for example P18 (Figure 24), P22 (Figure 26), and some clinics 
reported increased bed capacity, particularly those that provided admission services. 
By their very nature, some categories, for instance dug shops (P23 – Appendix 17) 
and P16(Appendix 13) and pharmacies (P14 – Figure 24) do not admit patients, 
hence they did not have any beds. 
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5.2.3.3. Expansion of service package 
Some FPFPs, particularly clinics, medical centres, private hospitals and an insurance 
company clinic, reported an expansion of service packages along their lifetime. 
However, the degree to which some increased their service package varied, with 
more services added in the post-conflict period compared to during the conflict. 
Expansion of service package in the post-conflict period was influenced by factors 
such as the availability of demand for certain services, procurement of new 
machines/equipment, subsidies from the district, the need to have a competitive 
advantage over others/survive in the market. 
For instance, many clinics reported having evolved from clinics without laboratories 
to clinics with laboratories to take advantage of the demand for diagnostic services, 
blood slides, pregnancy tests and sputum tests. For one insurance company, ‘free’ 
immunisation services did not exist until the district provided subsidies. P18 (Figure 
24), a medical centre, introduced ART services owing to the existing demand from 
the HIV-affected population, particularly among the local boda boda (motorcycle taxi) 
riders. 
 
5.2.3.4. Expansion of infrastructure and space 
Three FPFPs experienced expansion of infrastructure in the form of building extra 
rooms and finalization of structures whose construction had started earlier. These 
included   P17(Appendix 14), P18(Figure 24) and P15 (Appendix 12). However, in the 
case of P20 (Appendix 15), the managers merely rented a place with more space 
rather than erecting a building on their own. Partitioning existing rooms was another 
perceived dimension of growth, which was reported as an enabler for expanding 
 158 
 
operational space as well as the provision of extra services for P19 (Figure 27) and 
P16 (Appendix 16). For P19(Figure 27), the procurement of new equipment or 
machines constituted a form of expansion of infrastructure. In some FPFPs, 
expansion of infrastructure was perceived to signify improved capacity to provide new 
services which required more space and, ultimately, the expansion of the package of 
services. 
 
5.2.3.5. Opening branches beyond Gulu 
Two of the FPFPs reported that they had expanded their businesses by establishing 
branches within other areas beyond Gulu. A manager of P22 (Figure 26) attributed 
this change to patient feedback and ‘expression of demand’ for services of that FPFP 
in the ‘new area’. Indeed, based on observation, the researcher triangulated this 
finding. She observed three-quarters of an old notice pinned on the noticeboard (see 
Photo 2) communicating the change. The notice indicated that a new branch was 
opened in 2014 and this was mapped on the organisational timeline (Figure 26.) 
However, to appeal to the residents of the new area/town, the business had to adopt 
the name of the town. The notice indicated implications of the move: sharing some 
staff from the mother unit, unused equipment, and referrals for some major surgeries. 
A summary of the package of services provided was also indicated in the notice. 
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Photo 2: Memo communicating opening of a branch beyond Gulu. Courtesy of 
Justine Namakula 
 
5.2.3.6. Upgrade to a larger category 
During their lifetime, some FPFPs reported an upgrade into a larger category from 
what they were at the start of business. For instance, one private hospital (P22) 
started as a pharmacy and later became a hospital because the owner thought a 
hospital could serve more people affected by the war. Another upgrade was that of a 
pharmacy (P14) which had started as a drug shop. In the case of the pharmacy, an 
upgrade was influenced by regulators’ advice, based on an assessment of the drug 
stock. 
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[…] we started as a drug shop in 1997 but later, we changed it into a pharmacy 
in 2005. […] so, we have been operating as a pharmacy for the last 10 years 
[…]. That happened because of the inspector. You know because, always, 
when they came and saw the stock volume and other classes of drugs which 
we had, they said ‘no, this one cannot be a drug shop, it should be a pharmacy'. 
[…] and that is why we had to change to a pharmacy. (P14: LH_Pharmacy_Old 
FPFP) 
 
  
5.3. Discussion  
This chapter has shown that the formal private for-profit sector in Gulu municipality is 
heterogeneous in nature and has varying categories which increased across the 
conflict periods. They provide a range of services to the population in Gulu, including 
the disadvantaged categories. Very few FPFPs offer specialised services. Most of the 
services are largely provided on an Outpatient Department (OPD) basis, given that 
many of the FPFPs did not have the capacity to admit patients to stay overnight.  
For many FPFPs, the source of capital for the FPFPs was not large. Capital was 
mainly drawn from salary savings and resources pooled by a group of friends. From 
an NIE perspective, this implies that their sunk costs at the start of business was little. 
Given that the FPFPs are set up to make profits, from a neo-liberal perspective the 
FPFPs are expected to make profits. However, the FPFP managers had been initially 
reluctant to respond to this question during the pre-test, hence the question had been 
removed from the survey questionnaire, but probes were made during the life-history 
interviews. 
 
The quantitative findings showed that FPFPs gradually increased in number across 
the conflict periods, with the post-conflict period bringing in more numbers. However, 
this finding can be best understood in the light of the recollections of the regulators 
as well as the impressions of health workers in other facilities in Gulu. The 
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proliferation of the private sector providers in Gulu municipality reflects the neo-liberal 
assumptions of free entry resulting from reduced government regulation. Although 
flexibility in regulation was perceived as an opportunity which was exploited by FPFPs 
to open businesses, it was not perceived as the main factors that led to the 
proliferation of the sector.  Other factors that led to the proliferation of FPFPs included 
the return of peace; the increase in population and perceived willingness to pay; the 
demand for specialised services; inconveniences associated with public and PNFP 
facilities; and systemic health workforce challenges in the public sector. The 
proliferation of  private providers in Uganda in general has already been indicated by 
other studies conducted in Uganda (Whyte, 1991). The proliferation of the private for-
profit entities seems to be a consistent phenomenon nationally. More recently, at 
national level, the NDA developed the  2019 licensing guidelines for drug shops and 
pharmacies (National Drug Authority, 2019) with the aim of streamlining the 
distribution of  drugs to private  for-profit providers countrywide  and ultimately 
reducing the congestion of such facilities within urban areas, particularly the 
municipalities, and this seemed to be informed by the increase in the number of these 
providers.  According to the 2019 licensing guidelines, no new drug shops are 
expected to be licensed in municipalities with existing pharmacies and where drug 
shops exist; even these should be at least 200 metres from other drug shops and 1.5 
metres from other pharmacies. On the other hand, new pharmacies shall be opened 
at a distance of at least 300 metres from the nearest existing pharmacy in selected 
municipalities. Gulu municipality is among the municipalities where the new 
guidelines had to be enforced (National Drug Authority, 2019). 
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The FPFPs were at varying stages of the organisational life cycle, although many did 
not experience the stages in a linear manner. Sometimes there was stagnation at one 
stage and sometimes regression from a progressive stage to an earlier stage. 
However, the FPFPs experienced some growth dimensions along the way, 
particularly in areas of human resources for health, equipment and package of 
services, among others. These areas indicated investments, which from an NIE lens 
are termed as sunk costs. The FPFPs that had stayed longer in business (older 
FPFPs) had experienced more development compared to those that had opened less 
than 10 years earlier (young FPFPs).  Furthermore, from an NIE perspective, these 
investments over time can be interpreted as credible commitment by the older FPFPs 
to serve their people. Some FPFPs contemplated closing in the face of conflict but 
stayed the action and were still conducting business by interview time. This also 
illustrated credible commitment, which created opportunities for them to be targeted 
as partners for the expansion of coverage for immunisation services (Chapter 8). 
These partnerships are later illustrated in the networks under Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6: CHALLENGES, RESPONSES, STRATEGIES 
OF AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FPFPs DURING AND 
AFTER CONFLICT  
 
6.0. Introduction 
This chapter addresses research questions 2a) and b). Drawing upon qualitative 
sources (life histories and key informant interviews), this chapter presents the 
challenges faced by FPFPs and their strategies during and after conflict as well as 
the opportunities available to them. The analysis draws on the concepts of evolution 
and resilience, and on the NIE related concepts of sunk costs, credible commitment, 
transactional costs, and uncertainty. The challenges and coping strategies of FPFPs 
during the post-conflict period are presented concurrently. The chapter points out that 
the FPFPs experienced many challenges against which they innovated coping 
strategies. The chapter also illustrates that amidst the post-conflict challenges, 
various opportunities appeared and the FPFPs had to take advantage of them to 
enter the market or survive the market challenges. 
 
6.1. Challenges and FPFPs Strategies during the Conflict 
 
6.1.1 Insecurity 
During the conflict, insecurity emerged as the main challenge for FPFPs, particularly 
the old FPFPs. Insecurity was a result of two conflicts: a) the fighting between 
government and Kony rebels; and b) the tribal conflict between the Acholi and the 
Lango.  
 164 
 
At least two of the ‘old’ FPFPs reported that at two points in time, the security situation 
was unbearable and extremely risky for human life as well as for business operations.  
First, in early 1986, when the war/conflict erupted in the North, it coincided with the 
takeover by the current ruling government in Uganda. This made the situation in the 
rural areas of Gulu district unbearable. The situation on the outskirts of Gulu town had 
become unbearable, hence the owners of some of the businesses that had been 
located on the outskirts of Gulu town decided to briefly relocate the businesses to the 
centre of town. This was to enable them to benefit from the security provided by the 
army, which guarded the town by then. Later in the same year (1986), when the 
security situation in the town deteriorated, the business owners decided to close shop 
and leave the town. 
When the war started, we moved the business to town. […] security men were 
guarding Gulu town.   However, from December 1986-June 1987, we were not 
in town because of the insurgency. We moved out […] who could work here? 
(P17: LH _ Clinic_Old FPFP) 
 
Second, the tribal conflicts between the Acholi and the Lango tribes (also locally 
known as Langi) from the neighbouring Lango sub-region in Northern Uganda, which 
occurred at the start of the conflict in 1986, also exacerbated the security situation, 
making conditions unbearable for business owners who were from the Lango sub-
region. For fear of risking their capital, stock as well as their lives, such business 
owners decided to close their businesses temporarily and relocate with their stock to 
safer places, most commonly, their home areas. Some of the managers, who also 
served as health workers in the public sector at the same time, absconded from duty. 
However, businesses in Gulu later re-opened when the conditions were deemed to 
be a little favourable.  
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Around 1998, the conflict reached its peak again, the security situation in Gulu town 
worsened, and some of the business owners decided to close their businesses 
temporarily, as was the case with one of the old clinics. However, businesses in Gulu 
re-opened later when the conditions were considered a little favourable.  
In 1986, when Museveni [the current president of Uganda] was coming to 
power and the war here [in Gulu] erupted. There was [also] the tribal thing 
between the Acholi and the Langi, so we [the Langi] were at risk. I moved 
back home in Ngai with all the medical stock and kept it in the house. 
However, I remained working in Gulu hospital briefly and later absconded in 
1987. (P18: LH_ Medical Centre_Old FPFP) 
 
6.1.2 Risk of abduction 
The risk of abduction was also another effect of the conflict. One of the managers of 
the FPFPs reported having survived abduction by rebels, who wanted to abduct him 
so that his services could be used in the bush. He survived by disguising himself as 
one of his patients and leaving behind all the instruments that could have made easily 
identifiable as a health worker. However, given the near miss, he greatly attributed 
his survival to protection from God.  
In 1986[…] they wanted to take me captive […] so they wanted to take me for 
work in the bush or whatever else they had planned. I survived; it was God’s 
mercy because they got me in the clinic when the patients had lined up. I was 
seated by the table. […] They surrounded the whole building […] I left the 
stethoscope on the table […] and posed like a patient […] I passed in between 
them […]. (P17: LH _Medical centre_Old FPFP) 
 
6.1.3 Reduction in number of clients (and disconnection of Gulu from other 
places) 
Insecurity in the area made access to and from Gulu town difficult, especially for 
business owners who had started transporting goods to their customers outside Gulu. 
Many FPFPs highlighted this as a key influencing factor in the marked decline in the 
number of their clients. In the case of one ‘old’ FPFP, a wholesale and retail 
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pharmacy, which also relied on customers from outside town, insecurity made the 
movement of clients from village to town to buy the drugs difficult and, conversely, 
the pharmacy owners were unable to take the drugs nearer to the clients. Concerning 
such challenges, no innovations were reported by the pharmacy owners. All the 
owners did was to merely hang on. 
[…] movement of people from villages to town to come and buy the medicine 
was not easy. […] we had fewer customers and we were not even able to go 
to villages to supply those who were there. (P14: LH_Pharmacy_ Old FPFP) 
 
The participants noted that because of insecurity, transport from Kampala city to Gulu 
town became difficult and Gulu was thus ‘disconnected’ from Kampala. As a result, 
one of the managers of a certain old FPFP clinic who had gone for studies in Kampala 
decided to stay put in the city and only returned when the connecting highway was 
deemed safe.  
6.1.4 Raids 
One of the FPFPs reported having experienced raids by the rebels, although by that 
time, his business was located at the boundary of Gulu town.  The rebels looted drugs 
as well as some hard cash/ proceeds from the business. 
They took my bicycle, I also had made some money, 500,000 shillings [to put 
dollar equivalent at that time] that day and they took it. They also took some 
drugs. ([…]. (P17: LH_ Clinic_Old FPFP) 
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6.2. Challenges and Provider Business Strategies during the 
Post-Conflict Period 
 
Introduction 
The market in the post-conflict period posed numerous challenges to FPFPs. 
Accordingly, the FPFPs had to implement various business strategies and responses 
so as to survive.  In this section, the challenges and provider responses are presented 
concurrently. The challenges were categorised into the following themes: increased 
competition; high operation costs; difficulty in attracting and retaining highly skilled 
health staff; frustrations with referrals; high expectations from clients; and regulation 
requirements. The write-up in this section will focus on these.  Other challenges 
included inadequate capital, limited space of operation, seasonal fluctuation of client 
numbers and sole dependence on the owner. 
 
6.2.1 Increased competition 
Increased competition, reflected in increased struggle to maintain old clients or attract 
new ones, was a major challenge for FPFPs post-conflict. The increased number of 
FPFPs, described earlier in Chapter 5, was one of the explanatory factors highlighted. 
The increase in the number of FPFPs led to a spiral of effects, including the 
concentration, and crowding of FPFPs in Gulu town. According to a manager of a 
young organisation set up post-conflict, the increasing number of clinics and other 
FPFPs (already discussed in Chapter 5) was perceived to have caused a reduction 
in the number of clients, given the stiff competition.  
The number of patients reduced because very many people around here 
have opened clinics and drug shops are around here, that one also has 
reduced the patients. (P21: LH_Clinic_ Young FPFP) 
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And then, as far as the economic welfare situation is concerned, it has 
somehow improved. But I think they [FPFPs] are still too many especially 
around town. (P6: KI_Manager_ PNFP Facility) 
 
One of the participants, who was also working in a public facility at the time of the 
interview, also confirmed fears of stiff competition. He expressed optimism about the 
process of rehabilitation and the functionalization of public health facilities in the area 
during the recovery period. For instance, the functionalization of the pharmacy 
department in the public hospital would create even more competition for the FPFPs, 
given that fewer clients would be going to FPFPs to buy drugs. A manager at the 
private not-for-profit facility seconded his view. 
And when the hospital becomes efficient it is also disadvantageous for private 
for-profit when the public institutions improve like when we have medicines 
those fellas will almost close. (P2: KI_ Manager Public Health Facility) 
 
[…] In town [Gulu] the government hospital has been improved but in the past 
probably ten to five years ago when these clinics were still getting their roots 
in the government hospital was non-existent if you went to the hospital, they 
[would] prescribe for you and then you had to go and buy[drugs] from 
elsewhere. So maybe now that the government hospital has improved. So, 
they[customers] are also getting challenges. […] why go to two places instead 
of one? (P6: KI_Manager_ PNFP Facility) 
 
6.2.1.1.  Provider responses to increased competition 
The FPFP managers devised several strategies in response to the increased 
competition and these were mainly intended to attract and maintain clients. The 
strategies are summarised in Box 1 and are described further below. 
Box 1 
• Marketing of new and old services in both English and Acholi 
• Attempts to make attractive reception areas 
• Expansion of service package  
• Sabotage/provider-induced referrals 
• Having a one-stop centre (all services under one roof) 
• Flexibility of payment terms: loans and deferred payments, reduction in fees and unbundling 
of services. 
• Use of media campaigns 
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 Marketing of services 
To market their services, FPFPs used various strategies, including brochures, 
noticeboards, and signposts, or behaved in a way that gave the impression that they 
had a comparative advantage over others.  For example, the researcher observed 
that the majority advertised a long list of services that ‘were provided’.  Furthermore, 
the researcher observed that many FPFPs, except the small ones, indicated that they 
stayed open for 24 hours a day.  Some FPFPs used noticeboards in other FPFPs to 
market their services, as in the case of one imaging centre.  For instance, P18, a 
medical centre, used its noticeboard to advertise new services. However, they were 
keen to have the advertisement in the Acholi language (see Photo 3).The advert read 
‘Itwero nongo kony me yat two-jonyo ki kany bene!’ which translates as ‘HIV treatment 
services now available here’. On probing during the life-history interview, the manager 
also showed the researcher a private room where HIV testing took place. The 
manager informed the researcher that, given their consideration and provisions for 
privacy, they were getting more HIV clients. Photo 3 shows a brochure from one of 
the medical centres. 
 
Photo 3: An advert for the introduction of ART/ HIV services – Courtesy of Justine 
Namakula 
 
 170 
 
Having exquisite reception areas 
Two of the FPFPs – an insurance company clinic (P15) and a private hospital (P22) 
– maintained very clean and exquisite reception areas with the intention of creating 
the impression that the quality of services provided was high and also as marketing 
gimmick to attract potential clients. However, in some cases, some of these features 
instead created a perception that these facilities were awfully expensive and were 
meant for only the ‘rich’.  
 
Expansion of service package 
As indicated in Chapter 5, all the five old FPFPs reported that they had introduced 
new services in the post-conflict period. One interesting finding concerns a private 
hospital (P22) that had innovated by introducing an ambulance project called ‘Rapid 
Response Unit' to respond promptly before ‘any other provider’ in case of an accident 
in town and then take patients to the private hospital for treatment. P22 was the only 
one with an ambulance among the FPFPs in Gulu municipality. One of the medical 
centres (P17) introduced HIV services. 
Provider-induced referrals 
Some of the FPFP managers, who were also working in other non-FPFP facilities, 
were reported to have ‘sabotaged’ equipment at these facilities and later referred the 
patients to their private businesses. These allegations were made particularly in 
connection with those working in X-ray departments, as the manager of a public 
hospital stated. When these allegations were followed up, the manager of the X-ray 
centre denied them all and instead blamed the failure of the equipment on a lack of 
timely servicing and repair. 
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The people in the X-ray, some of them even damaged the machines here […] 
so he can use the others in his business when these get spoilt. (P2: KI_ 
Manager Public Health Facility) 
 
Given that the same manager had his private clinic in another district neighbouring 
Gulu, he expressed the concern that the FPFPs could also sabotage one another to 
push their competitors out of business and retain the customers.  
 
Then there is intrigue. People fight you.  You know it is a business! They want 
you to close so that they continue. They are fighting for business. (P2: KI_ 
Manager Public Health Facility) 
 
One-stop centres 
In the post-conflict period, the majority of the FPFPs, specifically those that had been 
in business for some time, decided to provide certain services in-house as a way of 
cutting costs, creating a one-stop centre and therefore increasing their competitive 
advantage. For example, private hospitals and some clinics incorporated both 
laboratory and drug sale services. In this case, the clients could access the services 
in one place, rather than having to be sent to another FPFP facility to get some of the 
services, a situation where there was no guarantee that the patient would return. The 
researcher also observed that many of the clinics, including P21, had a pharmacy 
embedded, while a few had a laboratory.  
Flexibility of payment terms 
The FPFPs implemented several strategies aimed at ensuring flexibility around 
payment with the aim to maintain clients by reducing their financial burden, which was 
perceived to be brought about by one-off payments. These included price reductions, 
loan books, deferred payments, and reduction in fees. These were also some of the 
mechanisms that FPFP managers put in place to enable the poor to access health 
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services within the FPFP facilities. Details of these as well as perceptions of who a 
poor person is are presented later in Chapter 8. 
Use of media campaigns 
One of the managers from an insurance company clinic (P15) used media campaigns 
to not only market their services but also address the negative image of the clinic as 
being expensive. The manager noted that because of the campaign, the number of 
clients and the income had increased. The same manager reported having lobbied 
religious leaders to encourage potential clients to access services at the clinic and 
used emails to communicate with clients who had utilised the services before. 
Hmm, I go to pray at Watoto Church. I also talked to the pastor. And they 
sent all their prayer people to come here for services. (P15: LH_ Insurance 
company clinic _Young FPFP) 
 
6.2.2 Provider responses to high operating costs (cost-cutting strategies) 
The study found that FPFPs experienced high operating costs in running the 
businesses. These costs included high costs of drugs, high rental fees, ever-
escalating electricity costs but irregular power supply, high and ever-increasing 
operating licence fees, high municipal council taxes and challenges in paying staff. 
Notably, some of these operational challenges were not collectively experienced by 
FPFPs; rather, they were mentioned by only a few FPFPs. 
 
The age of the business also seemed to have had an impact on which challenges 
were reported by some FPFPs. For example, both the young and the old FPFPs 
reported that they paid rental fees, although more of the young FPFPs reported this. 
Only two FPFPs did not report payment of rental fees. By the time of fieldwork, some 
old FPFPs had ‘constructed their buildings’.  However, old FPFPs and the managers 
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of many young FPFPs, which were still renting business space by the time of 
fieldwork, persistently complained about the ever-increasing rental fees.  A health 
worker from another FPFP clinic that participated in an in-depth interview shared this 
view: 
One of the challenges that we are facing is that we have extremely high rent 
charges which increase every year. In 2012, we paid 450,000/=, in 2014 it 
was around 400,000/=, the last year 2014 it was 550,000/= and this year it is 
650,000/= shillings. (P4: KI_ Health Worker_Other FPFP Facility) 
  
Licence fees and taxes paid to the government and the municipality, respectively, 
were reported by both the young and the old FPFPs.  Only the old FPFPs reported a 
pattern of ever-increasing operating licence fees over time.  However, a health worker 
who also doubled as a manager of a one young FPFP (an NGO clinic) expressed 
unhappiness about the burden of having to pay taxes for signposts in addition to 
paying the licence fee. 
The municipal they demand even over 600,000/- […] the municipal demands 
over 600,000/- as trading licence... […] for the signpost, […] we must pay for 
signposts separately. […] for the operation licence, people especially the 
private practitioners are not happy, and they are complaining. (P1: KI_ 
Manager_ Other FPFP Facility) 
 
FPFPs devised several cost-cutting strategies in response to the high operational 
costs. These included mobilisation of resources to buy their place or partitioning a 
room, hiring part time-staff as well as low cadre staff, purchasing cheaper brands of 
drugs and storing reagents in a water pot. Many of the cost-cutting strategies had 
implications for quality. Interestingly, none of the FPFP providers highlighted any 
quality implications. Only regulators highlighted this issue during the interview in 
relation to the challenges they faced when regulating and supervising the FPFPs 
themselves. 
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Another thing is I know how they are struggling with the supplies, the 
medicines when the prices keep fluctuating and then also the quality of 
medicine, they buy is also sometimes a problem. You have been seeing 
NOVAT-02 here. If the drug is from India the quality is poor. They will give 
the patient, will not improve; they will come back and later they will say, for 
me I will not come back to this clinic. (P12: KI_Regulator_ District level) 
The specialists are the part-timers. […] Like someone is working in the 
[public] hospital but they also come and work here. […] we cannot have them 
as a full-time staff […] they are expensive.  But it is not only that, a good 
number of the specialists tend to work at different hospitals. (P15: LH 
_Insurance company Clinic)  
             Some of them use nursing assistants who are not much experienced. (P9: 
KI_Regulator_ District level) 
As indicated in Photo 4, found on the noticeboard of one of the NGO clinics which 
specialised in the provision of reproductive services, clients were charged a fee for 
the services. This was one of the survival strategies aimed at making up for reduced 
donor funding. 
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Photo 4: Prices of services in one of the NGO clinics – Courtesy of Justine Namakula 
 
6.2.3. Provider responses to health workforce challenges 
The FPFPs faced challenges in attracting highly qualified/skilled staff, and even when 
they were successful in attracting them, they were unable to retain them for long. This 
is because specialists are few, very marketable, expensive, and already working 
elsewhere in other non-FPFP facilities. These skilled staff included specialist cadres 
of health workers such as gynaecologists, orthopedic surgeons, physiologists, and 
medical doctors. High turnover of specialists was reported to have happened in the 
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period immediately after the end of the conflict, through 2007, 2009 and 2012, and 
continued to be a challenge by 2015 (fieldwork time). 
 
Turnover of specialists was due to the attractive labour market for health workers in 
neighbouring South Sudan around 2011, and the health workers migrated there in 
search of better renumeration (Namakula et al., 2011).  In some cases, the staffing 
gap was unintentionally created by the official transfers, which are provided for in the 
Uganda Public Service Standing Orders (Government of Uganda., 2010). This is a 
legal document which deals with the management of staff in public service and issues 
concerning terms and conditions of service. It states that staff in public service are 
supposed to be transferred after at least three to five years of working in each station 
and that non-compliance with this formal procedure results in disciplinary action 
(p.99). Despite the dire staffing needs and challenges related to recruitment and 
attraction (refer to document review) created by the conflict in Northern Uganda, the 
policies on official transfers did not change (Mangwi et al., 2019). 
 
Two of the FPFPs that shared a gynaecologist who was working in the public hospital 
reported that they lost out because he was transferred to other regions under the 
deployment policy for health workers. One of the clinics reported a turnover of two 
dentists, within a given period, one of whom left to set up his own clinic.  In most 
cases, the turnover of such specialist cadres affected the FPFPs as they found it 
difficult to replace the specialists. This meant, too, that such FPFPs also lost the 
competitive advantage of offering such specialist services.  As highlighted by a clinic 
and a private hospital, the coping strategies included the continuous replacement of 
lost specialist cadres as well as abandoning the provision of such services altogether.  
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Initially, we had two gynaecologists. One was a medical doctor and but also 
specialised in gynaecology and the second one, Henry [not real name], was 
gynecologist – specialist. The medical doctor worked until 2009 and so we 
brought in Dr. Peter [not real name] because we needed one who was both 
a medical doctor and a gynaecologist. However, Dr. Henry [not real name] 
worked here from 2009-2011 and he went to South Sudan. Dr. Peter also left 
in 2012 and went to Mbale Regional Referral Hospital[…]we don't have a 
gynaecologist right now[…] it has really affected us, we don't have a 
gynaecologist and so many people come wanting to see one but we don't 
have. (P18: LH_Medical centre_ Old FPFP) 
 
Dr. Oketch [not real name] the gynaecologist left in 2006 when he was 
transferred from here to Mbale Regional Referral Hospital. Then the 
orthopedics also left in 2007 […] even the physio left and was replaced by a 
certain lady and she is gone now. (P22: LH_ Private Hospital_ Old FPFP) 
  
The regulators at the national and district levels who were interviewed as part of this 
research also confirmed that FPFPs faced challenges related to attracting, recruiting 
and retaining skilled health staff. One of the regulators at the national level attributed 
the retention challenges to the high operation costs. For example, rental fees made 
it difficult for FPFPs, particularly the smaller ones, to pay and retain skilled staff.  As 
a result, the skilled health workers spread their working hours across various FPFPs 
to get an aggregate benefit which, in the end, was perceived to affect actual quality. 
Another regulator pointed out that some FPFPs resorted to hiring lower cadres as a 
coping strategy. 
[…] these midwives of ours [that subscribe to the organisation] in these clinics 
are nurses [by cadre], they cannot afford to pay a nurse at the diploma level. 
[…]it is costly and yet some of them are renting, so […] because they are 
unable to pay salaries, definitely the staff will run away, or if the staff stays, 
they will moonlight in one clinic then another clinic in the evening and another 
clinic in the night.[…] so the quality of service is not kept up. (P13: 
KI_Regulator_ National level) 
 
[…]so, they tend to hire lower cadres- These who can accept low pay. […] 
Otherwise, you have to pay out all your profits and then you will remain with 
nothing. (P12: KI_Regulator_ District level) 
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6.2.4 Provider responses to high expectations from clients 
One FPFP manager and two regulators highlighted the challenge of high expectations 
from the clients.  This arose from clients’ desire to have ‘value’ for the money they 
paid. The expectations included the flexibility of opening hours, the availability of all 
services required by a client and the ability prescribe and provide some medicine 
regardless of whether it was necessary or not. In some cases, the inability of FPFPs 
to satisfy their clients' expectations and demands harmed the relationship between 
the two parties involved in the transaction. Coping strategies included implementing 
flexible opening times and offering thorough explanations as to why the facility is 
unable to provide certain services even when the client has an effective demand for 
them.  Some FPFPs instead referred such clients to non-profit facilities which could 
offer such services.  
[…] I think people's expectations are so high […] for example, expect you to 
be in the hospital all the time. So, we decided to open for 24 hours a day. […] 
Some women may come to deliver here. We explained ‘this is a clinic, so we 
do not do deliveries. […] another expectation is that of X-rays: someone 
breaks their leg and runs here. […] We refer them to Gulu regional referral 
hospital because it is the nearest. (P15: LH _Insurance Clinic_ Young FPFP) 
[…] their clientele has high expectations which they cannot meet; people think 
that if I pay for service, I expect ABCD. Normally people who go to PFPs have 
a certain level of knowledge so their expectations are high and they demand 
a lot, so they have increased levels of litigation, every other day they [FPFPs] 
spend money in court in and out. (P13: KI_Regulator_ National Level) 
 
It is difficult sometimes to satisfy patients […] a patient will pay money but 
expect many services to be offered. […]. For example, the patients may come 
with some problems the results are negative. They [FPFPs] will not give any 
medicine yet the patient has paid. […] and the patient feels like ‘I cannot go 
back home without medicine’. (P12: KI_Regulator_ District level)  
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6.2.5 Provider responses to strict regulatory requirements post-conflict 
The general impression among the key informants was that the regulation of FPFPs 
became stricter in the post-conflict period regarding who could open a health 
business. This resulted in business-minded health workers opening up FPFPs.  
However, information found in the guiding documents for the operation of some of the 
FPFP categories revealed relative flexibility within the tight regulatory measures, 
particularly in relation to opening of FPFPs, where provisions were made for non-
professionals to register and work under the supervision of professionals. For 
instance, the Uganda National Drug Policy Authority Act, Cap. 206(National Drug 
Authority., 1993), which is intended to provide a framework for the regulation of dug 
shops and pharmacies, provides for flexibility by making provisions for licensed 
persons and licensed sellers. It states:   
[…] A licence will be granted if the authority is satisfied that that the business, 
so far as concerns the restricted drugs, will be carried on under the immediate 
supervision of a pharmacist in each set of premises where the business is to 
be carried on (Section 14b). A person who carries on the business of a 
pharmacist without a licence issued under this section commits an offence and 
is liable to a fine not exceeding one million shillings or to imprisonment not 
exceeding five years or both (Section 14 (3), P.14. 
 
[…] If, on application made in the prescribed form by a person other than a 
pharmacist or a licensed person, the authority is satisfied—(a) that the 
applicant is fit to carry on a business of supplying by retail restricted drugs, 
other than drugs of class A or B;(b) that the area in which the applicant 
proposes to carry on that business is not sufficiently served by existing facilities 
for the retail supply of the drugs; and (c) that the applicant is an authorised 
person, the authority may issue to the applicant a licence authorising him or 
her, subject to any conditions specified in the licence (Section 15(1).p.15). 
 
 
Many of the FPFP managers reported that business-minded people did not have 
the authorized qualifications to open a pharmacy or drug shop. However, they 
instead decided to innovate around Section 14 of the National Drug Policy Authority 
 180 
 
Act by signing a paid contract with a qualified cadre to work as a quasi-
owner/supervisor of the business. In this case, if any queries arose, the contracted 
person would be answerable. This innovation seemed more common and, 
therefore, became the new norm within this setting. 
 
However, the study found that some FPFPs experienced challenges with these 
transactional contracts with ‘supervisors. Two of the managers complained about the 
unpredictable increase in the fees charged by those contracted as well as the threats 
to cancel the contracts in case the fees were not increased to the desired amount. In 
response, some of the FPFP managers resorted to negotiating a ‘favourable’ fee or 
identifying another ‘supervisor’. In the case of P16, which was found to be 
transitioning from a drug shop to a clinic, the manager was wary about the extra costs 
that the identification of another cadre would involve.  
Well, he [the supervisor] tried to complain that the money was little, but we also 
told him that money nowadays is little because there are very many 
pharmacies. (P14: LH_Pharmacy_ Old FPFP) 
[…] and now I must change the supervisor from pharmacist because I am 
turning my business into a clinic. (P16: LH_ Drug shop _ Young FPFP) 
 
In relation to P16, the researcher observed that the signpost was hidden away from 
the road, where it would normally be expected to be positioned to enhance the 
visibility of the business. On probing, the manager reported that since the partitioning 
was still underway and registration of the upcoming clinic was not yet finalized, he 
was safer hiding the signpost. 
Another issue reported with respect to enforcement in the post-conflict period was the 
suitability of premises and the storage of reagents. The National Drug Policy and 
Authority Regulation 2014, No. 36 stipulates conditions that need to be available in a 
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business before a certificate of suitability of premises is awarded, without which one 
cannot operate a business. These include cleanliness of the premises, regular water 
supply, enough space, good lighting and appropriate  storage  of  drugs and materials 
(National Drug Authority., 2014). The researcher observed that all facilities she visited 
had clean premises. However, in relation to space, she noted that many used 
plywood to partition so that they could appear to have more space.  Two of the clinics 
had resorted to having a laboratory in-house and they ensured that within the 
partition, the microscope was placed next to the window, which would bring in more 
natural light.  
 
The National Drug Policy and Authority Regulations for the suitability of premises also 
states  that some materials need to be protected from light and that the ingredients 
and finished drugs that are temperature-sensitive shall be kept in a temperature-
controlled storage facility (Article 15(2), p.7). The regulators seemed to be aware of 
this and tried to check the compliance of facilities during their inspection visits. 
However, compliance with this regulation seemed limited, particularly for the some of 
the young FPFPs that had to grapple with unstable power supply and to keep up with 
the high costs related to electricity bills. The situation was reported to be worse for 
the smaller businesses whose income could not enable them to purchase and 
maintain a generator for power back-up. In response, they implemented innovations 
which, in turn, raised serious issues of quality of healthcare.  One of the regulators 
highlighted the shortcuts he discovered with respect to the storage of reagents during 
some of his inspection visits and was concerned about the side effects. 
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Some of the reagents require storage in a refrigerator and many of them do 
not have refrigerators. I have seen few of them putting the reagents in a 
kaveera [ polythene bag] and they dip in a water pot […] that is why we get 
purported disease outbreaks. (P10: KI_Regulator_ District level)  
 
Interestingly, whereas the  regulatory bodies at national level such as Uganda 
Medical and Dental Practitioners Council (UMDPC) Act (Uganda Medical and Dental 
Practioners Council., 1998) Article 32(2)) and the Allied Health Professionals Act 
(Allied Health Professionals Council., 2000)Article 35(2)) call for inspecting officers to 
make a report about  the inspection to the councils, none of the regulators at district 
level mentioned this. When probed further, some mentioned having given warnings 
and advice to the facilities to improve. 
 
6.3 Opportunities for FPFPs Post-Conflict 
This section is a description of the opportunities for the FPFPs in the post-conflict 
period. Opportunities are different from coping strategies because they may present 
a favourable time or set of circumstances in which FPFPs can take advantage.  
Coping strategies, on the other hand, are responses to problems that can impede the 
performance of the FPFPs.  
 
The study identified several opportunities for the FPFPs in the post-conflict period. All 
the factors mentioned under section 5.22 opened opportunities for the FPFPs either 
to get established or to navigate the market and ultimately support their business 
strategies. Other additional factors that presented opportunities included new 
partnerships and opportunities for resource mobilisation. To avoid repetition, this sub-
section only explains the additional opportunities. These are explained in detail below. 
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New partnerships 
New partnerships with the district as well as partnerships with NGOs and other 
organisations, such as banks and supermarkets, were reported to have started 
around 2012/2014 and were still happening around the time of fieldwork in 2015. 
Although such partnerships were mainly reported by well-established businesses/ 
‘old’ FPFPs, a few young FPFPs with high marketing skills (e.g. an insurance 
company clinic, the private hospital and one clinic) also reported such experiences. 
The partnerships provided FPFPs with opportunities to contribute to wider health 
system coverage goals, to market the services available to potential clients, to train 
in self-regulation, to become health management organisations – as in the case of 
the facility-based insurance company clinic – and also to procure drugs and 
equipment at subsidized prices or on deferred payment. In Chapter 7, the researcher 
revisits the benefits of the partnerships and relationships between FPFPs and other 
providers in detail. 
 
Resource mobilisation with existing international NGOs/donor programmes 
Although scarce, there were opportunities for FPFPs to conduct resource 
mobilisation. For example, a manager at one of the FPFPs reported that, together 
with the existing NGOs in the area, they were planning to write proposals and request 
funding. 
 
6.4 Discussion  
 
This chapter has shown that the market in which FPFPs operated presented 
challenges for them to navigate during and after the conflict. The FPFPs faced 
numerous challenges, some of which directly resulted from active conflict and yet 
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others were related to operational costs and the changing regulatory context. Avis 
(2016) notes that the market in conflict-affected settings is not without challenges. 
However, this chapter has highlighted the agency of sector actors to seek solutions 
to challenges. For example, FPFPs innovated business strategies in response to the 
numerous challenges in the post-conflict period,  including those that would sabotage 
others, hence reflecting  the social Darwinist principle of  ‘survival of the fittest’ 
(Gregory, 2000)  This principle is  also reflected in the neo-liberal assumptions of 
competition and privatization, as well as resilience of the private sector in post-conflict 
settings. 
 
Sweeney (2009) argues that the private sector providers are resilient to systemic 
shocks and contextual challenges, as they can often change shape and direction and 
survive difficult situations. This closely reflects Vogus and Sutcliffe’s (2007 in Gilson 
et al., 2017) definition of resilience as ‘the maintenance of positive adjustment under 
challenging conditions such that the organisation emerges from those conditions 
strengthened and more resourceful’.  For example, the chapter has illustrated growth 
dimensions of the old FPFPs during the conflict and continued growth in the post-
conflict period, when faced with stiff competition.  This concurs with the ‘everyday 
resilience’ concept (Gilson et al., 2017), albeit it was mainly applied to the public 
health system. Everyday resilience refers to ‘the ability of health systems to continue 
to deliver services in the face of constant challenge and strain. Everyday resilience 
derives from the combination of absorptive, adaptive and transformative strategies 
that actors in systems adopt in responding to strain’ (Gilson et al., 2017). 
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At the individual level, everyday resilience was reflected through the experience of 
some managers of FPFPs, particularly those that experienced near-miss abductions 
or had had their businesses raided, among other challenges, during the conflict. They 
coped by disguising themselves as patients, hiding their stethoscopes, in some cases 
closing their businesses and moving to safer environments, only to later return and 
re-open the businesses when they perceived that the situation had improved. Such 
coping strategies are not only indicative of the resilience of  other health workers who 
worked during the conflict  in Northern Uganda (Namakula and Witter, 2014) but also 
of the resilience of  private sector  businesses operating in  fragile and conflict-
affected areas, as reflected in the work of the World Bank (World Bank, 2005). Gilson 
et al. (2017) refer to interconnected ‘individual and organisational capacities’ in which 
‘an organisation’s capacity for resilience is embedded in a set of individual level 
knowledge, skills, and abilities and organisational routines and processes by which a 
firm conceptually orients itself, acts decisively to move forward, and establishes a 
setting of diversity and adjustable integration’ (Lengnick-Hall et al. 2011 in Gilson et 
al. 2017). 
 
However, the chapter has shown that some coping strategies adopted by FPFPs, 
specifically those related to coping with the regulation of storage of reagents as well 
as with personnel challenges, had implications for the quality of services provided by 
the FPFPs. This emphasizes the need for regulation of the sector. Indeed, Asiimwe 
(2018) and Ssali (2018) express concerns about such negative effects of market-led 
health systems and underscore the need for the ‘return of the state’ in health service 
provision in Uganda. The implication of this finding, therefore, is that the private sector 
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needs to be regulated, and regulated effectively. Regulation here reflects the formal 
norms/institutions governing the operation and behaviour of the FPFPs. 
 
The chapter has also shown that there are several opportunities for FPFPs in Gulu 
after the conflict, hence the post-conflict period provided a window of opportunity 
within the broader context for FPFPs. For instance, some FPFPs were able to get 
established but also get clients. The reduced role of regulation, as well as its 
perceived flexibility during the post-conflict period – which in part mirrors a weakness 
of the legal institutions – has specifically been highlighted as one of the opportunities 
that enabled FPFPs not only to increase in number but also to cope with the 
regulatory requirements.  This again reflects the effects of the deregulation 
(proposition 9) of neo-liberal reforms (Williamson, 2004). However, the challenge of 
increased competition, which was reported as a spin-off effect of the increased 
number of FPFPs in the post-conflict period, also illustrates the effects of 
deregulation. Furthermore, the chapter indicated that opportunities for resource 
mobilisation for FPFPs were minimal, and this is also one of the challenges noted by 
Avis (2016) 
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CHAPTER 7:  RELATIONAL NETWORKS FOR FPFPS AND 
OTHER ORGANISATIONS 
 
7.0. Introduction 
 Relationships between FPFPs and others are envisaged as part of the dynamics of 
the healthcare market.  Hence, this chapter seeks to address part c) of the second 
objective, which focused on understanding the relationships between FPFPs and 
other organisations within the market. This chapter draws largely on the life-history 
interviews and, to a small extent, the organisational survey data.  The analysis in this 
chapter combined thematic analysis and social network analysis (see section 4.6.3). 
Hence, throughout this chapter, network maps which were developed using social 
network analysis will be used to illustrate relational links. The analysis of the data for 
this objective was mainly based on the NIE concepts of networks as a form of markets 
and contracts. Earlier, in Chapter 6, it was noted that the FPFPs were faced with 
numerous challenges and high operational costs.  Consequently, networks and 
linkages with others provide a form of coping.  
First, this chapter presents the general relationships between FPFPs and other 
organisations and then elaborates, in greater detail, on selected key relational links 
within the network. For the most important organisations within each of these 
networks, the challenges as well as the benefits are noted in some instances. This 
chapter is limited in that it does not indicate the changes in the network over time. 
This is because the networks and linkages that the FPFPs were asked about were 
only those for two years leading to the time of data collection. The main argument in 
this chapter is that there is interdependence and a connection between FPFPs and 
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other organisations; this also emphasizes the blurry nature of the boundaries between 
FPFPs and other organisations, including the public facilities. 
7.1 General Relationship between FPFPs and Other 
Organisations 
The study sought to understand the relationships between private for-profit providers 
(FPFPs) and other providers in Gulu municipality.  Figure 28 illustrates the 
dense/thick network of FPFPs in Gulu. The FPFPs in Gulu (coloured red) had 
linkages between themselves and with FPFPs outside Gulu town (coloured blue), 
non-FPFP facilities in Gulu and beyond (coloured green), NGOs/CSOs within and 
beyond Gulu (maroon), regulators at national level, including professional bodies 
(pink) and regulators at district level (black). FPFPs also had linkages with non-
medical organisations (yellow). Other organisations with whom FPFPs had 
relationships included non-facility-based insurance clinics and non-health 
organisations.  In the figure, there are indications, too, that other organisations within 
the network also have relationships among themselves. However, the discussion in 
this chapter will mainly focus on the linkages where the direction of the arrow flows 
from the red box to a box with any of the other colours mentioned above (only links 
between FPFPs and others) 
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Figure 28: General network for FPFPs in Gulu 
 
 
 
Key to network map for general relations 
  FPFPs in Gulu 
  FPFPs outside Gulu 
 NGOs and CSOs in Gulu and beyond 
 Non-health organisations 
 Regulators at national level (including professional 
bodies) 
 Regulators at district level (including professional 
bodies) 
 Others (non-facility-based insurance companies, 
Individuals 
 
7.1.1. Types/forms of relationship 
The relationships between FPFPs and other organisations were either formal or 
informal. According to the participants, formal relationships were those perceived as 
based on an agreement whereas informal relationships were those that emerged 
because of interactions or relationships between individuals working in relating 
organisations. In some cases, the informal relationships were later formalized, while 
in other cases, they remained merely interactions between individuals.  Figure 29 
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shows an extract of coded data indicating an informal relationship between one of the 
FPFPs and a gynaecologist working in the mission (not-for-profit hospital). 
 
Figure 29: Data extract coded for content for organisations linked through 
individuals (ATLAS.ti) 
 
 
7.2 Relational Links 
The relationships between the FPFPs other organisations, which are represented by 
arrowheads moving towards or away from the red boxes in Figure 28 were mainly 
driven by the exchange of resources or assistance rendered by one organisation to 
another and are, from this point forward, referred to as relational links. As noted 
earlier, through coding with ATLAS.ti software, 35 relational links emerged; these 
were later merged into themes and this is illustrated by Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Relational links of FPFPs by frequency of mention 
 
 
Source: Organisational life histories 
 
Although the study found numerous relational links, this analysis focused on seven 
that scored an average of 4 (mentions) and above, as indicated in Figure 30: referrals; 
regulatory links; partnerships with districts; partnerships with NGOs; contractual 
relations (health maintenance organisations [HMOs]); drug procurement and supply; 
and HR share.  The remaining relational links are clustered into ‘others’, including 
branches outside Gulu, board member, marketing drugs, hybrid, ambulatory service, 
waste management and funding but details about these were excluded from analysis. 
 
7.2.1. Referral relationships 
Referral relationships emerged as having the densest network (one that was 
mentioned most within the interviews). Figure 31 shows the most central 
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organisations36 in the referral network, with the private hospital as one of three 
facilities that play a central role within the referral network. The other two comprise 
the state’s regional hospital (Gulu Regional Referral Hospital) and the non-profit 
mission hospital (Lacor Hospital). This is illustrated by the many lines that are 
connected to them. 
These hospitals played a unique role of handling obstetric care and emergencies, 
major surgeries, chronic illnesses, and specialised services, among others.  For 
example, AAR Clinic Gulu has a referral link to both Gulu Regional Referral Hospital 
and Lacor Hospital (both state and non-profit), hence the lines pointing towards these 
two hospitals. The community clinic also makes referrals to the private hospital as 
well as the government hospital. 
Figure 31 further shows that within the network, there was also a stand-alone clinical 
laboratory and an X-ray imaging centre, which carried out unique diagnostic tests and 
offered X-ray and imaging services, respectively. For example, one Clinical 
Laboratory reported that they received referrals from the public hospital, the mission 
hospital, clinics in Gulu and hospitals located in the Lango sub-region.  One pharmacy 
located at in the yellow box at the top centre of figure 31 played a role in drug 
procurement, given that it reported having received referrals for drugs from both the 
public and the mission hospitals. Figure 31 also shows that referrals for HIV services 
seemed quite rare. For example, only one FPFP facility, reported having referred 
patients to an NGO which offers HIV/ AIDS care and support in the area for further 
care. 
 
36 One that had more lines in relation to referrals 
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Figure 31: Referral network for FPFPs in Gulu 
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7.2.1.1 Challenges associated with referrals between FPFPs and other 
providers 
Mistrust and frustration were associated with the referral relations between FPFPs 
and other non-FPFPs. According to managers of two FPFs who were interviewed, 
this mistrust was perceived to be expressed in part through the poor attitude of staff 
towards patients that had been referred and total disregard for the referral notes at 
the receiving end. This poor attitude was attributed to the benefits and profits FPFPs 
were perceived to enjoy compared to those who worked in non-FPFPs. This mistrust 
was ultimately reported to have resulted in negative consequences for patients, such 
as delays in receiving medical attention and death. 
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But there are some [facilities- PNFP and public] that still do not accept our 
referrals.  They do not consider us or our files. They would start all afresh. […] 
For us we continue to refer but now the patient is the one that suffers. They 
will say we do not listen to [name of medical centre]. (P18: LH Medical centre 
_ Old FPFP) 
Somebody […] may envy you because you are driving and say, ‘she is richer 
than me who works here with government’. […] such attitude is the one making 
clients suffer. (P1: KI_ Manager_Other FPFP Facility) 
One of the managers of the public hospital perceived the referrals, particularly in 
relation to X-ray equipment, to be induced by health workers who were doing dual 
practice in the public hospital and in their private business. He suspected failures in 
the X-ray machine to have been an act of sabotage by a staff member who also 
worked in the FPFP aimed at having patients go to their business outfit, which 
exclusively provided X-ray services. 
Some of the people working in the X-ray department damage the machines 
here at the hospital. […]. When they [machines] are spoilt, they send clients to 
their business. […]. (P2: KI_Manager public facility) 
Some of the FPFPs innovated around the challenge of referral-related hostility and 
enabled improvements in the way referrals were handled at non-FPFP facilities in the 
area by first creating formal agreements with individuals working in the non-FPFP 
facilities. As indicated in the quote below, a formal relationship between an FPFP 
HCII and a health worker in a PNFP facility (mission hospital) resulted in a formal 
arrangement for referrals and ultimately positive results for the patient. 
We usually refer to Lacor Hospital and not Gulu […] we have good mutual 
understanding with Lacor and the gynaecologist Mr. Opalat [not real name] is 
one of our board members. […] (P1: KI_ Manager_ Other FPFP clinic) 
Previously, deliberate efforts were made by the district to enhance discussions 
between FPFPs and other health providers in the public and the PNFP sectors in the 
municipality with the aim of improving referral collaborations. However, discussions 
were perceived as inadequate in relation to solving the challenges, given that they 
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resulted in the dissemination of mere directives for FPFPs to refer clients to the public 
and mission hospitals,  
In 2013, we had a workshop organised by Gulu district health team and 
Ministry of Health.  As FPFPs, we complained but we were told that referrals 
must be made to Government Regional Referral Hospital and the PNFP 
hospital. (P18: LH Medical centre _ Old FPFP) 
 
7.2.2 Regulatory links 
 The network for regulatory links for FPFPs is illustrated in Figure 32.  The FPFPs 
(coded blue) have a relationship with regulators at district (colour-coded red) as well 
as national level (colour-coded green). At district level, the DHO’s office (although 
interestingly mentioned by few FPFPs), which is one of the regulators at district level, 
plays a central role in the regulation of FPFPs. It does this mainly through its associate 
offices located at the district headquarters within the same compound. These include 
the Public Private Partnership for Health (PPPH) office, the DDI Gulu, Allied Health, 
and the laboratory focal person. Their responsibilities included the enforcement of 
registration and payment of annual operating licence fees on behalf of the 
professional bodies as well as conducting supervision to ensure quality of serviced 
provided. The Gulu municipal council authority was also mentioned as a regulatory 
body in charge of collecting business taxes from FPFPs, which contribute to the 
district local revenue. 
Furthermore, regulators at national level (coded green) were mainly professional 
association bodies such as Uganda Medical and Dental Practitioners Council 
(UMDPC), the Pharmaceutical Society of Uganda (PSU), Uganda Nurses and 
Midwives Council (UNMC), Allied Health Professionals, Uganda Private Midwives 
Association (UPMA). Within the National Quality Improvement Framework in Uganda, 
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the professional councils are responsible for the regulation of professional standards, 
ethics and code of conduct. They  are  also  entrusted with the power to recognise 
and reward good performance and also  sanction or institute disciplinary measures 
for professional misconduct (MOH, 2015). The professional councils have adapted 
the implementation of their roles through the enforcement of payment of association 
and subscription fees, supervision, legal cover as well as punishment for offenders. 
As summarised in Table 20, there are variations in the amount of membership fees 
paid by cadres based on professional speciality, nationality (non-Ugandan fees are 
usually higher), fines for defaulting in renewing membership and cases handled in 
relation to misconduct as enforced by the Uganda Medical and Dental Practitioners’ 
council.  
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Figure 32: Regulatory links for FPFPs in Gulu 
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The managers of FPFPs expressed an appreciation of the relationship with 
professional associations although the majority were unaware of the status of their 
members’ subscription to the professional bodies for that year. Three advantages of 
the relationship with professional associations emerged. These included a sense of 
belonging, a collective bargaining voice for FPFPs with the claimants as well as being 
able to have legal cover and favour in case of any issues. 
 
They [professional bodies] can protect you, but they can also demote you if 
you do something stupid […] If you are a registered person and you are 
engaged in doing quack things. (P4: KI_ Health Worker_ Other FPFP) 
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When probed about the circumstances under which health workers were 
protected/provided with legal cover, the registrar for one of the professional 
association bodies clarified that investigations need to be undertaken first. Should the 
health worker be found guilty of the accusations against them, then a punishment 
would be enforced accordingly.  According to the Allied Health Professionals Act, 
Article 27, punishments for professional misconduct and moral turpitude range from 
paying a fine to the revocation of licences, whereby the latter is operationalised by 
removal of the cadre’s name from the register. However, in Article 28, the law also 
provides for the reinstatement of the cadre’s name into the register after successful 
completion of the punishment period and payment of a prescribed fee (Allied Health 
Professionals Council, 2000).  
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Table 20: Fees structure for registration and licensing doctors in Uganda 
 
 
Source: Uganda Medical and Dental Practitioners Council – 
https://umdpc.com/Resources/FEES%20STRUCTURE.pdf 
 
Furthermore, key informant interviews indicated that regulatory relationships post-
conflict were of a friendly nature compared to during the conflict period. Specifically, 
at the time of data collection, the regulators noted that they interacted freely with 
those they regulated. The study also found a role conflict involving one of the 
regulators, who, despite the regulatory responsibilities they held, also owned a clinic 
within the same area.  It was therefore interesting to note that during interviews, the 
regulators in Gulu were more articulate about the challenges faced by the FPFPs and 
then, in the course of the interviews, put on their ‘regulator hats’. 
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7.2.3 Partnerships with the district/ government 
The study found that the FPFPs were in partnership with the district office and other 
government institutions, such the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the 
Pharmaceutical Society of Uganda and Gulu University. The partnership with the 
district office enabled the FPFPs to receive resources such as the Primary Health 
Care (PHC) grant, vaccines for immunisation, and family planning supplies. In relation 
to the provision of PHC and vaccines, the district officials indicated that the FPFPs 
were expected to conduct immunisation and submit reports. Interestingly, only one 
FPFP mentioned that they submitted reports to the district.  
Other benefits of the partnership with the district included training in self-regulation, 
cold chain management and support in tax management, waste management and 
health camps. Further analysis revealed that FPFPs that had been in business for 
some time (over 10 years) benefited more from these privileges than their 
counterparts who had set up business after the conflict. 
 
7.2.4 Partnerships with NGOs 
The FPFPs were also in partnership with several NGOs working around Gulu whose 
modus operandi was based on a written agreement, commonly referred to as a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU). The partnerships were established based on 
a manager approaching the NGO to discuss the possibility of working together or vice 
versa. The benefits of such partnerships included support for HIV testing and 
diagnostics, the expansion of service coverage through outreach and health camps 
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as well as training of health workforce particularly in reproductive health and family 
planning as well as drug display. The most influential NGOs are shown in table 21. 
 
Table 21: Some influential NGOs in the network of FPFPs 
Name of NGO partner Partnership 
NuHITES Support with HIV diagnostics 
GWED-G Tests to communities 
PACE Family planning support, training in drug display – for drug shops 
Health for Them Health camps 
PROFAM Support for family planning 
Reproductive Health Uganda Referrals 
Watoto Ministries Tests and health camps 
 
7.2.5 Health maintenance organisations (HMOs) 
Health maintenance organisations (HMOs) provide health coverage for an annual fee.  
There were several insurance companies which were reported to have clients in the 
municipality. However, many except two, were non-facility-based and hence utilised 
a network of facilities in the municipality to provide health services to their clients. As 
indicated in Figure 33, the facilities utilised by the HMO network mainly comprised 
the three well-established hospitals in the district, including the private for-profit 
hospital, the mission hospital, and the public hospital. One of the insurance company 
clinics seemed quite popular, as it provided services for non-medical organisations 
such as the UCUMI supermarket and banks as well as clients of other insurance 
companies which operated in the area but lacked a physical health infrastructure.  In 
cases where the insurance company clinic was unable to offer services, particularly 
in complicated cases, it would sub-contract the three hospitals mentioned earlier to 
provide services on its behalf while it retained the role of managing payments. The 
manager of the said insurance company clinic boasted of making huge profits. 
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We also have an MOU that we would treat their clients for a number of 
insurance companies that do not have their medical setting […] those give 
us about 25 million Uganda shillings a month. (P15: LH_Insurance company 
clinic _ Young FPFP) 
 
Accordingly, Figure 33 illustrates that one insurance company clinic is central and 
important in the network because it provides services to clients of other insurance 
companies, which are indicated within the network, as well as employees of NGOs 
and banks. One private health centre II was providing services to students in two 
secondary schools and staff of a supermarket and an NGO. Based on the interviews, 
Gulu Independent Hospital had previously been providing services to clients of 
various insurance companies. However, by the time of fieldwork, all MOUs had 
expired, and it was only providing services to clients of Vamrenda Insurance. This link 
is indicated in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33: Networks for health maintenance organisations 
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7.2.6 Drug procurement 
Drugs are a key input to any health business at whatever level, hence relational links 
of drug procurement and drug supply existed for FPFPs and pharmacies as well as 
pharmaceutical companies. The study found that during the conflict, the choice of 
pharmacies was limited, whereas the relative post-conflict peace created an 
opportunity for more pharmacies to open up and hence increased the scope of 
sources from which FPFPs procured their drugs within the municipality. The study 
found that post-conflict, pharmaceutical companies from Kampala flooded the market 
and started advertising their products. Some pharmaceutical companies even 
reportedly implemented innovations such as delivering drugs at the doorsteps of the 
FPFPs, hence indirectly saving managers the trouble of travelling to Kampala to 
purchase drugs. 
 
7.2.7 HR sharing and borrowing 
The study found that sharing of the health workforce occurred between FPFPs and 
fellow FPFPs as well as between FPFPs and non-FPFP facilities such as Gulu 
University. Three of the 10 cases interviewed for a life history experienced sharing of 
staff with FPFPs beyond the municipality boundaries. The managers of the FPFPs 
interviewed perceived sharing of staff as a way of coping with the high costs of paying 
for experienced cadres as well as filling the vacuum created by the absence of some 
staff during the peak hours. One of the managers referred to the latter as ‘borrowing 
staff’. 
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We have been borrowing medical doctors from the clinics. For instance, the 
medical officer or CO would come and leave at midday, and there is no one to 
replace and maybe I know somebody somewhere and I call that somebody 
may be working in victory Medical centre. (P18: LH_ Medical centre _ Old 
FPFP) 
 
In instances where staff were shared with non-FPFPs, they mainly came from the 
public sector and this, although not exclusively, was common with specialised cadres. 
Certain policies of managing the workload in the public sector, such as working in 
shifts to ensure flexible schedules for health workers in public facilities, created an 
opportunity for health workers to juggle work in the public sector and in the FPFPs 
during the periods they were indicated as being off duty. This could be either during 
the day or late in the evening. These staff could easily be part of the pool to be 
‘shared/borrowed’ by FPFPs and enable the FPFPs to cope with the high cost of 
salaries.  
When you are in private practice and you employ someone, who is in 
government service, part of the burden to satisfy that person has been taken 
by the government. Now if you are going to keep him as the sole employer 
then you are going to raise that bill yourself. (P2: KI_ Manager Public facility) 
 
 
7.3 Discussion  
Chapter 7 has shown that FPFPs have a dense network with other organisations 
within the market in which they operate. A network indicates an accumulation of links 
between individuals or organisations (McPake and Normand, 2008). The networks in 
this chapter have been illustrated by the network maps indicating the relational links 
involving each organisation. McPake and Normand (2008) further note that networks 
act as an alternative way of organizing transactions. They reflect not only the market 
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structure, but also the organisations reputation and, from an NIE perspective, some 
level of trust between organisations. 
Furthermore, Gilson et al. (2017) emphasize that ‘relationships and social networks 
within the health system underpin everyday resilience’. From an NIE perspective, the 
emergence of networks could be interpreted  as a coping strategy, where FPFPs  
attempt to move from hierarchical to market modes of transacting in order to 
economize on transaction costs (McPake et al., 2013:152). For example, FPFPs 
indicated that amidst the high operational costs and the challenges faced in hiring 
full-time staff, they took advantage of a public workforce that needed more income, 
which is a neo-liberal tactic facilitated by shift work in the public sector. The emerging 
social networks illustrated in this chapter were considerably important in 
strengthening the presence and participation of FPFPs in the health market in the 
area. For instance, they provided an opportunity for some to contribute to the 
expansion of service coverage and referral. Most of the relational links indicated an 
exchange of resources without necessarily paying with money, which reinforces the 
NIE assumption that organisations can help co-ordinate markets. 
The relational links also illustrate the blurry nature of boundaries between FPFPs and 
other organisations. This reinforces the evidence and arguments about the 
distinctions between the public and the private sector (Whyte, 1992, Guisti et al., 
1997) and the fluid nature of the boundaries between the two sectors, which enables 
‘free circulation’ of resources (Birungi et al., 2001). 
The chapter has also shown that relationships between FPFPs and other 
organisations were based on both formal and informal contracts and agreements. 
Within NIE, these contracts enable the coordination of transactions by providing for 
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the creation of formal or informal rules. According to McPake and Normand (2008), 
formal contracts can be explicitly written and legally binding agreements but can also 
be implicit. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) in McPake and Normand (2008) define 
implicit contracts as ‘a shared understanding that is not legally enforceable but that 
parties consider to be binding on one another’s conduct. These contracts were 
common among FPFPs. For instance, the provision of loan books by the smaller 
FPFPs and the contracts between managers of the FPFPs and those they contracted 
to supervise their facilities in order to beat the strict regulation are reflective of the 
informal category defined by Milgrom and Roberts (1992). 
Furthermore, within the new institutional economics, contracts present a new mode 
of conducting an exchange. However, Williamson (1985) in McPake and Normand 
(2008) describes two challenges that arise with contracts – bounded rationality and 
opportunism (p.132) – which have already been explained in Chapter 2. This implies 
that contracts can present difficulties and some of the challenges reported by 
business managers in relation to ‘supervisors’ wanting to increase the fee for acting 
as quasi-partners reflect this aspect really well. 
Lastly, the chapter has also highlighted the central role that FPFPs play in the health 
market, including participation in referrals, the expansion of service coverage, the 
procurement of drugs and equipment as well as health maintenance of clients, 
particularly with the emergence of insurance companies.  
The chapter has shown that referrals are a main relationship within the network and 
market in which the FPFPs operated. Indeed, the literature indicates that referral is 
one of the key relationships between the public and the private sectors (Birungi et al., 
2001, Gautham et al., 2014).  The available literature within the ReBUILD Consortium 
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indicated that the private not-for-profit organisations play a major role in supporting 
health service delivery in the Acholi sub-region (Namakula et al., 2016). The network 
maps indicated that FPFPs not only referred clients to the public but also to private 
not-for-profit facilities and highlighted the special position of the private sector within 
the health system in such a setting.  Some categories of FPFPs, e.g. the X-ray centre, 
the stand-alone clinical laboratory and pharmacies, acted as middlemen in the 
treatment cascade. For example, a patient at public facility A would be referred to 
pharmacy X for drugs and then return to the facility for treatment. Nevertheless, these 
FPFPs were in some cases the last place of reference. However, the chapter has 
shown that referrals between public facilities and FPFPs, which were characterised 
by perceived mistrust and envy, could be a starting point for a discussion of the public-
private partnership for health. 
A unique contribution of this chapter, however, is the information about other 
relational links, including those around HR, and regulatory relationships, among 
others, and the evidence that, indeed, transactions between organisations may not 
necessarily require money. 
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CHAPTER 8: MECHANISMS BY FPFPS TO ENSURE PRO-
POOR ACCESS 
 
8.0. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the third research question of this study, which sought to 
understand the mechanisms employed by FPFPs to ensure pro-poor access. The 
chapter draws upon both quantitative (organisational survey) and qualitative methods 
(life-history interviews and key informant interviews). While analyzing this data, the 
researcher reflected on the neo-liberal assumption of profit maximization while also 
highlighting aspects of social entrepreneurship theory. 
First, the chapter explores the FPFP managers’ perceptions of the poor and presents 
some parameters that guide the identification of the poor as innovated by the 
managers. Thereafter, the mechanisms that the FPFPs employed to show that they 
‘care for the poor’ are presented, with corresponding justifications indicated, where 
applicable. Lastly, a concluding discussion of the chapter is presented. 
8.1. How Do the FPFPs Identify/Define a ‘Poor’ Person? 
The interviews explored the concept of poverty, particularly how poverty relates to 
care-seeking in FPFP providers. The researchers first explored how FPFPs defined 
the poor. According to some participants, the ‘poor’ could be defined based on five 
main parameters, which were determined mainly by the manager of the for-profit 
business. These included the following: 
i)  Appearance 
 In terms of ‘presentation/appearance’, a poor person is defined as one who is 
either ‘not well dressed’ or ‘not clean’. One of the managers (a regulator who 
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owns a clinic within Gulu) claimed to be able to distinguish a rich person from a 
poor person even if they are both dirty. 
[…] if someone is not well dressed […] ( P1: KI_Manager_Other FPFP_ 
facility) 
That skin [for a rich person] will still shine even if [covered] in the dust; yes, 
even if very dirty today we can know that this one here. So, we give them a 
bill and they say I cannot afford five thousand and say I have only three 
thousand shillings only, but I will see you […]. (P9: KI_ Regulator_ District 
level) 
 
ii)  Perceived inability to pay bills 
 A person’s inability to pay the bill was evaluated, based on the managers’ 
empathetic feelings generated after listening to the client’s explanations 
regarding failure to pay and the observation that the person had been ‘stranded’ 
at the facility owing to non-payment of bills. A poor person was one who said they 
were unable to pay even a bill perceived to be small or one that affirmed that they 
found it difficult to cover the bill for a service offered. Mothers were more likely to 
take on the caregiving role at the facility or take the patients to the FPFP facilities.  
 
Yes, when a mother comes you can see for yourself that she as only two 
thousand [shillings- [equivalent of about half a dollar based on the 2015 
exchange rates] you do the laboratory test. […] and if you see that the child 
has malaria now, she will tell you now I do not have the money. (P1: KI_ 
manager, Other FPFP facility) 
 
iii)  Perceived level of politeness 
 The polite way to ask for favours that was employed by some clients as they 
requested an exemption or fee reduction qualified them as ‘poor’.  Politeness was 
judged based on the words and tone used by clients. Those with a perceived high 
politeness level were perceived to be poor and the arrogant ones were perceived 
to be rich.   
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[…] the way they [patients] will talk to you, you will know. So, you do not need 
too much psychology, you will know this one has nothing, but this other one 
can pay. They [poor people] are usually very polite even in the way they ask 
[…] But there are some people who have money and they will start talking to 
you with arrogance. (P19: LH_ medical consulting and X-ray_ Young FPFP) 
 
iv)  Place of residence 
 For some FPFP managers, a poor person was perceived as someone whose 
place of residence was located a long distance from Gulu town (rural Gulu).  Such 
participants also seemed to imply that medical personnel were gifted with an 
extraordinary skill of identifying people who have travelled long distances so as 
to access the services in Gulu town. 
You ask the patient to pay 2,000 shillings- [50 US cents] […] and he tells 
you he does not have money […] he starts pleading with you that I came 
from Ngai, or Opit village and just walked to Gulu town, I am really sick or 
my baby is really sick. Therefore, you can see that if you do not help, they 
will probably have to walk back to Opit village without being treated or 
offered services. (P18: LH_ Medical centre_ Old FPFP) 
 
V) Use of coins to pay for services 
 According to one of the managers, clients who use coins are perceived as poor. 
This is because of the perceived difficulty related to the process of accumulating 
and counting coins of a certain amount to be able to pay a medical bill. 
[…] and gives you coins not notes, you must know the person has no 
money. (P20: LH_ Clinical laboratory Young FPFP) 
 
8.2 Mechanisms Employed by FPFPs to Enable Pro-Poor Access 
to Health Services 
The interviews explored how FPFP providers approached or tried to show that they 
cared for the poor and the reasons why. Various mechanisms were employed by 
FPFPs to enable the poor to access health services in Gulu municipality. These 
included the provision of free services, fee reduction and top-up of fees and payment 
of services in-house/outside the FPFP facility. There were also some flexibility and 
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practices around ensuring that payments were ‘manageable for clients. These 
included loans, fractions/partial doses, and payment in instalments. The mechanisms 
are explained in detail below: 
 
8.2.1 Provision of free services and fee exemptions by FPFPS 
Although the FPFPs are largely believed to be for-profit, the researcher asked the 
question to test the theory that FPFPs cannot offer any fee exemptions. As indicated 
in Table 22, all the 45 FPFPs interviewed except pharmacies, laboratories, private 
hospitals, and insurance company clinics, reported that they offered some fee 
exemptions. However, fee exemptions were most likely to be offered in clinics or 
medical centres than in other categories of facility. 
Table 22: FPFPs likely to offer a fee exemption 
 
Q114Do you have a fee exemption? 
  
Category of organisation Yes No Total 
Clinic 6 12 18 
Medical centre 3 4 7 
Pharmacy 0 5 5 
Laboratory 0 2 2 
Private hospital 0 1 1 
Insurance company clinic 0 1 1 
NGO clinic 1 0 1 
Drug shop 2 6 8 
X-ray and scan centre 0 1 1 
HC II 1 0 1 
Total 13 32 45 
 
The categories exempted included the elderly, child mothers, adolescents, women 
within childbearing age (pregnant women) and people with disabilities (PWDs). 
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Services for which fee exemptions are likely to apply within FPFPs 
Figure 34 shows that fee exemptions were likely to apply to all services except X-ray, 
Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) and eye clinic. In descending order, the services for which 
fee exemptions were likely to apply included consultation, prescription of drugs, sale 
of drugs, family planning and laboratory services. Fee exemptions were least likely to 
apply to services such as major surgeries, minor surgeries, maternal deliveries, and 
dental services. 
Figure 34: Services with likely fee exemptions 
 
 
Services with exemptions 
In addition to those services indicated in Figure 34, qualitative interviews with 
managers indicated that other services which were provided for free by FPFPs 
included immunisation of children, family planning, HIV testing, screening for hepatitis 
B, diabetes screening and blood transfusion. 
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8.2.1.1.  Reasons why FPFPs offer free service 
Partnerships: The interviews explored the reasons why FPFPs provided free 
services. The study found that one of the factors that enabled this was partnerships 
with governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as partnerships with some 
selected educational institutions within Gulu municipality. FPFPs reported that they 
were able to provide free immunisation services as it is an area of coverage targeted 
by the public sector. This was enabled by government subsidies in the form of 
vaccines, fridges for storage and primary healthcare. A few well-established and 
larger FPFPs, particularly hospitals and insurance company clinics, were thus able to 
provide free services. In return, such FPFPs were expected to submit reports to the 
district offices. 
 
[…] we get the vaccines from the district and we do UNEPI [immunisation] 
here and then we give the district the report […]. (P15: LH_ Insurance company 
clinic_ Young FPFP) 
 
Partnerships with NGOs and other FPFPs, and MOUs with academic institutions 
enabled FPFPs to conduct health camps during which they undertook the provision 
of services such as free blood pressure checks, free hepatitis-B screening, free 
cancer screening and family planning. These partnerships were reported to be 
because of lobbying by managers of the individual FPFPs, as in the case of one 
insurance company clinic.  
 
Free services as an advertisement: In most cases, free services were perceived as 
advertisements for other services in an FPFP facility. For instance, when mothers 
came for free immunisation, they would be informed about other paediatric-related 
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services.  Free consultation and blood transfusion were provided mainly by small and 
large FPFPs, respectively, with the aim of encouraging prospective clients to seek 
services.  
  
Then we have other free services like blood transfusion […] but they are not 
going to get blood only, they are going to get other treatments and we shall 
charge for the sets used to administer the blood and all treatments. If we find 
that you also have malaria, we are giving you anti- malarial[tablets] which are 
not for free. (P4: KI_HW other FPFP facility) 
 
To avoid wasting vaccines: One of the deviant cases was a manager who explained 
that their facility provided free services, for instance vaccinations, simply because 
they wanted to get rid of reagents that were about to expire. 
 
8.2.2 Price reduction and bargaining 
Price reduction was another mechanism employed by FPFPs. The study found that 
FPFPs were likely to offer price reductions for all services except for major surgeries, 
ENT, laboratory and family planning. The services with the lowest likelihood for fee 
reductions included dental services, X-ray, maternal deliveries and minor surgeries. 
Services such as sale of drugs, consultation and the prescription of drugs, blood tests 
and laboratory tests were reported to have the highest likelihood for fee reductions.  
 
Categories of clients for whom fee reductions are offered 
Results showed that none of the FPFPs was likely to offer fee reductions to former 
abductees. However, some FPFPs would mostly offer fee reductions to the elderly 
(7), adolescents (5), Persons with disabilities (PWDs) (3), Persons Living with 
HIV/AIDS(PLWHAs) (3) and child mothers (3). An equal number of FPFPs (3), 
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although still low, reported that they would offer fee reductions to pregnant women 
and all households in Gulu. Only one FPFP reported that they would offer fee 
reductions to NGO staff. However, some FPFPs also reported that they would offer 
fee reductions to other categories of clients, particularly regular customers and 
uninsured patients, needy women and ‘those who cannot afford’. Figure 35 shows 
that only nine out of 14 services offered had the possibility to reduce fees. 
Figure 35: Services with likely fee reduction 
 
 
Price discrimination: Some FPFPs practiced price discrimination by reducing the price 
for the person perceived to be poor and increasing the price for the person perceived 
to be rich to make up for the shortfall. For instance, a manager of one of the insurance 
company clinics reported reducing the price for those clients who were not under 
insurance cover while making the bill higher for those covered by insurance. 
However, qualitative interviews revealed that in the event of price reduction, FPFPs 
ensured they still made some profit, although some intended to maintain clients by 
using the ploy of reducing the prices for them. 
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[…] usually people bargain, and we reduce. For example, ultrasound scan is 
at 25,000/= ($6.63), there is some negotiation that ‘Doctor, I have 20,000/= 
($5.30)’.  We say okay, pay that and they feel happy […] and you maintain a 
relationship with them because they say, the doctor reduced the price for me 
[laughter]. If I tell them this is that there is no reduction, I realise I am being 
rude. (P2: KI_Manager Public Facility) 
 
Furthermore, some managers of the FPFP facilities were hesitant to publicize price 
reductions to minimize the chances of such incidents happening. 
 
But we do not publicize that, we just do it quietly, otherwise even those with 
money will come and say that ‘we are being discriminated’. (P1: KI_ Manager 
Other FPFP Facility) 
 
Normally, I would take the person aside, because you know we do not want to 
make people think that it is common for us to [actually] reduce the prices. (P15: 
LH_ Insurance company clinic_Young FPFP) 
 
In one of the cases, price reductions emerged from a bargaining process between 
the manager and a client/patient.  Bargaining was perceived to create a ‘win-win’ 
scenario for both the manager and the patient.  For instance, one haggled for the cost 
of an operation for a medical condition and noted that in the end, the patient went 
away with the satisfaction that they had had a fair bargain, although the provider still 
got the expected price. 
We have the advantage that we know more about the [operation] procedure 
than the patient […], so if I tell you one million ($300), because it is a 
complicated procedure. Because you have the confidence in me, someone will 
say I have 800,000/= ($250) then I say 900,000/= ($280), you can pay that 
[laughter]. (P2: KI_Manager Public Facility) 
 
8.2.3 Loan books and deferred payments 
Loan books were common among ‘small’ providers as a strategy for dealing with 
competition with ‘big’ providers who have a greater market share. Loan books 
enabled the client to pay later hence, reduced the burden/inconvenience on the client 
of paying the whole fee at once. However, trust emerged as a key factor in the 
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operationalisation of the loan books. The presence of the manager was an enabler 
for decisions for loans or deferred payments to be made. The loan book was also 
mainly an agreement between the manager and the client to whom the loan was 
given. 
[…] we can give you your full dose, but you make a commitment to pay. For 
example, that woman you saw, we are giving her treatment for her child, and 
she has a loan book here. She can pay later […] (P4: KI_ Health Worker_ 
Other FPFP Clinic) 
 
8.2.4 Unbundling services/medicines 
Unbundling services/medicines was a practice used by the FPFPs to motivate those 
who could not afford to pay for the full dose at once. This was particularly common 
for malaria doses and among smaller FPFPs. Under this arrangement, a client would 
be given a portion of the dose that they could afford on the assumption that they 
would come back the next day with money for the next dose. One of the managers in 
a public facility who also owned a clinic elsewhere reflected on his experience at his 
clinic.  
[…]  Now if it is an outpatient, and the patient says that ‘I only came with, say 
50,000 shillings’, we tell them that the dose is incomplete, it is supposed to be 
for seven days. Buy. We have given you for two days because of the money 
you have. You can come back for the remaining part of the dose when you get 
the rest of the money […] there are some who go and don’t come back and 
they will not heal because of the incomplete doses but I would not have lost 
money. (P2: KI_Manager Public facility) 
 
8.3 Discussion  
Chapter 8 has focused on the mechanisms employed by FPFPS to ensure relevance 
to the pro-poor agenda. The chapter contributes to the ongoing debate about whether 
the private sector, particularly for-profit organisations, should or should not be 
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engaged in efforts to achieve UHC. The chapter also provides evidence to test the 
hypothesis ‘whether or not the private sector can be pro-poor’.   
The chapter has shown that FPFPs would like to maintain a good image among the 
public by ensuring that they enable access to healthcare services by the poor. 
However, they continuously face a dilemma of balancing the optimization of their 
incomes with the altruism objectives. 
The chapter has shown that FPFPs implemented various mechanisms to ensure that 
the poor could access healthcare. These mechanisms, according to the social 
entrepreneurial theory (Abu-Saifan, 2012), provide evidence that the FPFPs have the 
potential to swing between making profit and acting for a social value, hence acting 
as social entrepreneurs.  
The chapter has shown that the implementation of any equity mechanism requires 
some measures of identification of the poor involving about five parameters which 
were unsystematically applied by managers. However, owing to the unsystematic 
nature of applying the parameters, the absence and the mood of the manager, some 
of the very poor are likely to miss out on the opportunity to qualify for the free services 
or a reduction in price. There is, therefore, a need for a more systematic way of 
identifying the poor within the for-profit providers (Patouillard et al., 2007). 
Ironically, the mechanisms were not meant to be advertised (made known) and the 
operationalisation of some mechanisms, for instance, fee exemptions and bargaining 
for fee reductions, reflected a dilemma that managers were facing to move along the 
extreme continuum of social entrepreneurship.  
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Some of the mechanisms enabled a reduction in the financial burden that would result 
from the clients paying at one go while some flexibility and practices ensured that 
payments were manageable for clients. These included loans, fractions/partial doses 
and payment in instalments. Furthermore, some of these mechanisms are not 
necessarily unique to post-conflict settings but similar to those found in some studies 
conducted among informal providers in relatively stable contexts such as India and 
Bangladesh (Bloom et al., 2011).  
The dilemma was further reflected through actions undertaken by FPFPs to ensure 
that they leveraged the opportunity made available by the provision of free services, 
which was enabled by partnerships with other sectors, to market the other services 
that they provided in-house. Furthermore, the chapter has shown that the package of 
services that were picked out for fee exemptions was narrow, and mainly focused on 
prevention. The price exemptions within FPFPs, therefore, leave a lot to be desired, 
given that some of the most critical services, such as diagnostic services, are not 
exempted.  In terms of UHC, there is need for a more comprehensive and clearer 
package of service. 
Unlike the young FPFPs, the older FPFPs were more likely to provide free services 
through partnerships with government agencies and with NGOs. From the NIE 
perspective, this reflects rewards for credible commitment, which may later have 
enabled the FPFPs to  undertake complex contracting and transactions that would 
otherwise have been difficult, and hence ensured their continuous survival in 
business (North, 1994). The older FPFPs showed credible commitment through 
investing in infrastructure; such commitment was also reflected through being able to 
conduct business and provide health services for a long time, even during conflict, 
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and thereby being able to negotiate for support from the district offices and attract 
partnerships for the exchange of various resources in the early post-conflict period.  
This evidence further supports the assertion that organisations are agents of change 
in an economy and that their bargaining power and perceived effectiveness over time, 
as a result of changes in their relative success in accomplishing their objectives,  can  
influence alterations in the institutional framework (North, 1994).  
The majority of FPFPs implemented fee reductions, mainly resulting from 
negotiations between the client and the provider. Beyond prices, NIE recommends 
bargaining as a means of determining price, hence again going beyond the neo-
classical economic assumption of prices being determined by only forces of demand 
and supply. Evidence emerged from this study that negotiation has limitations since 
some managers reported exaggerating the price of treatment. This finding points to 
greed and the need to maximize profit, which is one of the assumptions of the neo-
liberal theory, and further reflects the NIE-related concept of information asymmetry 
(McPake et al., 2013), which is one of the challenges with the demand for healthcare. 
As noted in Chapter 2, information asymmetry is a situation where one party in a 
transaction has more information than the other. In this case, the doctor has more 
information than the patient and takes advantage of this situation (McPake and 
Normand, 2008, McPake et al., 2013). Such a scenario further implies that the doctor 
has misused his position as an agent and highlights the need for oversight by 
professional bodies (ibid.).  In this study, one of the managers lied about the actual 
condition of the patient and used this lie as a ploy to bargain for the price of the 
operation with the client.  
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Some FPFPs practiced unbundling of services, where the clients would be given 
doses that they could afford with the hope that they would return.  This situation leads 
to a dilemma. On the one hand, it helps reduce catastrophic expenditure by breaking 
down the burden of OOP over a period. However, this has implications for quality, 
which is reflected through drug resistance, particularly when the clients fail to return 
to complete their dose. The concern about quality of services in the for-profit sector 
in relation to breaking down doses has also been highlighted elsewhere (Bloom et 
al., 2011).  
Unbundling of services and extending loans were based on trust, which, as indicated 
earlier, is a key concept of NIE (Dequech, 2005). Trust reflects a ‘social-contractual 
relationship’ between the providers and the clients, as indicated by Bloom and 
colleagues (Bloom et al., 2008).  Trust is important for the effective performance of 
health systems, given that it creates a feeling of satisfaction in connection with both 
clients’ needs/expectations and providers’ expectations (Gilson, 2003, Bloom et al., 
2008). Another study conducted earlier on the private sector in the conflict-affected 
region of Northern Africa also found trust to be an important aspect of business (World 
Bank, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.0. Introduction 
The key findings of this study have been presented in the previous chapters – 
Chapters 5 to 8.  This chapter begins with a summary of the contributions of this 
study. The researcher also presents her reflection upon the initial conceptual 
framework, which was conceived earlier, in relation to the study findings, and 
highlights areas for emphasis and new developments arising from the study findings. 
Consequently, an empirically derived conceptual framework is presented. The main 
findings of the study which relate to private sector characteristics, resilience, and the 
extent of the contribution of FPFPs to UHC are then discussed in the light of the 
existing literature. The researcher simultaneously reflects upon patterns of behaviour 
observed in private providers that are particularly characteristic of post-conflict 
settings, while noting, where possible, the outstanding similarities with settings that 
are relatively stable. The researcher then reflects on the limitations as well as the 
strengths of the study. The conclusions and recommendations based on the empirical 
findings are also presented. Lastly, the researcher summarises areas for further 
research and action. 
9.1 Main Contributions of This Study 
The overall objective of this study was to understand the extent to which FPFPs have 
contributed to building an equitable/pro-poor health system in Northern Uganda. This 
study was important owing to the limited body of evidence on the FPFP sector in 
general and on conflict/post-conflict settings. The study makes a contextual 
contribution, in that it provides knowledge about how conflict affects the FPFP 
sector’s contributions over time as well as the aspects of resilience and strategies for 
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benefiting from opportunities presented in the post-conflict period. The study provides 
insights into how FPFPs get established and survive, and identifies the innovations 
used to cope with conflict and business strategies in relation to the challenges 
encountered in the post-conflict period.  
  
Furthermore, the study provides evidence about innovations devised by FPFPs to 
gain social acceptability and to contribute to the advancement of UHC goals. Despite 
the dilemmas highlighted in relation to balancing the latter with the for-profit objective,  
this can also be  perceived as a contribution to the know-how knowledge type, which 
presents guidance on local operational knowledge about  good practices by the 
formal for-profit private providers (Bennett et al., 2014). The information about 
relational networks singles out the key FPFPs within the networks of health service 
delivery in Northern Uganda and provides learning about the possible set of 
interactions (Bennett et al., 2014) that may occur among the actors in the healthcare 
market.  In addition, the networks illustrate some areas, for instance referrals, health 
maintenance and diagnostics, where FPFPs play central roles. This evidence can, 
therefore, be a useful resource for informing the development of programmes for the 
engagement of the FPFP sector or for strengthening the implementation of the public-
private partnership for health (PPPH) in Uganda.  
 
There is limited documentation about  innovative ways of acquiring data from private 
health providers in order to capture the complex dynamics present within health 
markets (Bennett et al., 2014). Using a range of mixed methods, this study makes a 
methodological contribution to studying a complex phenomenon, understanding the 
experiences of FPFPs across post-conflict phases as well as the healthcare market. 
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In particular, the use of the life-history method allowed the providers to narrate their 
experiences, hence providing them with an opportunity to contribute to tacit local 
knowledge about the dynamics of the market. Furthermore, the use of the life-history 
method enabled retrospective interrogation as well as an understanding of the 
changes/evolution of the FPFPs over time and their survival/resilience across conflict 
phases. Literature about the use of the life-history method to study such organisations 
in conflict-affected settings and even in relatively ‘stable’ settings is limited. 
Additionally, social network analysis was used to illustrate the relationships between 
FPFPs and other organisations in the area. Whereas documentation about these 
linkages in the market has been in existence, this is the first time that SNA has been 
used to graphically illustrate such linkages. 
The study also makes a theoretical contribution by providing an understanding of the 
factors that enable transactions beyond the forces of demand and supply, for 
instance, non-price mechanisms such as organisations and networks. This is 
because the study utilised the NIE theory to inform data analysis. 
9.2.  Reflection upon the Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework (Figure 9) introduced in Chapter 3 was developed by the 
researcher prior to data collection and was mainly based on the existing literature. 
Within this framework, the researcher outlined the factors that were expected to 
influence the contribution of the FPFPs to building equitable health systems in post-
conflict settings. The assumption was that the broader contextual factors on the left 
column of the conceptual framework – EC1 – would influence changes/adaptations 
within the FPFPs- IC. The organisational factors related to the characteristics of 
FPFPs (at the centre of the framework – IC) and the adaptations brought about by 
factors in the broader context as well as factors within the policy levers that feature in 
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the right column of the conceptual framework – EC2. The policy levers illustrated 
controls by the government in relation to regulation, health workforce recruitment, 
management and incentives that have influenced the establishment of and 
adaptations within FPFPs.  For instance, the study findings indicated that under 
column EC2, professional bodies such as the Uganda Medical and Dental 
Practitioners’ Council, the Allied Health Professionals, Uganda Nurses and Midwives 
Council, Private Midwives Association of Uganda and the Pharmaceutical Society of 
Uganda provided the national institutional context and rules for establishment and 
operational conduct, among others, with which FPFPs were expected to strictly 
comply. 
 
 At district level, the office of the district health office enforced the norms at national 
level through supervision. The municipal council levied annual tax fees and ensured 
that fees paid were appropriate for the size of business and size of signposts. The 
findings also showed that in some ways, changes within the organizational 
characteristics created response in the EC2 column. A case in point was when the 
key informants reported that the government had initiated laws about the number of 
FPFPs expected on a given street and the standard distance of 60 metres that must 
be between the different facilities.  
 
Initially, the researcher assumed that all the factors indicated in the conceptual 
framework would prove to be significant, that the conceptual framework was 
exhaustive including all potential factors, and that the relationships between the 
factors listed were obvious and straightforward.  However, from analysis of the all the 
information collated from the key informant interviews, life histories and organisational 
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survey, the researcher realised that first, not all factors that influenced the contribution 
of the FPFPs had been captured in the conceptual framework. Secondly, that there 
exist inter-connections between some factors. Thirdly, the effect of the different 
factors and their influence on the contribution of FPFPs towards an equitable health 
system in Northern Uganda vary, although this cannot be easily indicated/illustrated 
in the conceptual framework. Finally, some factors, such as the amount of profit made 
and some adaptations in response to regulation/non-compliance with regulations, 
were more latent and were, therefore, less likely to be discussed by the FPFP 
managers directly or openly and these could be synthesized at the analysis stage.  
 
For instance, economic factors, when viewed within a broader context – EC1 – such 
as national tax laws and funds provided by donors at the international level, were 
initially hypothesized to be important influencers of sources of initial capital to 
establish a business. There was minimal mention of this in the interviews, except for 
one FPFP manager who stated that they were trying to write a proposal for resource 
mobilisation as one of the opportunities available in the post-conflict period. Instead, 
the findings indicated factors at individual level – personal savings and funds pooled 
by friends (see section 5.1.3 and Table 17) as key economic factors, particularly in 
relation to establishment of businesses.   
 
Security of the area, another broader contextual factor, had been assumed to be an 
important factor and evidence from the study supported this assumption. For 
example, the study found that conflict in the area, whether during or after the conflict, 
clearly influenced the FPFPs in various ways – from their establishment, through the 
range of challenges they experienced to the strategies for coping with the challenges. 
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Contrary to the assumption that the insecure environment created high economic risk 
(Avis, 2016) and therefore many got too scared to invest their moneys in a volatile 
setting, there was no mention of this.  Similar to previous studies conducted in the 
region, insecurity resulting from conflict brought about challenges such as risk of 
abduction for the managers of FPFPs as health workers and raids on their businesses 
in general and, therefore, brought out resilience aspect of the managers as health 
workers (Namakula and Witter 2014). The managers innovated to ensure their 
security as well as survival by masquerading as patients, closing or changing the 
location of their business. The role of the conflict as a contextual factor and the 
resilience of  workers as well as the private sector have also been emphasized in 
other studies about fragile settings (Bertone et al., 2018, Namakula and Witter, 2014, 
Sweeney, 2009).  Based on the analysis of the interviews, it became clear that 
changes in the security situation (also referred to as end of conflict) was a signal to 
many of those interviewed that they could begin to invest in a business, even though 
a return to complete stability could not be easily predicted. This is part of the evolution 
story that research question number 1 sought to explore in this setting. This context 
is different from that of other parts of Uganda and elsewhere where the FPFPs 
operate.  Security of the area did not only affect internal businesses but also affected 
some factors in EC 2 (policy levers), particularly the regulation of the private sector 
by making it limited, which limitation was perceived as flexibility to be enjoyed by the 
FPFPs. 
 
Demand for services, another EC 1 factor, was assumed to be a major influencer, 
particularly of the establishment of the FPFPs, and to later shape the package of 
services provided by the FPFPs. However, the researcher had not anticipated 
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changes in demand for services and this was revealed later. The findings indicated 
that the demand for services moved from limited demand or mainly humanitarian 
demand during the conflict, to growing demand after the conflict, that came from both 
the population (segmented according to income) as well as other sectors (public and 
PFNP), and this increasingly led to a heterogeneous FPFP. The end of conflict 
brought into demand related factors such as population influx, and existence of NGOs 
that were more complex and, therefore, required additional layers of interpretation 
which the researcher had not anticipated. For example, a population influx was 
identified as a demand related factor, which was due to settlement in Gulu during the 
conflict and the resultant greater urbanisation of the town in the post-conflict periods 
(Branch, 2013). The existence of NGOs in the immediate post-conflict period created 
a ready demand and perceived willingness to pay.  As shown in Chapter 2, income is 
a key element among the other determinants of demand (McPake et al. 2013).  In 
connection with this, NGO employees were perceived to have more disposable 
income, which was reflected in their demand for specialised services and the use of 
insurance companies to manage their healthcare. These factors were also reported 
to explain why some FPFPs established businesses. 
 
Ability to pay and demand, which are part of the broader contextual factors – EC1 –
interacted with the organisations, such as adaptation within FPFPs, which are in the 
central column of the framework (IC). These interactions enabled the researcher to 
observe connections and answers to research question 3 as well as the overall 
question about contribution to the pro-poor health system.  The general perception 
among the FPFPs interviewed was that, with the exception of the NGO employees 
indicated earlier, the population living in the area in which FPFPs operated was 
 229 
 
characterized largely by people who were poor and vulnerable but in need of health 
services. This caused the FPFPs to undertake adaptations internally to attract and 
maintain clients as well as respond to the pro-poor agenda. Chapter 8 illustrated 
various mechanisms including loan books and price reductions. Furthermore, the 
finding about the identification of the poor as perceived by the managers of 
FPFPs/providers contradicts Robert Chambers’ argument that the definition of 
poverty is mostly highly dependent on perception as defined by the poor themselves 
(Chambers, 1980). The findings indicated that the providers’ perception is mostly 
unsystematic, unpredictable, and unreliable, hence indicating a likelihood of some of 
the extremely poor people to miss out on the opportunity to benefit from the pro-poor 
mechanisms and ultimately health services. Hence, some of these highlighted 
aspects have an influence on the extent to which FPFPs contribute to a pro-poor and 
equitable health system post-conflict. Therefore, there is need for a more systematic 
way of identifying the poor within for-profit providers (Patouillard et al., 2007). A 
systematic review of interventions by the private sector37 to improve the utilization of 
quality  health services by the poor also acknowledges that, indeed, poverty is difficult 
to measure (Patouillard et al., 2007). However, Patouillard et al. (2007) also include 
place of residence38  among  the proxies to measure poverty in absolute and relative 
terms. They further advise the use of the socioeconomic status (SES) measure, which 
looks at the distribution of socio-economic benefits among the most disadvantaged 
groups within a given population (ibid.). 
 
37 The systematic review mainly focused on interventions for the private sector that are driven by 
government and non-governmental actors. This study, however, provides information about 
private sector-led interventions, although some are enabled by partnerships with other actors 
38  As was found in this study 
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The existence of other providers in the area, which are part of the broader 
contextual factors (EC 1), was initially assumed as an important factor which mainly 
influenced competition and, therefore created challenges for the FPFPs to navigate. 
Indeed, those interviewed expressed concern that one of the main challenges they 
faced in the post-conflict period was increased competition, which resulted from an 
increase in the number of other providers. This reflects the evolutionary nature of 
competition as well as the pluralistic nature of the market in which FPFPs operate, 
and this is what research question 2 attempted to address. The existence of other 
providers partly influenced organisational factors (IC), particularly the adaptations 
within the FPFPs. For instance, some of the managers interviewed attributed post-
conflict challenges, such as increased competition, to the perceived increase in the 
number of other providers in the area. In Chapter 6, managers of existing FPFPs 
highlighted marketing as a major strategy perceived to be effective to enable them to 
attract customers, and ultimately intended to enable them to gain a higher market 
share compared to others and to survive in business.  Recollections by some of the 
managers of the existing businesses interviewed through the life histories indicated 
premature closure of some FPFPs, and this was attributed to the inability to keep 
pace with the competition. Competition, therefore, seemed to keep the number of 
FPFPs in check. However, the study also found that there were intentional and unfair 
efforts by some health workers who were employed in both the FPFPs and the public 
sector to displace their competitors (the public sector). These were reported to use 
some illegal means such as sabotage of equipment of attracting customers to their 
personal businesses.  Such extreme cases of provider induced referrals can also be 
viewed as shortfalls that the policy levers, particularly dual practice policy, if 
operationalised, could address.  
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The existence of other providers did not only influence internal adaptations with in 
FPFPs but also the heterogeneity of the FPFPs. For example, some managers 
highlighted the emergence of the demand for specialised services, not provided 
readily by the existing providers in the public or PFNP sectors, as one of the main 
reasons they opened FPFPs to offer such services.  This was true of the stand-alone 
laboratory, X-ray and scanning centre as well as the emergence of insurance 
company clinics post-conflict. In a way, these developments were influenced by the 
desire to be unique and different from those that already existed but also to have a 
competitive advantage and meet customers’ expectations. 
 
One major finding in Chapter 7 that had not been anticipated was the positive effect 
or advantages of the existence of other providers/alternatives to FPFPs by facilitating 
their survival and existence in the market. The alternative providers such as the PNFP 
and public sector facilities and other FPFPs in the area also presented opportunities 
for potential collaboration which, some cases, enabled the FPFPs to navigate some 
costs.  One collaboration reported to exist between FPFPs and other FPFPs and 
between FPFPs and public facilities in the area was in relation to sharing of staff. 
Ideally, this would be perceived as an illegal dual practice for individual health 
workers. However, at organizational level, this was perceived as a positive thing, 
which enabled FPFP facilities to cope with high staff costs by sharing the payment of 
the salary that would ideally have been shouldered by only one FPFP facility.  
Furthermore, Chapter 7 provides details of several other relational linkages between 
FPFPs and other organisations, including other FPFPs, the PNFP and the public 
sector. The linkages were also illustrated by the dense networks. This issue is further 
explored under organisational factors. 
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Organisational factors, which are located at the centre of the conceptual framework 
(IC), were assumed to play an important role in influencing the contribution of the 
FPFPs. Among all the factors that had been listed in the initial conceptual framework, 
age and size of business, skills mix, formal and informal networks, adaptation within 
the FPFP and, to some small extent, the package of services emerged as important 
characteristics which had a significant and interconnected role in the contribution of 
FPFPs towards an pro-poor and equitable health system in post conflict Northern 
Uganda. However, the initial source of funding and objective function of an 
organisation did not emerge as very influential except for being characteristics that 
defined the uniqueness and heterogeneity of the FPFPs.   
Initially, the researcher expected the existence of one form of relationship which is 
more common in the literature – the relationship between FPFPs and the public sector 
– and that this enabled the FPFP’s contribution towards a pro-poor health system. 
However, the study findings indicated additional relationships such as linkages with 
other FPFPs, the PNFP/mission sector and the regulators at national and district 
levels as well as non-health organisations such as supermarkets. The nature of these 
relationships was also found to be both formal and informal, with some evolving 
mainly from informal relationships between health workers to formal relationships, 
while others largely remained informal. Without formal agreements, informal 
relationships could not be easily reported by respondents, except with further probing. 
Analysis showed that the benefits of such relationships/networks did not only 
influence the contribution of FPFPs towards a pro-poor health system but also 
enabled close interaction of the factors identified in the policy lever factors column 
(EC2), for example regulation, referrals and policies on dual practice. 
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The life-history interviews revealed that good and trusting relationships between the 
customers and the FPFPs built over time enabled the contribution of FPFPs to the 
pro-poor agenda. For instance, customers were able to access services without 
necessarily having all the cash at hand. In Chapter 8, loan books, which were 
established based on a verbal agreement between the provider and the customer, 
ably elaborated trust between the two parties.  This is because customers were given 
a chance to pay fees charged on a service utilised in a phased manner based on an 
agreed-upon period, with each payment recorded in the loan book. However, in some 
cases, particularly where bargaining for price reduction was reported to have taken 
place, dishonesty of the providers reflected breach of the trust their patients had in 
them. One of the providers reported having concealed some critical information about 
the magnitude of the illness which required an operation, thereby creating the false 
impression that they had reduced the price yet, in actual fact, they were still able to 
make a profit. This is an example of the negative effects of information asymmetry, 
which is a crucial concept of NIE. 
Among the policy levers/external controls indicated in EC 2, regulation of the 
FPFPs was assumed to be an important factor that influenced the contribution of the 
FPFPs. Initially, registration of the FPFPs (as an aspect of regulation) had been 
assumed to only influence entry of the FPFPs into the market and merely as an 
expected compliance criterion to be fulfilled annually.  Indeed, the study found that 
registration seemed to have been enforced, resulting in the acquisition of the 
necessary documents to operate a business.  
However, beyond registration, the enforcement of quality and regulation in relation to 
area of location seemed to have challenges. The district health office and the 
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representatives of some professional bodies could play a role as unofficial regulators 
in the absence of strong state enforcement/capacity during conflict and these need 
to be incorporated within the policy levers under EC2. Notably, these also had 
numerous challenges, including role conflict, which affected vigilant policing, as well 
as financial constraints. The findings in this study, therefore, mimic the situation on 
the regulation of private health sectors in other FCAs settings such as Somaliland 
and Afghanistan, where, although regulation is perceived as important, it is either 
non-existent or limited in enforcement despite the existence of regulatory frameworks 
(Caitlin et al., 2009, Cross et al., 2016). Nonetheless, some innovations to strengthen 
regulation during periods of fragility have also been implemented and these have 
varied in terms of how both formal and informal institutions have been used to 
implement them. In Somalia, for example, informal institutions, such as clan courts 
and other networks of trust, have been used as institutions to enforce regulation in 
the absence of the state (World Bank, 2005). However, in Afghanistan, as a formal 
institution, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) launched a stewardship initiative in 
2008 to  strengthen oversight and the regulation of the for-profit private organisations 
(Cross et al., 2016). 
Many other scholars  are in favour of the use of formal institutions for regulatory 
purposes and have, therefore, emphasised the need for the state/country 
governments to take leadership in regulating the for-profit sector in other parts of the 
world and also indicated the inherent advantages of the approach (Doherty, 2015, 
Patouillard et al., 2007, McPake and Hanson, 2016). Doherty (2015) points out that 
government stewardship in regulatory efforts would strengthen the mitigation of 
disadvantages brought about by the for-profit sector such as distortions in the quality 
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and price of health services in East and Southern Africa. McPake and Hanson (2016) 
also argued that state leadership in the regulation of quality in the for-profit sector 
would enhance the advancement of UHC goals.  
 
Referral policy had been indicated under EC 2 on the right column of the conceptual 
framework as one of the significant factors for the contribution of FPFPs. Referral 
policy was never mentioned by the participants. Although those interviewed showed 
that referrals happened, they seemed to occur “naturally” guided by the networks and 
relationships between health workers (with in the FPFP facilities and those in other 
facilities.  The practice of referrals was also earlier highlighted as a component of the 
networks for the FPFPs (part of question 3). Furthermore, referral relationships 
between FPFPS and other non-FPFP facilities was characterized with unresolved 
challenges, mainly caused by mistrust and grudges between health workers in private 
and public facilities.  The mistrust was attributed to the perception that health workers 
in FPFP facilities earned more than their colleagues who worked exclusively in the 
public facilities and, therefore, never had a chance to engage in dual practice. The 
study found that some initiatives, such as a district-led dialogue meeting to which 
FPFP managers and directors of public and PNFP facilities were invited, were helpful. 
This one-off meeting was aimed at enhancing engagement of providers to ensure 
improved referrals among health service providers in Gulu municipality. The 
frequency of occurrence of such dialogues needs to be increased to strengthen the 
referral-related linkages between FPFPs and other actors within the health care 
market.  
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There was a direct causal link between the EC2 factors (policy levers) such as 
recruitment, remuneration and the management of health workforce policies and the 
IC factors, particularly adaptation of FPFPs, which led to the perceived contribution 
of FPFPs. Inadvertent challenges within some of these policy levers enabled the 
FPFPs to get established hence answering questions 1 and 2, respectively. In chapter 
8, it has been reported that the shift-working policy is a challenge because it enables 
health workers to have extra free time when they are off-duty. Many of the health 
workers took advantage of to work elsewhere and others to open their own health-
related businesses. To some extent, therefore, this policy is central to the influence 
of the FPFP network linkages which result from sharing human resources for health. 
Therefore, shift-working policy needs to be included in column EC 2 as one of the 
policies under the management of the health workforce workload. This is because 
shift working contributes to the survival of the FPFPs and entrenches dual practice 
as an unintended consequence. 
 
Dual practice, another factor in EC2, had a direct causal relationship with the 
contribution of the FPFPs.  Dual practice,  which generally refers to the practice of 
holding  multiple concurrent clinical  jobs  in both public and private facilities, is  
documented as a common phenomenon in both high and low middle-income 
countries (McPake et al., 2014, Russo et al., 2018, Paina, 2014, Hipgrave and Hort, 
2014). This definition characterizes dual practice as only having a likelihood of 
happening between the public and the private. Available literature indicates four main 
forms of dual practice that could occur within a system. These include: 1) private 
practice outside; ii) private practice beside; iii) private practice within; and iv) private 
practice integrated within the  public facility (Russo et al., 2013, McPake et al., 2016). 
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The first two forms of dual practice were more commonly reported by study 
participants, implying that the majority of the participants held their second jobs in 
environments outside the public facility which were in some way  located  at a distance 
close to the public health facility (McPake et al., 2016).  This study provides evidence 
that dual practice also occurs between private for-profit facilities, a phenomenon 
which is yet to generate much attention. 
In the literature, dual practice has been  widely associated with discussions about its 
effects on service delivery and quality and these have further intensified in the context 
of universal coverage (McPake et al., 2014, Paina, 2014, Russo et al., 2018). The 
effects of dual practice include increased patient neglect in the public sector, 
inefficiencies due to the existence of ghost workers, absenteeism, and long waiting 
lines among others (Paina, 2014). Hence the evidence available generally depicts 
dual practice as an illegal practice and this  is referred to as the service-level 
perspective (McPake et al., 2016). 
However, McPake et al. (2016) also suggest that the service-level analysis needs to 
be combined and/or balanced with the system-level analysis of dual practice, which 
enables one to appreciate the possible benefits of dual practice, such as health 
worker retention and satisfaction. Many of the study participants seemed to subscribe 
to the system view. They were reluctant to criminalise dual practice or even provide 
a hint about the existence of a formal policy to mitigate dual practice. In addition to 
the provision of an opportunity for individual health workers to earn extra income 
(McPake et al., 1999), managers perceived dual practice as a coping strategy for 
FPFP, particularly in the light of staffing costs. Hence, dual practice has benefits 
beyond the individual health workers. It has also been argued that dual practice, if 
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regulated appropriately, can improve health service access, the range of services 
offered and doctors’ satisfaction (Hipgrave and Hort, 2014). However, this would be 
partly dependent on how the health workers balance their time between facilities. In 
dual practice, time allocation by health workers between facilities can be influenced 
by numerous factors, including the hourly wage in the private sector, the number of 
dependents, the length of time spent as a physician, work outside the city, and being 
a specialist with or without technology (McPake et al., 2014). Furthermore, scholars 
on dual practice have  not only decried its pervasive nature but also underscored the 
need for strengthening the capacity of LMIC governments to identify and develop 
appropriate regulatory measures for  the various forms of dual practice (Hipgrave and 
Hort, 2014, Paina, 2014, Russo et al., 2013). Within the context of UHC, insurance 
companies also provide marketing and financing opportunities for regulating dual 
practice (Hipgrave and Hort, 2014). 
Lastly, the policy on public-private partnerships for health (PPPH) was one of the 
policy levers in the context of EC2 which was expected to influence the contribution 
of the FPFPs towards an equitable and pro-poor system. Indeed, Chapters 7 and 8 
showed that partnerships between the district health office and FPFPs, albeit limited 
to a few, enabled the FPFPs to contribute to broader coverage goals for immunisation 
services. The Third Health Sector Strategic Plan for Uganda 2010-2015 had already 
highlighted the importance of partnerships and the need for engaging the private 
sector in order to increase geographical access as well as the scope of services 
(MOH, 2010a). A policy on PPPH was developed with guidelines for 
operationalisation (MOH, 2001). However, its operationalisation has been faced with 
challenges, such as mistrust, lack of appreciation for partnerships among key 
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stakeholders in government and weak enforcement (Ssennyonjo et al., 2018). The  
degree to which partnerships between private providers and government or other 
organisations can  respond to the interests and needs of the poor is dependent on 
the effective management of relationships between these actors (Bloom et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the study recommends the operationalisation of the PPPH to include the 
FPFPs to tap into the available potential. 
9.2.1 Empirically derived revised conceptual framework 
 Section 9.2 was a reflection of the initial conceptual framework (Figure 9) that was 
introduced earlier in this thesis. To a large extent, the researcher found the initial 
conceptual framework useful in answering the research questions. However, several 
unexpected findings and linkages emerged during the analysis. It was thus realised 
that these would need to be added to the conceptual framework to enhance the 
understanding of the contribution of FPFPs towards building an equitable and pro-
poor health system in post-conflict Northern Uganda. The initial conceptual 
framework, therefore, had to be adjusted to develop Figure 9.  Most of the concepts 
listed remained the same. However, those that had been missing, such as the PPPH 
policy and requirements from professional bodies, were added.  More arrows 
indicating direct relationships between some features in the three domains of the 
conceptual framework which had not been anticipated needed to be indicated, for 
instance, links between security of the area and features such as regulation, length 
of stay, adaptation within and adaptations within FPFPs. The relationship between 
the existence of other providers and features such as adaptations within FPFPs and 
networks was also illustrated. Lastly, arrows were also drawn to indicate 
interconnections between demand for services (and expectations) and category of 
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organisation as well as package of services. Figure 36 illustrates the empirically 
derived conceptual framework. 
 
Figure 36:  Empirically derived conceptual framework 
 
 
 9.3  Summary of Main Findings 
9.3.1 Heterogenous nature and evolution of FPFPs 
Research question 1 focused on understanding the characteristics and evolution of 
FPFPs. The FPFPs in Gulu municipality depict  a heterogeneous nature (Morgan et 
al., 2016)  and they include both general providers and specialised  services, and are 
varied in terms of size, age of existence, source of income, package of services, 
staffing and operating hours. This variation illustrates the fragmented and 
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heterogeneous nature of the private sector that is routinely found in other settings 
(Mackintosh et al., 2016, International Finance Corporation, Undated, McPake and 
Hanson, 2016, Morgan et al., 2016, Clarke et al., 2019, Patouillard et al., 2007). 
Heterogeneity of FPFPs evolved across the conflict phases, with specialised and 
somewhat unique categories, including insurance company clinics, stand-alone 
laboratories, X-ray centres and NGO clinic (hybrid) emerging post-conflict. The 
findings portray what happens to a market structure during a shift from protracted 
conflict (humanitarian) to a more peaceful, post-conflict situation (development 
phase). While FPFP heterogeneity can be found in most places, including the rest of 
Uganda, what is interesting about those in Gulu is that it kept broadening across the 
conflict phases and this is an important development in developing/strengthening the 
district health system and what it offers. The broadening was enabled by conflict 
opportunities such as the return of peace, urbanisation and the influx of NGOs, 
among other factors.  
 The FPFPs in this study varied in their stages of evolution, although the majority were 
unable to  follow the typical life cycle stages of an organisation, as noted by Lester et 
al. in Chapter 5 (Lester et al., 2003), owing to the conflict-affected environment in 
Northern Uganda. For instance, the growth of the majority of FPFPs was stunted and 
they were stuck in a survival stage for a long time instead of blossoming, while some 
died shortly after they were established, and yet others contemplated closure at an 
early stage. This scenario  mirrors  the possibility of an organisation  to fail to progress 
past an early stage or to stagnate at one stage (Lester et al., 2003). Those that 
remained open for business, however, indicated resilience by showing investments 
in various areas, including HR and equipment. 
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9.3.2 Resilience of FPFPs during conflict and post-conflict 
 The study found that, within their evolution, FPFPs were typified  by resilience 
(Sweeney, 2009) and their resilience, over time, potentially contributed to the broader 
resilience of health systems in post-conflict settings. FPFPs exercised resilience, 
considering both the conflict and the numerous challenges experienced post-conflict. 
Some of the responses related to cost-cutting had serious implications for quality and 
could potentially affect immediate health outcomes, such as quality service delivery 
and, therefore, gave rise to the need for increased regulation of these providers.  
Chapter 7 showed that FPFPs’ relational networks with other organisations (both 
health and non-health-related) strengthened the survival of FPFPs and enabled their 
resilience to operate in the dynamic market. The network is illustrated by the many 
relational links which indicate the exchange of resources between organisations. The 
networks provided lots of benefits for FPFPs, including HR support, drugs, and 
equipment, as well as partnerships for service delivery. The exchange of resources 
enabled by networks reflects an interdependence of actors within the market that 
emerged post-conflict and an emphasis on the fluidity of boundaries across the public 
and the private sectors (Sweeney, 2009). In response to this interdependence, 
Morgan and colleagues (2016) recommend that any state intervention in the private 
sector needs to not only include individual providers but also focus on other players 
in the system(Morgan et al., 2016). Furthermore, Chapter 7 indicated the central roles 
played by FPFPs in the networks, for instance in the referral networks and in health 
maintenance. These are potential areas which could be explored further when 
planning the engagement of the formal private for-profit sector. Such networks also 
need to be nurtured to build the resilience and responsiveness of the health system.  
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 In the early post-conflict phase, some FPFPs, particularly the old ones, reported that 
they started to provide free services because of partnerships established between 
them, the district health office in Gulu and some NGOs in the area. This reflects a 
pattern of the market that seems to emerge in situations of transition from conflict to 
post-conflict with the potential to contribute to the resilience of the health system in 
the longer term. 
9.3.3.  Contribution of FPFPs to building an equitable and pro-poor health 
system post-conflict.  
The fundamental objective of this thesis and research question 3 were focused on 
understanding the contribution of FPFPs to building an equitable and pro-poor health 
system. Chapter 8 showed that FPFPs would like to maintain a good image among 
the public by ensuring that they enable access for the poor, implying that they can 
contribute to a social mission. However, they continuously faced a dilemma of 
balancing optimization of their incomes with the altruism objectives.  For example, 
FPFPs implemented various mechanisms to enable the poor to access health 
services but these were unsystematic and reliant on the presence and judgement of 
the manager. Some FPFP managers noted that they were keen not to publicize 
favours such as fee reductions.  Key services provided by the FPFPs for use by the 
poor included mainly Immunisation and other preventive services. The provision of 
immunization (using supplies from the district administration) made business sense 
because it created an opportunity to market the range of services offered by the 
FPFPs to prospective clients.  
 
The FPFPs innovated to contribute to the pro-poor health system. Some of the 
parameters used by managers to identify the poor have a specific reference to conflict 
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settings, for example, inability to pay bills, which are also indicated in the Hausmann-
Muela framework of vulnerability as part of the long-term effects of conflict, which 
arise from the destruction of livelihoods of populations (Hausmann-Muela et al., 
2003). Other scholars have termed this situation as the ‘security-development nexus’ 
or the ‘poverty-conflict nexus’. This implies that there is a bi-directional relationship 
between poverty and conflict, whereby poverty and conflict can reinforce or potentially 
lead to each other (Goodhand, 2001, Draman, 2003). Even in such settings, however, 
the degree of poverty may not be the same across all populations. For instance, this 
may depend on the varying experiences of conflict based on gender or age and 
among those who participated in the study. 
The FPFPs also came up with some innovations and practices around ensuring that 
payments were manageable for clients. These included loans, fractions/partial doses, 
and payment in instalments. Some of these mechanisms are not necessarily unique 
to post-conflict settings but similar to those in some studies conducted among 
informal providers in relatively stable contexts, such as India and Bangladesh (Bloom 
et al., 2011).  These findings contribute to the evidence that the private sector can 
also be used as an engine of development and thus to enable the poor to access 
health services (DFID, 2011). Others have argued that  the private for-profit sector 
can, in fact, have both a profit as well as a social mission (International Finance 
Corporation, Undated), although the latter is most closely associated with the 
mission/faith-based sector. Notwithstanding, the general impression within the 
literature about the private for-profit sector is that it exploits the population by making 
huge profit. Some scholars have argued that the private sector can deter the 
achievement of UHC goals(McPake and Hanson, 2016).This is partly due to its 
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perceived lack of quality and its dependence on OOP expenditure, which results in 
an increase in catastrophic health expenditures among the poor or discriminates 
against them  (Marriott, 2009, Rachlis, 2007, Morgan et al., 2016). In 2005, the World 
Bank Group found that OOP expenditures by individuals who sought services from 
the private sector contributed half of the 60 per cent of the $16.7 million total health 
expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa. A report about doing business in sub-Saharan 
Africa indicates the negative effects of what is referred to as ‘the pursuit of excess 
profits’ by the for-profit sector. These include unethical business practices such as 
under- or over-servicing, collusion, false billing, price gouging, and unlicensed 
practice (International Finance Corporation, Undated). The report, however, also 
recognises the possible existence of some private for-profit sector that could be 
responsible and whose efforts may be overshadowed by the misconduct of their 
counterparts, hence reinforcing the deep-seated suspicion of the private sector.  
Notwithstanding, the researcher’s overall impression was that, as health businesses, 
the FPFPs were not necessarily making profits. Where it made business sense to do 
so, they innovated to contribute to pro-poor health access. However, the FPFPs 
struggled for survival amidst numerous challenges related to conflict and high 
operational costs, among other post-conflict challenges and, as noted earlier, many 
stagnated at certain stages or died shortly after being established.  
 Chapter 6 showed that FPFPs are struggling with high costs and an effective 
insurance scheme would assist in coping with some costs.  However, this would 
reflect type 5 of the stratified private sector, which can reinforce inequality, given that 
some may not afford and escalate operational costs (Mackintosh et al. 2016). Despite 
the skepticism, the evidence here  highlights the presence of a growing insurance 
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sector in the conflict-affected areas and presents scenarios to stimulate debates in 
the ongoing global-level  discussions about how private sector entities can be 
engaged for the public good as well as towards the advancement of UHC (McPake 
and Hanson, 2016, Gautham et al., 2019). At national level, in Uganda, there is an 
ongoing debate about the modalities of implementing the National Insurance Scheme 
(MOH, 2019). Possibilities can also be explored whereby the government would pay 
a premium for those who may not be able to afford insurance(Akal and Harvey, 2001, 
Kotoh and Van der Geest, 2016). This would enable the mitigation of cost escalation 
and reduce the effect of price on demand for services (McPake et al. 2013). Lessons 
can also be learnt from  countries such as Rwanda where community health 
insurance has contributed to increased medical care utilization and decreased OOP 
expenses (Chemouni, 2018). In the context of UHC, however, insurance has been 
criticized for contributing to health inequities by further disadvantaging the poorest 
and the unhealthiest as they may not have the money to pay the premium (Kotoh and 
Van der Geest, 2016, Oxfam., 2013, Wang et al., 2017). In order to address the 
challenges related to community insurance and government-funded  insurance as 
well as meet the multiple objectives of efficiency and equity, multiple funding sources 
for insurance are recommended (Akal and Harvey, 2001).  
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
The findings of this study need to be considered within the context of several 
limitations. The study limitations included lack of focus on the quality of services, 
supply-side bias, social acceptability/desirability bias, limited generalizability of 
findings, limitations of the survey and limited focus on regulation. These are explained 
below. 
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No focus on the quality of services 
Although the researcher acknowledges that the quality of services provided by the 
private sector is at the centre of debate, the study did not investigate quality issues 
although some insights about quality emerged. Nevertheless, the focus was to 
understand the evolution of FPFPs and the extent to which they contribute to the pro-
poor agenda. 
 
Supply-side bias 
The study was biased towards the ‘supply side’ and did not seek out clients’ views on 
whether the FPFPs were contributing to the provision of equitable and pro-poor 
services. However, using the organisational survey, the study was able to generate 
insights about which categories of people sought services from the private sector and 
which categories were targeted for the provision of free services or price reductions. 
Using life histories, however, the study presents an in-depth investigation of the 
private sector while discussing the major events in the existence of the business 
across conflict phases. This interview method was a rather new way of gathering 
information about the sector, hence the study made a methodological contribution. 
 
Social acceptability bias 
The study also experienced a potential social acceptability bias because it relied on 
provider self-reports of their characteristics and behaviour, particularly in relation to 
actions for enabling access to the poor (Fisher and Katz, 2000). Social acceptability 
bias occurs when the persons interviewed either over-report good behaviour or 
under-report bad behaviour (Lavrakas, 2008). Hence, in this study, the researcher 
cannot rule out the possibility that providers answered questions in a manner that 
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made them to be viewed positively as a sector. For instance, the survey questionnaire 
included questions about a pre-generated list of disadvantaged groups in Gulu to 
whom FPFP facilities were providing services. The majority of the 45 FPFPs surveyed 
responded with a ‘yes’ to almost all the categories, with a few even reporting that they 
were ‘providing services to all people in Gulu’. The questionnaire also included 
questions about whether the FPFPs were providing fee exemptions and reductions 
to the same list of people. To this question, the majority responded ‘yes’. However, 
the questions about the types of services that were fee-exempt or to which reductions 
applied indicated some insights that the providers’ responses needed to be 
triangulated. 
 
During the life-history interviews, however, the researcher further triangulated the 
results in the survey and asked for explanations, scenarios, and justifications in 
relation to fee exemptions and fee reductions. The explanations provided in Chapter 
8 indicate that the providers experienced a dilemma involving the need for profit 
maximization and their social mission.  Furthermore, although the providers had been 
reluctant to answer a question about how much profit they were making39, the 
researcher used proxies, such as the number of customers over time, to assess the 
amount of profit being made. Nonetheless, the probes carried out during the life-
history interviews (see Chapter 8) also, to an extent, reflected instances where the 
providers could make a profit, for instance, areas in which bargaining for price 
reduction could be done. The researcher believed that the rapport created between 
her and the managers during the life-history interviews made the latter adequately 
 
39 A question about profit was removed from the questionnaire after the pre-test 
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comfortable to talk about both the negatives and the positives without getting too 
concerned about whether the responses might affect their social desirability. 
 
Limited generalizability of findings but the provision of insights 
The relatively small number of organisations that were involved in the survey –  
which was anticipated – may limit the precision and the generalizability of the survey 
results.  The number that took part in the survey were influenced by the list provided 
by the district officials and by the willingness of some FPFPs to participate in the 
survey.  Additionally, the small number of life histories conducted may also not enable 
generalizability. Nevertheless, the information gathered through these methods 
provides a general picture about the formal for-profit sector as well as insights about 
the survival of businesses in post-conflict settings, including Northern Uganda.  
The study was conducted in Gulu, one of the eight, but also most urban, districts in 
the Acholi sub-region. Gulu district has also, to date, been a hub of benevolent and/or 
humanitarian activity for many international and national NGOs, which may, in very 
many ways, influence the establishment of several FPFPs and the demand for 
services provided by FPFPs compared to the other districts in the same region. 
Therefore, generalization of the findings to the other districts in the region may be 
limited.  
 
Limited deliberate focus on regulation 
Whereas the researcher acknowledges the centrality of regulation to the debate about 
the private sector, this study did not have an in-depth focus on regulation. The 
researcher also realised that a detailed focus on regulation could not align well with 
the chronology of the research questions. Nevertheless, the study findings (see 
Chapters 5 and 7) highlighted the role of regulation in the context of the market within 
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which the FPFPs operate, the network links in relation to regulation, how regulation 
has changed across phases as well as the challenges and coping strategies used by 
both the regulators and the providers. The researcher plans to solicit funding to 
undertake work around stakeholder engagement to improve regulation in the region 
and dig deeper into how the self-regulation initiative that was mentioned by the study 
participants can be operationalised. 
Limitations of the survey 
The researcher acknowledges that the survey was limited in explaining some of the 
descriptive issues. For instance, the survey could not sufficiently explain the increase 
in the number of FPFPs over time. Hence, the researcher triangulated this finding 
with information from key informant interviews. In this case, recollections of regulators 
about the names, numbers and locations of the FPFPs that were open during and 
after the conflict provided a good supplement to the survey findings in supporting the 
claim that the number of FPFPs had increased over time. 
 
9.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The central argument in this study was that in order to understand the extent to which 
the FPFPs contribute to building an equitable/pro-poor health system in the post-
conflict period, we need to understand the factors that influence/have influenced this 
‘contribution’ over time. Above all, the study attempted to present the voices and 
experiences of the FPFPs in Gulu using the life-history interview method, which 
enabled a retrospective interrogation. The researcher supplemented this information 
with data from key informant interviews, observation, and document analysis. 
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The researcher concludes by noting that despite the challenges faced by the private 
sector and the doubt regarding the contribution of the sector, the FPFPs play a critical 
role in service delivery and can, indeed, contribute to UHC. This happens amidst the 
continuous dilemma they face of balancing their profit maximization against the 
altruism objectives. 
 Additionally, the contribution of the FPFPs depends on various factors, including 
those that are internal and unique to FPFPs, as well as factors within the broader 
internal and policy environment in which the FPFPS operate. These include the length 
of stay, the size, and networks of the organisations, as well as the presence and 
judgement of the manager.  
The findings chapters have shown that conflict was a key influencing factor in the 
establishment, survival, and growth of FPFPs. Conflict also affected the quality of 
regulation for the FPFPs. Interventions in the private sector in such settings need to 
consider the aspect of organisation of the market structure for FPFPs, which was 
shaped by conflict.  
The mechanisms employed by the FPFPs to enable the poor to access services from 
these providers are partly aimed at maintaining or attracting customers or creating a 
good public image rather than exclusively reducing the financial burden of the poor. 
Altruism can be embraced for UHC but the coping strategies for profit maximization 
might raise quality and regulatory challenges. However, to ensure equitable access 
among service users, the altruistic mechanisms need to be institutionalized and 
standardized within and across FPFPs. Furthermore, mechanisms to facilitate the 
operationalisation of the PPPH, e.g. results-based financing (RBF) and sustained 
technical support and provision of equipment, need to be strengthened. This will 
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enable the for-profit sector to reduce their financial burden, broaden the scope of free 
and/or subsidized services, and increase the population served. 
Increased regulation of the private sector by the government using incentives for good 
performance and law enforcement for poor performance is recommended to minimize 
quality and regulatory challenges. Self-regulation by the private sector (reported as a 
one-off event) can also be promoted further, although this needs to be undertaken 
with caution and, if implemented, requires continuous monitoring as many FPFPs 
may fall through the cracks if left to their own devices. 
The dense networks and relational linkages between the FPFPs and other health and 
non-health organisations in the area have shown that the FPFPs are already 
embedded in the fabric of the pluralistic health system in Gulu. Therefore, we cannot 
merely wish them away. Rather, we need to leverage their strengths while also 
improving the regulation to mitigate the quality issues and catastrophic expenditure.  
  
Despite the expectation by the public and pro-UHC supporters that the sector would 
contribute broadly to a social mission, the private for-profit providers cannot be pro-
poor, given that they are formed with the objective of making profits. Their contribution 
towards a social mission can be strengthened through support from the district office 
and partnerships with NGOs. The support can have overarching benefits for the 
broader UHC agenda as, at the same time, it benefits the FPFPs. Currently, this 
support is limited to a few FPFPs and, therefore, needs to be continued and expanded 
across more FPFPs. Lastly, regardless of its contribution, the private for-profit sector 
in general cannot be left alone in health service provision in such settings. Rather, 
the state also needs to regain its legitimacy, particularly in settings where the health 
sector has previously been battered by conflict. 
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9.6. Areas for Further Research and Development 
There are three areas for further research, which, given the constraints within which 
I worked and the limitations of focus for the study objectives, I could not investigate 
further and would like to expand on in the future. 
 
First, there is need to undertake work around stakeholder engagement to improve 
regulation in the region and to conduct a further inquiry into how the self-regulation 
initiative that was mentioned by the study participants can be operationalised. 
 
Second, the study findings indicated challenges in relation to referrals between 
FPFPs and non-FPFPs. Furthermore, the findings showed that some discussions on 
the matter were enabled, although these were one-off. With funding, I hope to ignite 
stakeholder engagement and discussions about the improvement of referrals 
between FPFPs and other providers in the region (such as sub-national stakeholder 
engagement to improve health service delivery). 
 
Third, the study revealed innovations around altruism among FPFPs. Further 
research needs to be conducted in relation to how this altruism can be operationalised 
for the advancement of UHC. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Consent Form for Managers or health workers participating in the 
mini- organisational survey of Formal Private for- Profit 
organisations in Gulu 
 
Study title: Health care markets in post conflict settings: Experiences of formal Private for- 
Profit health care organisations in Gulu district, Northern Uganda 
Makerere University School of Public Health, ReBUILD Consortium 
 
My name is Justine Namakula, a research fellow working on ReBUILD project at Makerere 
University School of Public Health, Mulago Kampala. I am also a PhD student at Queen 
Margaret University Edinburgh. I am interested in learning about the experiences of Formal 
Private for- Profit organisations (FPFP) in Gulu, particularly during and after the conflict that 
ended in 2006. This will help me, and policymakers understand contribution of FPFP to health 
service delivery in Gulu as well as challenges they face. The research is for academic 
purposes and will contribute to my PhD. 
Whereas I will plan to have detailed interviews at a later stage, I would like to first conduct a 
survey of all the FPFPs in Gulu in order to get a general understanding of their characteristics. 
Your organization has been identified using a list of all FPFPs which was provided to me by 
the district office. I am looking for managers of these FNFPs or any person that may be 
assigned by the manager to participate in this survey on behalf of the organization.  
If you agree to participate, I would like to discuss a few issues about your organisation. The 
questionnaire consists of issues such as date of establishment and registration of the 
organization, category of organization, main purpose, operating hours, major services 
offered, number of staff and categories, level of education and relationship with other 
providers as well as development partners. Your opinions will be taken as the opinions of 
your organization in this study. I am going to take notes. 
The information you provide will be kept in strict confidence and will not be shared with any 
other person.  Your name will not be used in the reports or publications that will arise from 
this study. If the name of your organization is identifiable in the publications, the research 
team will uphold the principle of “do no harm” in regard to the information associated with the 
organization.  
Participation is voluntary. You are free to decline answering questions you do not feel 
comfortable about. You can stop the interview at any time. However, your participation, 
response to the questionnaire and provision of many as many answers as possible will be 
greatly appreciated. The interview should take between 30-45 minutes of your time. 
If you have any concerns about the study you can ask me to explain more or contact the 
following: Dr John Sempebwa Chairman Ethics Review Committee, Makerere University, 
School of Public Health, Tel:  0414 543872.  
Would you like to volunteer answers to this study?          Yes            No 
 
Participant’s Signature ____________   Date___________ 
 
Witness’ Signature __________________ Date___________ 
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Appendix 2: Consent form for District health team members, Managers and 
health workers of Private not- for-profit facilities and Public health 
facilities in Gulu, Representatives of donor agencies, 
Representatives of association bodies in Gulu and at national level 
 
Study title: Health care markets in post conflict settings: Experiences of formal Private for- 
Profit health care organisations in Gulu district, Northern Uganda Makerere University School 
of Public Health, ReBUILD Consortium 
My name is Justine Namakula, a research fellow working on ReBUILD project at Makerere 
University School of Public Health, Mulago Kampala.  I am also a PhD student at Queen 
Margaret University Edinburgh. I am interested in learning about the experiences of Formal 
Private for- Profit organisations (FPFP) in Gulu, particularly during and after the conflict that 
ended in 2006.  This will help me, and policymakers understand contribution of FPFP to 
health service delivery in Gulu as well as challenges they face. The research is for academic 
purposes and will contribute to my PhD. This research seeks to understand the process and 
history of your organisation and how it responded to the challenges of the conflict and its 
growth since then.  You have been purposively selected to participate in this study because 
you are one of the stakeholders contributing to health service provision and development in 
Gulu district. 
If you agree to participate, I would like to discuss a few issues. I would like to ask about your 
perception of the role of the private for-profit sector in general. I would also like you to 
comment on what you think the challenges and opportunities of the FPFPs. I would also like 
you to tell me about the relationship between your organisation and the FPFPs. I would also 
like to know if there are any ways you engage with the FPFPs to enable the provision of 
health services for the poor people in Gulu district. 
I am going to take notes. However, with your permission, I would also like to use a tape 
recorder to enable me to capture all the information that I would have missed out during note 
taking. The information you provide will be kept in strict confidence and will not be shared 
with any other person.  Your name will not be used in the reports or publications that will arise 
from this study.   If the name of your organization is identifiable in the publications, the 
research team will uphold the principle of “do no harm” in regard to the information associated 
with the organization. Participation is voluntary. You are free to decline answering questions 
you do not feel comfortable about. You can stop the interview at any time. However, your 
participation and provision of your opinions will be greatly appreciated. The interview will take 
between 45 Minutes and one hour of your time.  
If you have any concerns about the study you can ask me to explain more or contact the 
following: Dr John Sempebwa Chairman Ethics Review Committee, Makerere University, 
School of Public Health, Tel:  0414 543872. Would you like to volunteer answers to this 
study?          Yes            No 
Participant’s Signature___________Date ___________ 
 
Witness’ Signature ___________Date __________________ 
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Appendix 3: Consent form for Managers and health workers of the selected 
Formal private for- Profit organisations in Gulu participating in Life 
histories and In-depth interviews 
 
Study title: Health care markets in post conflict settings: Experiences of formal Private for- 
Profit health care organisations in Gulu district, Northern Uganda 
 
Makerere University School of Public Health, ReBUILD Consortium 
 
My name is Justine Namakula, a research fellow working on ReBUILD project at Makerere 
University School of Public Health, Mulago Kampala. I am also a PhD student at Queen 
Margaret University Edinburgh. I am interested in learning about the experiences of Formal 
Private for- Profit organisations (FPFP) in Gulu, particularly during and after the conflict that 
ended in 2006.  This will enable policymakers and I to understand contribution of FPFP to 
health service delivery in Gulu as well as challenges they face. The research is for academic 
purposes and will contribute to my PhD. This research seeks to understand the process and 
history of your organisation and how it responded to the challenges of the conflict and its 
growth since then.  
 
Your organization is purposively selected based on the criteria that it is a Formal Private for- 
Profit organization (FPFP), which is the focus of this study; it was either established during 
the conflict and four that were established after the conflict. I am looking for seven managers 
who have worked with their organisations since they were established. If you agree to 
participate, I would like to discuss a few issues about your organisation. Particularly, I would 
like you to elaborate on when this organisation was established, who the founding members 
were, what you perceive as the most important events in the life of this organisation, the 
challenges and how they were overcome as well as the opportunities that have come your 
way and how the organisation has tried to make use of them.  In general, I would also like 
you to tell me about the relationship between your organisation and other providers and your 
perception of the general contribution of this organisation to the health of the people in Gulu. 
 
I am going to take notes. However, with your permission, I would also like to use a tape 
recorder to enable me to capture all the information that I would have missed out during note 
taking.The information you provide will be kept in strict confidence and will not be shared with 
any other person.  Your name will not be used in the reports or publications that will arise 
from this study.   If the name of your organization is identifiable in the publications, the 
research team will uphold the principle of “do no harm” regarding the information associated 
with the organization. Participation is voluntary. You are free to decline answering questions 
you do not feel comfortable about. You can stop the interview at any time. However, your 
participation and provision of your opinions will be greatly appreciated. The interview will take 
between 11/2 hours and 2 hours of your time.  
 
If you have any concerns about the study, you can ask me to explain more or contact the 
following: Dr John Sempebwa Chairman Ethics Review Committee, Makerere University, 
School of Public Health, Tel:  0414 543872.  
Would you like to volunteer answers to this study?          Yes            No 
Participant’s Signature __________   date ____________    
Witness’ Signature __________________date __________________ 
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Appendix 4: Survey questionnaire 
 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
HEALTH CARE MARKETS IN POST CONFLICT SETTINGS: EXPERIENCES OF 
FORMAL PRIVATE FOR-PROFIT HEALTH CARE ORGANISATIONS IN GULU 
DISTRICT, NORTHERN UGANDA 
IDENTIFICATION ORGANISATION ID (four digits):  
INTERVIEWER’S NAME: 
INTERVIEW DATE: 
LOCATION OF ORGANISATION (Street name/ name of the road): 
SECTION 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE ORGANISATION 
NO QUESTIONS CODING CATEGORIES SKIPS 
1.1 Sex of respondent 
(Don’t ask, just indicate) 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
1.2 When was this organisation 
established? 
Month____________ 
Year: ____________ 
 
1.3 How many years has this 
organisation spent in 
existence? 
  Years/months  
1.4 In which year was this 
organisation registered? 
(write one number in 
each box) 
     
 
 
1.5 To what category does this 
organisation belong  
(Circle only one option) 
1. Clinic 
2. Medical centre 
3. Pharmacy 
4. Laboratory 
5.  Private Hospital 
6.  Insurance Company Clinic 
7. Other (Please specify) 
_____________ 
 
1.6 Does this organisation 
have a written mission 
statement? 
1.Yes 
2.No 
IF NO, SKIP 
TO QN 1.8 
1.7 What is the main purpose 
of this organisation? 
_______________________________ 
_________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
 
1.8 What are the operating 
hours of this organisation? 
(Circle any two that 
apply) 
1. Open less than 12 hours a day 
2. Open 12 hours a day 
3. Open 24 hours 
4. Open Monday to Friday only 
5. Open every day of the week 
 
1.9 Does this facility admit 
patients to stay overnight 
1.Yes 
2.No 
IF NO, SKIP 
TO QN 1.11 
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1.10 How many admission beds 
does this organisation 
have? 
(Circle only one) 
 
1. None 
2. 6 and below 
3. Between 7 and 15 beds 
4. Between 16- 24 beds 
5. Between 24and 50 beds- 
6. Above 50 
 
1.11 What are the major 
services offered by this 
organisation? 
(Circle all that apply) 
 1.Dentistry 
2. Sale of drugs only 
3. X-ray services 
4. Consultation 
5.Prescription of drugs and medicine 
6. Family planning services 
7. Maternal deliveries 
8. Major surgeries 
9. Minor surgeries 
10. Blood tests 
11. Ear nose and throat related services 
12. Eye clinic 
13. Laboratory 
14. Other (Please specify) 
_____________ 
 
1.12 Which of the services in 
1.11 above is your 
organisation best known 
for among people in Gulu 
district? 
(Circle any three that 
apply) 
1.Dentistry 
2. Sale of drugs only 
3. X-ray services 
4. Consultation 
5.Prescription of drugs and medicine 
6. Family planning services 
7. Maternal deliveries 
8. Major surgeries 
9. Minor surgeries 
10. Blood tests 
11. Ear nose and throat related services 
12. Eye clinic 
13. Laboratory 
14.Other (Please specify) 
______________ 
 
1.13 Who are the users of these 
services? 
(Circle all that apply) 
1. Elderly people 
2. People with disabilities  
3. Pregnant women from the slums in 
Gulu 
4. Employees of NGOs in Gulu 
5. Households in Gulu slums 
6.  Formerly abducted youth 
7. People living with HIV/ AIDS 
8.  Child mothers 
9.  Adolescents 
10. Other (Please specify) ________ 
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________________________ 
1.14 Do you have a fee 
exemption policy? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
IF NO, SKIP 
TO QN 1.17 
1.15 If yes in 1.13, which of the 
services does the fee 
exemption policy apply? 
(Circle all that apply) 
1. Dentistry 
2. Sale of drugs only 
3. X-ray services 
4. Consultation 
5.Prescription of drugs and medicine 
6. Family planning services 
7. Maternal deliveries 
8. Major surgeries 
9. Minor surgeries 
10. Blood tests 
11. Ear nose and throat related services 
12. Eye clinic 
13. Laboratory 
14. Other (Please specify) 
______________  
 
1.16 For which categories of 
people does the exemption 
fee policy apply? 
(Circle all that apply) 
1. Elderly people 
2. People with disabilities  
3. Pregnant women from the slums in 
Gulu 
4.  Employees of NGOs in Gulu 
5. Households in Gulu slums 
6.  Formerly abducted youth 
7. People living with HIV/ AIDS 
8.  Child mothers 
9.  Adolescents 
10. Other (Please specify) 
_____________ 
________________________ 
 
 
1.17 Do you have a fee 
reduction policy? 
1.Yes 
2.No 
IF NO, SKIP 
TO 
NEXTSECTION 
1.18 If yes in 1.17, which of the 
services does the fee 
reduction policy apply? 
(Circle all that apply) 
1. Elderly people 
2. People with disabilities 
3. Pregnant women from the slums 
in Gulu 
4. Employees of NGOs in Gulu 
5. Households in Gulu slums 
6. Formerly abducted youth 
7. People living with HIV/ AIDS 
8. Child mothers 
9. Adolescents 
10. Other (Please specify) 
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NO QUESTIONS CODING CATEGORIES SKIPS 
2.1 How many staff are employed 
by this organisation? (State 
actual number) 
_____________  
2.2 What is the highest level of 
education completed by staff 
employed in this organisation?) 
(Circle all that apply) 
1. None  
2. Primary 
3. Secondary 
4. University 
5. Vocational institute 
6. Other (Please Specify) ________ 
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SECTION 3: RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PROVIDERS AND HEALTH DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERS 
NO QUESTIONS CODING CATEGORIES SKIPS 
3.1 Is this organisation connected to 
any other health providers within 
Gulu district? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
IF NO END 
INTERVIEW 
3.2 Which types of organisations is this 
organisation connected with (circle 
codes for organisations)? 
 
Clinics                                    11 
Medical Centres                  12  
Pharmacies                          13 
Laboratories                        14 
 
2.3. Please indicate number of staff 
per category circled in 2.2 
above 
1. None  
2. Primary 
3. Secondary 
4. University 
5. Vocational institute 
6. Other (Please Specify) 
_______ 
----------- 
----------- 
----------- 
--------- 
______ 
______ 
 
2.4 Does your organisation have 
any of the following cadres of 
staff? 
(Put tick against Yes if 
available and tick against No 
if category is not available) 
1. Medical doctor 
2. Surgeon 
3. Radiologist 
4. Enrolled Nurse 
5. Registered 
Nurse 
6. Enrolled 
midwife 
7. Registered 
midwife 
8. Radiologist 
9. Laboratory 
assistant 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
Yes___ 
NO___ 
 
 
2.5 Indicate sex of Manager of 
facility 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
2.6 What is the highest education 
level completed by the 
manager/ In-charge of this 
organisation? 
(Circle only one option) 
1. None 
2. Primary 
3. Secondary 
4. University 
5. Vocational Institute 
6. Other (Please Specify) 
___________ 
________________________ 
 
2.7 Do you have any staffs who 
work here part time? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Multiple responses apply  Private for-profit hospitals 15 
Insurance Company Clinic   16 
Public hospital                        17 
Public Health facility………   18 
Private not-for-profit             19 
NGO ………………………………….19 
Donor agency …………………….20 
Other non-registered health provider 
(Please specify) 
_________________21 
 
3.3 What is the relationship between 
your organisation and the 
organisations in question 3.2 
above? 
(Circle all relationships that apply 
and give at least two names or 
organisations) 
Relationship 
 
 
1.We refer patients 
to them 
 
2. They refer 
patients to us 
 
3.Funding source 
 
4. Regulation and 
support supervision 
 
5.Inspection 
 
6.Information 
exchange 
 
7. Some of our staff 
work there too 
 
8.Some of their 
staff work here too 
 
9.Membership) 
 
10. Other (Please 
specify) 
 
 
 
Name(s) of organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
END OF INTERVIEW. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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Appendix 5: Organisational Life-history interview:  interview guide 
 
Please can you help draw a line on this paper indicating the key events that 
happened in this business since it was established? 
1. Initiation and structure of the organisation 
Probes:  
 In what year did the organisation come into being? 
What caused its creation? 
Who was the main source of support in the creation? 
What was the original source of funding? 
 What was the early orientation of the organisation? 
 What was the organisation’s main leadership and membership structure? 
2. Organisational evolution 
Probes: 
How has the organisation changed since the early days? 
What were the events that led to these changes? 
 What are the accomplishments? 
 What are the challenges and how have they been overcome? Which 
challenges were not overcome? 
 What have been the opportunities along the organisations’ life span? 
 How has the organisation positioned itself to harness the available 
opportunities e.g. donor funding, contracting e.t.c?  
3. Relationship to associations and networks 
Probe for:  
Any collaborations with other providers in the neigbourhood 
Membership ofan umbrella organisation, regional network, national network or          
international 
Relationship with other providers 
 Relationship with the district, State 
 Nature of relationship (is it formal or informal)? 
 Overall, how have these relationships and collaborations with others played 
an important role in the target organisation’s life history? 
4. Mechanisms to ensure access for the poor and equity 
   Are there any mechanisms in this organization that enable the poorest to 
access health care? 
 If so, please give examples  
 Briefly explain source of funding for these mechanisms/ initiatives 
Briefly explain how each was implemented,  
 In your opinion, what impact have these mechanisms had on number of 
people accessing health care in your facility 
In your opinion, what impact have these mechanisms made on the general 
image of your organisation  
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Appendix 6: Key informant guide and In-depth interview guide 
 
1. In general, tell me about your view of the private for-profit health sector? Probe for views on 
roles, a brief on how they have evolved in the area (depending on how long the key informant 
has worked in the region 
2. In what ways is your organisation related to the private for health provider? Probe for referrals, 
information exchange, human resource sharing, equipment, training, regulation, funding and 
personal links to the FPFP among other aspects. Probe for names of the facilities that are 
related to the respondents’ own 
3.  What challenges have you faced in your role? 
4. Please tell me about any mechanisms that you are aware of that are being implemented by 
the private for-profit to ensure that the poor access health care.  
5. In your opinion, what are the challenges and opportunities for the private for-profit health care 
in Gulu? 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7:  Observation guide/checklist 
 
Name of FPFP:  
Physical structure (size and quality)  
 
Signpost (Range of services offered) 
 
Posters around the facility 
 
Location and nearby surroundings 
 
Interaction between the health workers in the FPFPs and their clients 
 
General (SOPs) 
 
 Cleanliness 
 
 General advertisement mechanisms used to attract clients and direct clients 
 
 
AOB 
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Appendix 8: Clearance from QMU 
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Appendix 9: Clearance from Makerere University Higher degrees 
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Appendix 10: Clearance Letter from Uganda National Council for Science and 
Technology (UNCST) 
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Appendix 11 : Introduction letter to the district 
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Appendix 12: Timeline for P15 
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Appendix 13: Timeline for P16 
 
Appendix 14: Timeline for P17 
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Appendix 15: Timeline for P20 
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Appendix 16: Timeline for P21 
 
Appendix 17: Timeline for P23 
 
 
